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Abstract 
In this thesis we study the influence of corporate governance on product 
innovation in the machine-tool sector in Italy. The theoretical framework employed 
in the analysis is part of the Systems of Innovation literature. It can be defined as a 
"national-technological system of innovation" type of approach as it distinguishes 
between countries with different systems of corporate governance and between 
sectors that employ different technologies. The main hypothesis is that variations in 
national systems of corporate governance can help to explain national patterns of 
sectoral specialisation. 
The thesis focuses on the Italian National System of Innovation from the 
point of view of its corporate governance. The main characteristics of the system are 
analysed in the first part of the thesis where it is also shown how they can help to 
explain the Italian industrial specialisation. The study proceeds with an application of 
the theoretical framework to the analysis of the machine-tool sector, its technology 
and its historical evolution. A particular focus is put on the decline of the US in the 
sector during the 1970s and 1980s and the corresponding upsurge of Japan. 
The final part of the thesis studies the Italian System of Innovation in the 
machine-tool sector. It highlights that firms are not the only actors in the System and 
that other stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers, play an important part in the 
innovation process. It shows also that the system presents some weaknesses, 
consisting mainly of the lack of financial resources, that need to be resolved. Our 
final argument, supported by an econometric analysis, is that one of the solutions 
suggested by the machine-tool builders association, namely a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions, is not necessarily the best answer. A stronger coordination and 
cooperation among competing and non-competing firms appears to be the most 
incisive solution from the point of view of innovation for this sector. 
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Introduction 
Product innovation is one of the main driving forces of any economic system. 
Recognizing that innovation is not an exogenous phenomenon and that firms play an 
active role in the innovation process has been a fundamental achievement over the 
past century. Unfortunately, an agreement on which firms' characteristics determine 
their innovativeness has yet to be reached. Scale, level of R&D, cash flow, and 
diversification are all factors that have been studied for decades without obtaining 
any definite result. 
In the last ten years a new approach for the study of innovation has emerged. 
Such an approach, known as the Systems of Innovation approach, stresses that firms 
do not innovate in isolation but in conjunction with other actors. Studying the 
characteristics of firms is therefore not sufficient to uncover the main determinants of 
innovation. The focus needs to be widened so as to comprise both the firm and all the 
other actors that are part of the system and that interact with the firm in the process 
of innovation. National, regional and technological systems are now being 
investigated, both with a holistic approach and with a focus on one or few elements of 
the system, such as the financial system, the public sector, the educational system and 
so on. 
Very recently, it has been suggested that the system of corporate governance 
might be one of the most distinguishing features of a System of Innovation. The idea is 
that the system of corporate governance influences the amount of resources being 
spent on innovation and the type and extent of the incentives given to those who can 
contribute to the innovation process. This hypothesis is currently being investigated in 
Europe by two teams of researchers from various European countries. The first team, I 
of which the author of this thesis is part, is co-ordinated by Prof Andrew Tylecote 
from the University of Sheffield. The project and the relative framework are known as 
the COPI (COrporate governance and Product Innovation) project. The second team, 
1 The team members are: Prof. Andrew Tylecote and Mrs. Paulina Ramirez (University of Sheffield); 
Prof. Tom Groot and Mrs. Denise Go-Feij (Vrije University, The Netherlands); Prof. Reinhart Schmidt 
and Miss Birgit Maczulaitis (Martin-Luther University, Germany); Prof. Diana Grosse and Miss Dana 
Fritsch (LS ABWL, Germany); Prof. Pierre Garrouste and Miss Marianne Guyot (GATE -Groupe 
d'Analyse et de Theorie Economoque, France); Prof. Sergio Albertini (University of Udine, Italy); 
Prof. Sten Jonsson, Dr. Gert Sandahl and Mr Zia Mansouri (Gothenburg School of Economics and 
Commercial Law, Sweden). 
with a different framework, is co-ordinated by Prof William Lazonick from INSEAD 
in France. 
This thesis employs the COPI framework to study the influence of corporate 
governance on product innovation in the machine-tool sector in Italy. The choice of 
country is linked to the nationality of the author and to her specialisation. The choice 
of the sector was dictated by its strategic importance within any economy. Machine 
tools are, in fact, essential in the production of any type of innovative machinery, 
which is very often a Significant part of the expenditures that a firm supports for 
innovation. Firms that belong to countries with a strong and innovative machine-tool 
sector can utilise an important source of competitive advantage (the innovative 
machinery) one or two years before their foreign competitors. Understanding what 
factors favour innovation in the machine-tool sector has therefore a great importance 
for the economy of a country, as a whole, not only for the sector itself 
As explained in Chapter 1, according to the COPI framework, not one of the 
systems of corporate governance is the "one best way". Each system presents its 
advantages and disadvantages according to the industrial sector under consideration. 
Such differences would explain the different industrial specialisation of different 
countries. According to the framework, insider systems should perform better in 
sectors characterised by incremental innovation, a low degree of appropriability of 
the returns on investments and a low degree of visibility (i.e. sectors where the type of 
information that flows within firms and towards the markets can be incomplete and 
misleading). Outsider systems, on the contrary, should perform better in sectors 
characterised by radical types of innovation, a high degree of appropriability of the 
returns on investments and a high degree of visibility (i.e. where the flows of 
information are more exhaustive). 
Chapter 2 contains an explanation of the method employed in the thesis. In 
Chapter 3 we study the main characteristics of the Italian system of corporate 
governance, trying to categorise it either as insider or outsider. We study the 
structure of ownership and control, the capital market, the public sector, the labour 
relations' system and the market structure. We also critically assess the recent major 
developments in terms of the capital markets, venture capital market, code of conduct 
for listed firms and so on. A significant transformation of the corporate governance 
system can in fact seriously undermine the competitive advantages of a country's 
industry, leading to a stalemate. 
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According to the framework, it is the technology employed in a particular 
industry that determines what system of corporate governance better delivers 
innovation in that industry. Accordingly in Chapter 4 we analyse the machine-tool 
sector in order to identify its main characteristics and to highlight the main 
requirements in terms of corporate governance. We also employ the COPIframework 
to try and give an explanation for the decline of the US in the machine-tool sector 
during the 1970s and 1980s andfor the upsurge of Japan. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are dedicated to the machine-tool sector in Italy. Chapters 
5 and 6 contain two case studies. The first case study is about an Italian independent 
family-business of a medium scale with its seat in the Veneto region. The second case 
study is about a group of firms with subsidiaries both in Italy and abroad and with 
Headquarters listed on the stock exchange. The case study also contains a 
comparison between the Italian Headquarters and a Swedish subsidiary, with a 
particular focus on the differences in corporate governance. These two case studies 
help to uncover those issues that demand the most attention and that form the basis of 
the study of the machine-tool sector in Italy, which is dealt with in Chapter 7. 
The study uses the COPIframework to point out the strengths and weaknesses 
of the corporate governance system in the System of Innovation of machine-tool 
builders. In addition, it addresses a specific problem, which is whether machine-tool 
builders should merge or become part of groups of firms in order to enhance their 
ability to innovate. This latter possibility has been put forward by UCIMU (the Italian 
association of machine tool builders) as the only way Italian builders can maintain 
their competitiveness and market share. As mentioned above there is not unanimous 
consensus on whether the scale of a firm has any influence on its degree of 
innovativeness. At the end of Chapter 7 an econometric analysis is employed in 
testing whether large firms or groups of firms in this sector have a higher probability 
of innovating. Conclusions and policy propositions follow at the end. 
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1. Corporate governance and product innovation: a 
review of the literature 
"J think there is a world market for maybe five computers. " 
Thomas Watson, chainnan of IBM, 1943. 
"But what .... is it good for?" 
Engineer at the Advanced Computing Systems Division of IBM, 1968, 
commenting on the microchip. 
"Who the hell wants to hear actors talk?" 
H.M. Warner, Warner Brothers, 1927. 
"Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible." 
Lord Kelvin, president, Royal Society, 1895. 
"Drill for oil? You mean drill into the ground to try and find oil? You're 
crazy. " 
Drillers to whom Edwin L Drake tried to enlist for his project to drill for oil 
in 1859. 
"Everything that can be invented has been invented. " 
Charles H. Duel, Commissioner, U.S. Office of Patents, 1899. 
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1.1 Introduction 
These few quotes refer to some of the most spectacular innovations of the last 
150 years or so: the audio system for cinema; the plane; the microchip; the personal 
computer and the idea of drilling into the ground for oil. However, the generation of 
an innovative product is not automatic and, as we can learn from the quotes above, 
very often, those who have a good understanding of a sector might not see the 
revolutionary content of a new idea. 
Innovation is one of the most fundamental components of a capitalist 
economy and achieving the appropriate level and most effective way of spending in 
projects that present the highest potentiality for success is essential to sustained 
economic development. What are then the best conditions to fulfill this goal? What 
should the characteristics of those who are in control be to ensure that the allocation 
of resources follows the correct path? What type of information is needed by the 
financers of innovation to understand the potentialities of the investment projects 
they are asked to finance? What is the best structure of incentives for managers and 
employees to obtain their maximum participation in the innovation process? To 
whom are the returns of investment to be allocated? 
These and other questions will be answered in Section 1.5. There weI will 
introduce the theoretical framework that will be used in the next chapters of this 
thesis to study the Italian system of corporate governance and its role in the 
innovation process within the machine-tool sector. Before proceeding with the 
description of the theoretical framework, however, we will offer a short summary of 
the state of the art on this topic, namely corporate governance and product 
innovation. As the two topics have never been studied together before, we will need 
to present both the summary of the state of the art of innovation (Section 1.2) and 
that of corporate governance (Section 1.3). In Section lA, we will offer a description 
of the various systems of corporate governance and discuss their distinguishing 
characteristics. Finally, in Section 1.6, we will present a comparison of the 
theoretical framework used in this thesis with the theoretical framework suggested by 
I The use of the fIrst person plural might be misleading as the author is part of the COP! project. 
However, unless clearly specifIed, this thesis is entirely the result of the author's work. 
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Prof. Lazonick, the coordinator of the parallel European project on the influence of 
corporate governance on product innovation. 
1.2 Innovation, innovating firm and systems of innovation 
Innovation is the driving force of modern capitalism. Understanding and 
explaining the process of innovation is therefore vital. It is also a very complex and 
articulated problem that needs to be addressed from different angles and at different 
levels of analysis. Since the works of Joseph Schumpeter (1939, 1942), a multitude 
of theories on innovation have been produced, not only within economics and 
management, but also within many other disciplines. A thorough review of the 
literature on innovation is therefore a very challenging task that goes beyond the 
scope of this work. In this section we will therefore concentrate only on those 
approaches to the study of innovation that, we think, can help to better understand 
the theoretical framework employed later in this thesis. 
Studies on innovation can be classified according to the level of analysis 
employed, whether it is the innovation itself, the innovating firm or the overall 
system of innovation. 
The traditional categorization of innovations distinguishes between 
incremental, radical, architectural and component innovations. In addition, it is 
possible to distinguish between competence-enhancing and competence destroying 
innovations. Incremental innovations introduce relatively minor changes to existing 
products, utilise the potential of an established design and often reinforce the 
strengths of established firms. For these reasons, incremental innovations are usually 
considered as competence-enhancing innovations (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) as 
they build on the core competences (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) of the firm. Radical 
innovations, on the contrary, are based on different scientific principles and are 
generally competence-destroying, that is, they destroy the usefulness of the existing 
capabilities of the firm. According to Tushman and Anderson (1997), progress is the 
result of a succession of radical and incremental innovations along so called 
"technology cycles". The latter start with a radical innovation, or technological 
discontinuity. This event is followed by an era of substitution, during which the new 
technology progressively displaces the previous one, and an era of design 
competition, during which several designs based on the new technology exist 
6 
simultaneously. The competition culminates in the appearance of a dominant design, 
which becomes accepted as a standard. Following this is an era of incremental 
change, during which the dominant design is progressively extended and improved 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) and competition is based on market segmentation 
and efficiency. The cycle then starts again with a new technological discontinuity. 
The literature distinguishes also between architectural and component 
innovation (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990). This 
distinction arises from the consideration that any product is composed of a series of 
components and of an architectural design that brings all the components together to 
form a system. "Successful product development requires two types of knowledge. 
First it requires component knowledge, or knowledge about each of the core design 
concepts and the way in which they are implemented in a particular component. 
Second it requires architectural knowledge or knowledge about the ways in which 
the components are integrated and linked together into a coherent whole." 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990, p.3). It follows that component innovations are 
innovations that involve one or more components of a product and leave its 
architectural design untouched. As for architectural innovations, Henderson and 
Clark (1990, p.9) define them as a modification in "the way in which the components 
of a product are linked together, while leaving the core design concepts (and thus the 
basic knowledge underlying the components) untouched [ .. ]. This kind of innovation 
[ .. J destroys the usefulness of a firm's architectural knowledge but preserves the 
usefulness of its knowledge about the product's components." Architectural 
innovations can cause serious problems to firms as they are subtle and difficult to 
recognise and firms very often try to deal with them relying on their existing 
knowledge. On the contrary, this type of innovation requires a different type of 
architectural knowledge, usually accumulated through a different learning path and, 
therefore, a different organisational architecture. In other words, architectural 
innovations are often competence-destroying and require important modifications in 
the learning process of firms, which takes time and large investments of resources. 
Other approaches within the literature on innovation focus on the innovating 
firm (Metcalfe, 2000) and, more specifically, on the availability of resources to 
invest in innovation, on the incentives to make such investments, on the core 
competences of the firm and their effect on innovation and on the capabilities 
managers need to manage the process of innovation. 
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Studies that analyse the relationship between R&D expenditure and firm 
characteristics, such as firm size (see Nelson et aI., 1967; Bound et aI., 1984; Cohen 
et aI., 1987), business unit size (see Cohen et aI., 1987), cash flow (see for example 
Mueller, 1967; Teece and Armour, 1977) and degree of diversification (Nelson, 
1959; Scherer, 1965; Grabowski, 1968), belong to the first group. 
Studies that concentrate on the appropriability conditions belong to the 
second group. As argued by Cohen and Levin (1989, p.226): "to the extent that new 
knowledge is transmitted at relatively low cost from its creator to prospective 
competitors, and particularly to the extent that such knowledge is embodied in new 
processes and products that may be copied or imitated at relatively low cost, 
appropriable rewards may be insufficient to justify innovative effort". This group of 
studies (see Mansfield, 1986; Levin et aI., 1987) show inter-industry differences in 
the appropriability conditions due to a difference in the effectiveness of patents. They 
also show that when patents are not effective, firms tend to rely on other means of 
protection, such as complementary assets, marketing, customer service, complexity 
of the product and secrecy. 
As for the competences of a firm, in line with the literature on the 
characteristics of innovation discussed above, it has been argued that whereas the 
core competences of a firm are one of its main sources of competitive advantage 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) they simultaneously enhance and inhibit development 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). "Core competences need not become core rigidities" 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1997, p.3). Innovations, in fact, necessarily require some 
degree of creative destruction (S chump eter, 1942) and especially when they are 
radical or architectural, they require continuous organisational renewal. It is often 
said that managing a firm through a process of renewal of this type is more difficult 
than managing it through a recession, as it breaks political equilibria, embedded 
competences, cultures and organisational processes. The fourth group of studies, 
therefore, suggests paths that managers could follow to bring their firms from 
strength to strength, through processes of continuous change. For example they stress 
the importance of a deep analysis of existing formal structures and of obtaining the 
cooperation of the employees (Bird and Jelinek, 1990), of leveraging on existing core 
competences (Prahalad, 1993) and of models of congruence (Nadler and Tushman, 
1997). 
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Finally, a new approach to the study of innovation calls the attention to the 
fact that "firms almost never innovate in isolation. In the pursuit of innovation they 
interact with other organisations to gain, develop and exchange various kinds of 
knowledge, information, and other resources. These organisations might be other 
firms (suppliers, customers and other resources) but also universities, research 
institutes, investment banks, schools, government ministries, etc. Through their 
innovative activities, firms often establish relations with each other and other kinds 
of organisations; therefore it does not make sense to regard innovating firms as 
isolated, individual decision-making units" (Edquist, 1997, p.2). This new approach 
is known as the Systems of Innovation approach, and it forms the basis of the 
theoretical framework employed in this thesis. Drawing in large part from the 
evolutionary theories of Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982), knowledge is put at the 
centre of the attention and it is for this reason that the understanding of the process of 
knowledge formation, (i.e. learning), is a fundamental part of this approach. This 
process, as argued by Lundvall (1992, p.1 ),2 "is predominantly an interactive and 
therefore socially embedded process which cannot be understood without taking into 
consideration its institutional and cultural context". The problem is where to lay the 
borders of the context. Some authors believe that the focus should be on a national 
basis. This is for several reasons ranging from market and natural resource 
determinants (similar resource base and similar revenues and consumer tastes); to the 
fact that user-producer collaborations and most of the other types of informal 
collaborations occur more frequently within the national economy than on an 
international level; to the fact that technically-based interdependences are more 
likely to occur within national economies and finally to the role played by the State 
in the direction and rhythm oftechnological innovation (Niosi, et al. 1993). 
Two of the most important and earliest works that adopt the systemic 
approach, namely Lundvall's (1992) National Systems of Innovation: Towards a 
Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning and Nelson's (1993) National 
2 "According to this author's recollections, the fIrst person to use the expression 'National System of 
Innovation' was Bengt-Ake Lundvall and he is also the editor of a highly original and thought-
provoking book (1992) on this subject. However, as he and his colleagues would be fIrst to agree (and 
as Lundvall himself points out) the idea actually goes back at least to Friederich List's conception of 
'The National System of Political Economy' (1841), which might just as well have been called 'The 
National System ofInnovation'" (Freeman, 1995, p.5). 
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Systems of Innovation: A Comparative Study, even if in a different way,3 put the 
boundaries of the system at the national level. Other authors place a major emphasis 
on regional systems of innovation, where regions might cross the national borders or 
be part of a wider national system. For example Hans-Joachim Braczyk, et al. 
(1998), trace the history and the structural characteristics of fourteen regional 
systems of innovation. 
Both of these approaches, however, embrace all the industries existing in a 
specific country or region and do not take into consideration the possible variations 
among industries. The so-called Technological Systems of Innovation CTS) approach, 
instead, defines a system as "a dynamic network of agents interacting in a specific 
economic/industrial area under a particular institutional infrastructure and involved 
in the generation, diffusion, and utilisation of technology" (Carlsson and 
Stankiewick, 1991, p.93). Their focus is therefore on innovations in specific 
technological systems, which differ for economic competences, networks of 
entrepreneurs and institutional infrastructures. In line with this approach, but with 
some differences, is the Sectoral System of Innovation (SIS) approach by Breschi 
and Malerba (1997). According to these authors a SIS "is composed of those firms 
that are active in developing and making a sector's products and in generating and 
utilising a sector's technologies; such a system of firms is related in two different 
ways: through processes of interaction and cooperation in artefact-technology 
development and through processes of competition and selection in innovative and 
market activities" (ibid., 1997, p.l31). Using the authors' words, "the perspective 
offered by SIS is different from the TS notion. While the concept of TS looks at 
networks of vertically integrated as well as horizontally connected agents and 
organisations engaged in the development of specific technologies, the concept of 
SIS focuses on competitive relationships among firms by explicitly considering the 
role of selection environment" (ibid., 1997, p.l31). Breschi and Malerba do not deny 
the importance of institutions but their centre of attention is the firm and its 
relationship with other firms. 
3 Nelson's book focuses mainly on different national R&D systems, whereas Lundvall's book adopts a 
more theoretical approach and each chapter is dedicated to a different aspect of the national system of 
innovation approach, including the relationship between producers and consumers, the fmancial 
system and so on. 
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The theoretical framework that will be used in this thesis was first put 
forward by Tylecote and Conesa (1999), in "Corporate Governance, Innovation 
Systems and Industrial Performance". It can be defined as a "National-Technological 
System of Innovation" as it distinguishes both between nations and between 
industries that employ different technologies. In addition, even if it adopts a systemic 
approach, and tries to point out the main elements influencing innovation for each 
sector (user-producer relationships, flows of information, institutions, educational 
system and so on), it tends to focus on a particular distinguishing aspect of each 
country, namely their system of corporate governance. This is a new line of study 
within the National Systems of Innovation approach4 and it is not certainly reductive 
since, as Edquist (1997) argues, focusing on a single aspect of the system is often 
necessary. "A system of innovation should be looked upon as a 'whole' because 
many of its elements are - more or less closely- related to each other- otherwise, 
there would be no 'system'. But it is also sometimes necessary to deal only with 
parts of the system - one at a time or a few in relation to each other. Hence, it may 
sometimes be necessary to restrict the analysis to various subsystems of a system of 
innovation. To divide the complex 'whole' into pieces [ .. J it is sometimes useful -
and sometimes even a necessary way of understanding and creating theories about 
the relations between various parts or 'elements' involved in the process of 
technological and organisational change. In other words, a study limited to, for 
example, the financing of innovation is not necessarily reductionism" (ibid., 1995, 
p.1S). 
Before focusing on the framework, in the next few sections we will offer 
some background on the state of the art of corporate governance. 
1.3 Theories of corporate governance 
Since the classical work by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, studies on corporate governance have 
dealt with ways of aligning the interests of a self-interested management and weak 
and dispersed shareholders. Berle and Means, in fact, draw attention to the 
prevalence of widely held corporations in the US, which are characterised by a 
4 The only other author that studies systems of corporate governance and innovation is Lazonick 
(1998). See also Soskice (1997) for a similar approach. 
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separation between ownership and control. They pointed out that by the end of 1929, 
an identifiable individual or compact group of individuals held a majority of the 
equity in as few as 11 % of the 200 largest industrial corporations. For about half the 
companies, the dispersion of ownership was so high that the managements of these 
companies were said to have total control over them and were not held accountable 
to any particular owner or other stakeholder. With respect to such evidence, studies 
on corporate governance have tried to answer three main questions: "How do the 
suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they 
make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply, or invest it in bad 
projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers?" (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997, p.737). These questions are intrinsic to the so-called contractual view of the 
firm.5 The financers rely on the managers' specialized human capital to obtain 
returns on their funds and the managers need the financers' funds to make 
investments in the firm. The two groups of individuals sign a contract that indicates 
what the managers can do with the funds and how the returns to the investments are 
to be divided between the two groups. 
However, as most future contingencies are too difficult to describe and 
foresee, complete contracts are "technologically unfeasible" (ibid., 1997, p.741). 
Those rights not indicated in the contract are defined as residual rights and in a large 
publicly held corporation, the residual control rights and the residual income rights 
are usually unbundled. The management is assigned the first group of rights and the 
shareholders the second group. Having the residual income rights means that the 
shareholders are the residual claimants or, in other words, that they get what is left 
after all the expenses are paid. Therefore, maximising their return is the same as 
maximising the total wealth created by the firm.6 Managers are therefore supposed to 
use their residual control rights to allocate resources to those investments that 
maximise the return to the shareholders. This approach is defined as the financial 
perspective of corporate governance. 
Empirical evidence suggests that managers tend to pursue their own interests 
instead of those of the shareholders and companies and, therefore, very often get 
away with lacklustre performance. The possibility of poor business performance due 
5 See Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983 a,b). 
6 Other approaches to what the underlying goal of a company should be are presented in the following 
sections. 
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to the separation of ownership and control had already been anticipated by Adam 
Smith in his famous book, The Wealth of Nations. There he wrote: "The directors of 
such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of 
their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own" (Smith, 1976, p.233). The separation of ownership and control, in 
fact, gives rise to particular types of costs defined as "agency costs" which comprise 
both the costs resulting from managers misusing their position and the costs of 
monitoring and disciplining them. The fundamental problem dealt with in corporate 
governance debates is concerned with the most effective ways of reducing agency 
costs and aligning the interests of managers to those of shareholders. 
Since the introduction of the "improved management hypothesis" by Manne 
in 1965, the market for corporate control (often referred to as the takeover market) 
has been considered a powerful instrument for disciplining managers. For example 
Herzel and Shepro (1990, p.3) state, "the most compelling argument in favour of 
hostile takeovers is that they are an important discipline on the managements of 
likely target companies". According to this hypothesis, takeovers allow the transfer 
of control from inefficient management teams to more efficient ones and therefore 
should encourage the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. 
Managers are in fact threatened by the possibility of a takeover and this keeps them 
from abusing their power or misusing company resources. When a management team 
is not successful or does not pursue the maximisation of the shareholders' value, the 
stock price of their firm falls, reflecting the mismanagement. This attracts buyers 
who acquire the firm to change the managers and correct the abuses. The empirical 
evidence, however, does not seem to support this view. In 1996 Franks and Mayer 
examined the relationship between hostile takeovers, dismissal of management and 
poor prior performance. Even if they found evidence of high board turnover and 
restructuring after the takeovers, they found very little evidence of poor performance 
prior to bids and "reject the view that hostile takeovers perform a disciplinary role" 
(ibid., 1996, p.164). 
The attention has also been focused on the role played by the board of 
directors as disciplining mechanism. "In principle, the board of directors is the single 
most important corporate governance mechanism" (Blair, 1995, p.77). In the US and 
in the UK this body is very powerful, having the right of hiring and firing the 
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executive directors and of performing numerous functions. There are, however, quite 
a number of factors that hinder the effectiveness of this body as a monitoring and 
disciplining device. First, it does not appear to have a sufficient degree of 
independence, as, very frequently, (at least in the US) the CEO serves as the 
chairman, and board members other than the chairman are part of the management 
team.7 Second, "even if shareholders elect the board, directors need not necessarily 
represent their interests" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.751). In fact, it is usually very 
difficult for the shareholders to remove a board member and to vote for somebody 
other than those suggested by the directors themselves (which basically means by the 
management). For these reasons, much of the debate is centred on questions about 
the best composition of the board, the rules of its functioning and the interests it 
should serve to transform it into an effective and independent monitoring and 
disciplining instrument.s One widely accepted proposal is to include a majority of 
outside directors on the boards. It appears that the presence of non-executive 
directors on the board favours the replacement of inefficient managers (Franks, 
Mayer and Renneboog, 1996). "Performance measures are more highly correlated 
with CEO turnover for firms in which outsiders dominate the boards of directors than 
for firms in which insiders dominate. Outsider-dominated boards tend to add to firm 
value through CEO changes" (Weisbach, 1988, pA58). In the US, proposals of 
reform of the board of directors also include a reduction in its size and the 
establishment of special committees that should allow the directors to specialise in 
specific areas and to be able to take effective decisions.9 
As mentioned above, when the shares are highly dispersed, there is little 
incentive for each minority shareholder to exercise control and exit appears to be the 
cheapest option. This free-rider problem can be mitigated by the presence of large 
shareholders. "When control rights are concentrated in the hands of a small number 
of investors with a collectively large cash flow stake, concerted action by investors is 
much easier than when control rights, such as votes are split among many of them. 
[ .. J A substantial minority shareholder has the incentive to collect information and 
monitor the management thereby avoiding the traditional free-rider problem. He also 
has enough voting control to put pressure on the management in some cases or 
7 See Mace (1971) and Jensen (1993). 
8 See for example Weisbach (1988), Fama (1980) and the Cadbury Committee (1992). 
9 See Blair (1995, p. 77-82). 
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perhaps even to oust the management through a proxy fight or a takeover" (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997, p.753-754). At the same time, however, there is also evidence that 
the presence of large shareholders bears consistent costs. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
indicate two main types of costs arising from the presence of a large shareholder. 
Firstly, large shareholders are not diversified and as a consequence bear excessive 
risk. Secondly, while using their control rights to maximise their own welfare, large 
shareholders can redistribute wealth from other shareholders and stakeholders. Such 
expropriation can take several forms. For example it can be a straightforward 
expropriation, when the large shareholder treats himself preferentially at the expense 
of the other stakeholders. It can also have direct negative effects on the performance 
of the firm, when it negatively influences the incentives of managers and employees 
to invest in their human capital or when it hinders the possibility of rising external 
sources of finance. 
Consistent with this VIew, several studies not only show that in some 
countries (those where there is a lower legal protection of the minority shareholders) 
shares with superior voting rights trade at a much higher price,1O but also that 
concentration of ownership has a positive effect on the profitability of firms only up 
to a certain level. ll Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.759) interpret the latter 
phenomenon as follows: "Consistent with the role of incentives in reducing agency 
costs, performance improves with higher manager and large shareholder ownership 
at first. However, as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain 
nearly full control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private 
benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders". 
The debate about the role played by large shareholders III the corporate 
governance of firms has become much more lively in the last decade. This is mainly 
because a rapidly increasing body of studies12 shows clearly that companies with a 
widely dispersed ownership are very rare in most countries and that a large majority 
of firms in the world, even when listed, have a dominant owner. For example, La 
Porta, et al. (1998b) studying the 20 largest traded companies in 27 different 
countries conclude that considering "the Berle and Means corporation as the 
10 See for example Zingales (1994) for Italy. 
11 See Mork et aL (1988), Stulz (1988) and Wruck (1989). 
12 See for example Eisenberg (1976), Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lebn (1985), Shleifer and Visbny 
(1986). Country specific studies are those by Franks and Mayer (1994) for Germany; Berg16f and 
Perotti (1994) for Japan; Barca (1995) for Italy and La Porta, et al. (1998b) for developing countries. 
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dominant ownership structure in the world is misleading" (ibid., p.19). Instead, 
controlling shareholders -usually the State or families- are present in most large 
companies, not only as shareholders with strong control rights but also as managers. 
For this reason, they argue, the "theory of corporate finance relevant for most 
countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders 
with large equity stakes to pursue strategies that benefit them at the expense of the 
minority shareholders. Unlike the case of managers with limited ownership interests, 
the problem of expropriation of minorities becomes much more central than that of 
empire building" (ibid., 1998b, p.6). 
Another question on the agenda of the corporate governance debate, 
especially in the US, is that of finding what type of large shareholder would best 
solve the myopia problems that according to some authors appear to affect the long-
term investment capacity of American firms. Those who sustain this idea argue that 
for several reasons, American managers are encouraged to focus on short-term 
performance, and, as a consequence, often sacrifice the long-term performance. 13 
Among the reasons there are: the high cost of capital, which shortens the time 
horizons for investment; 14 the trading activities of portfolio managers, who are 
mainly rewarded on a quarterly basis for their performance; and the fact that 
portfolio managers do not have the time or resources to learn the details about the 
investment programs of hundreds of companies and therefore they make judgments 
on the basis of measures of synthesis. 
According to those who adopt this approach, institutional investors and 
pension funds in particular could "fix the governance system" (Blair, 1995, p.145). 
Until the late 1980s, the idea was that the most evolved financial and corporate 
governance system was the American one, with its fragmented financial institutions, 
liquid markets and highly regulated disclosure of information. All the other systems 
were expected to converge sooner or later to this highly efficient system. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, increasing evidence had shown that Japan and Germany had 
set up systems of corporate governance that could spur investments and create wealth 
as well as or even better than the American one. In particular, it seemed that an 
essential difference was the presence, in those countries, of powerful financial 
13 See Blair (1995) for a survey on the market myopia hypothesis. See Demirag (1998) for a series of 
contributions on short-termism in various countries. 
14 See Jacobs (1991). 
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institutions able to perform a critical governance function that appeared to be missing 
in the American systemY The idea that a "relationship type of investing",16 would 
solve some of the corporate governance problems and the business myopia in the US 
has progressively become more widespread in the last 5 to 8 years. In particular, it 
seems that pension funds would be the best partners for a long-term relationship. As 
reported by Blair (1995), these financial institutions differ in several ways from the 
Wall Street money managers. Firstly they have predictable inflows and outflows, 
which means that liquidity is not as important for them. Secondly, some of the 
pension funds have become so large that they cannot easily buy and sell large stakes 
in individual companies without the risk of destabilising the market. Finally, as their 
portfolios are very diversified they are likely to have shares in both sides involved in 
a transaction and therefore would oppose transactions that did not create an overall 
positive value. 
Notwithstanding the differences between the financial and the business 
myopia perspectives, it is possible to find a common denominator, namely the belief 
that the firm has to be run in order to maximise shareholders' value. There is, 
however, a different perspective according to which the firm has responsibilities also 
towards other stakeholders. This approach, usually referred to as stakeholder 
perspective, takes several forms. Some authors 17 propose that it is in the interests of 
the shareholders to take into account the interests of the other stakeholders in the 
firms as this would enhance the their own wealth. Other authors argue: "the interests 
of the stakeholders are of intrinsic value. That is, each group of stakeholders merits 
consideration for its own sake and not merely because of its ability to further the 
interests of some other group, such as the shareowners" (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995, p.67). According to this perspective, all the persons or groups who participate 
in an enterprise do so to obtain some benefits and none of these stakeholders have 
prima facie priority over the others. But in illustrating their model they also add: "all 
the stakeholder relationships are depicted in the same size and shape and are 
equidistant from the 'black box' of the firm in the centre" (ibid., 1995, p.68). This 
15 See next section for a thorough description of the differences between the insider and outsider 
systems. 
16 That is "a situation in which the investing institution is responsibly engaged in overseeing the 
management of the company, rather than remaining detached or passive, and is committed to the 'long 
term'" (Blair, 1995, p. 172). 
17 See for example Clarkson (1994). 
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statement indicates how the sustainers of the stakeholder perspective (as much as 
those of the financial perspective) are totally concerned on how the returns to 
investment have to be divided between various constituencies but do not pay any 
attention to how the system of corporate governance actually influences the 
functioning of the "black box". A good system of corporate governance, in fact, is 
the one that ensures that the available funds are invested in the best possible way so 
as to maximise the overall wealth. A good system of corporate governance is one that 
is generated once the "black box" has been opened, and once the functioning of firms 
has been understood. It is built in order to ensure that those who could better enhance 
the total wealth of a firm have the proper incentives to do so. 
A step in this direction was taken for the first time by Blair in her book 
Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century (1995), and even better in her book Wealth Creation and Wealth Sharing 
(1996). In these two books, the author calls attention to the fact that other 
stakeholders, apart from the shareholders, bear some risk in being part of a firm. The 
author argues that the employees invest in specific human capital that cannot be 
fruitfully employed in another firm. Such investment would be largely lost in case of 
dismissal or if the firm shuts down. "By firm-specific human capital we mean skills 
or knowledge or networks of personal relationships that are specialised to a given 
enterprise and are more valuable in that enterprise than they would be in alternative 
uses. Unlike generic human capital skills that I could take with me to another job or 
another firm, firm-specific human capital comprises skills that we have or routines or 
relationships that have developed that are of much less value outside the service of a 
particular employer" (Blair, 1996, p.8). It has been calculated that, at least in the US, 
as much as 10 to 15 percent of total compensation of employees represents a reward 
for firm-specific skills. According to Margaret Blair, that percentage can be 
considered as a surplus generated by the firm that is being paid to the employees for 
their bearing a risk in the company. However, this surplus is treated as an economic 
cost in the current accountancy regime. At the same time, if the company is under 
financial pressure, the employees can be laid off and lose their investment (as much 
as the shareholders). "Hence employees with firm-specific skills not only share in the 
real economic residual of the firm; they also, necessarily, share in the residual risk 
associated with the firm. If Topel's estimates are even close, the value of the rents 
that employees have at risk in the typical large corporation is, in the aggregate, 
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roughly the same order of magnitude as the value of the stake that shareholders 
have,,18 (ibid., 1996, p.ll). Therefore "under prevailing labour relations practices in 
this country, maximising share value is a dangerously incomplete performance 
standard for corporations. [ .. J Because of this, we believe management and directors 
should focus on maximising the total wealth-creating potential of the firm, not just 
on maximising the value of the stake held by shareholders" (ibid., 1996, p.13). If this 
is not understood, one thing that could happen, according to Blair, is that "we will 
find changes going on in which firm-specific human capital is used less because of 
the contracting problems. When we look around at companies and see that they are 
laying people off and then hiring them back as subcontractors, we can surmise that 
those companies have decided that former employees' skills are not firm-specific; 
they are generic, and they might as well transact their business at arm's length. They 
don't have any particularly compelling reason to be in an employer-employee 
relationship. This may work fine for some types of tasks. But there may be other 
tasks where it is really important to build teams of people who develop firm-specific 
skills and relationships and who are committed to the enterprise. The problem is that, 
in the effort to achieve efficiencies in the category of tasks that do not require firm-
specific skills, we may be undermining the social mechanisms we once had for 
fostering and protecting firm-specific skills in those tasks where they are still 
important" (ibid., 1996, p.48). In other words, if the legislation and the accountancy 
regime are not changed so as to take into account the rents that the employees are 
putting at risk when they are investing in firm-specific human capital, employees will 
stop investing in that highly valuable human capital and firms will lose a very 
important resource, which is essential in order to keep their competitive position. 
The contribution by Blair has the advantage to try to look inside the firm and 
at how the surplus is generated. However, she does not analyse the role played by 
technological change in contemporary capitalism and the influence of different 
governance systems on such technological change. This is very well done by 
Tylecote and Conesa (1999). Adopting a rather broad definitionL9 of corporate 
governance, they suggest that different governance systems present different degrees 
18 "Topel reviewed a large sample of workers who had lost their jobs through business closings or 
layoffs in the mid-1980s and found that, on average, these workers earned about 14 percent less on 
their next jobs." (Blair, 1995, p.265). 
19 "Corporate governance is the system by which companies are controlled, directly or indirectly, by 
shareholders and other stakeholders" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.25). 
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of effectiveness in delivering innovations according to the sector in consideration and 
that these differences help explaining national patters of sectorial specialisation. 
According to the authors, industrial sectors differ in the intensity of three main 
factors characterising innovation, namely visibility (how easy is it for someone who 
is not directly involved in managing the development of a new product or process to 
judge what resources are being devoted to it and how well they are being spent), 
appropriability (the facility to ensure the returns of an innovation) and novelty 
(measured by the rate of technological change in the sector). Systems of corporate 
governance appear to differ in their ability to cope with problems ansmg m 
connection to these factors. 
A thorough description of this theoretical framework will be offered in 
Section 1.5. However, a good understanding of it requires the knowledge of the main 
differences among systems of corporate governance. For this reason, Section 1.4 
contains a categorisation of the various existing systems of corporate governance, 
with particular reference to the most famous distinction between outsider- and 
insider-dominated systems. 
1.4 Systems of corporate governance 
The most widely accepted distinction among systems of corporate 
governance is the one offered by Franks and Mayer (1992) between outsider (or 
arm's length) and insider (or control-oriented) systems. In the former systems firms 
are directly controlled by their managers but indirectly controlled through the market 
for corporate control, by their shareholders, mainly institutions that trade and invest 
on the Stock Exchange. In the second systems, the ownership tends to be rather 
concentrated and several subjects other than the shareholders have the power to 
influence the management of a firm, such as banks, the state, the employees, the 
customers and so on. 
As is shown m Table 1.1, the two systems present numerous other 
differences. In outsider systems, the degree of concentration of ownership is very 
low, investors tend to have a portfolio orientation and as a consequence the share of 
control-oriented finance is low. A large number of firms are listed on the stock 
exchange, which guarantees a high degree of liquidity. Firms are generally controlled 
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by their managers and this usually induces agency conflicts between ~em and the 
shareholders. 
Table 1.1 Corporate governance systems 
Type of financial system 
Control-oriented Arm's-length 
(insider) (outsider) 
Share of control-oriented finance High Low 
Financial markets Small, less liquid Large, highly liquid 
Share of firms listed on exchanges Small Large 
Ownership of debt and equity Concentrated Dispersed 
Investor orientation Control-oriented Portfolio-oriented 
Use ofmechanisrns for separating Frequent Limited (often by regulation) 
control and capital base 
Dominant agency conflict Controlling vs. minority Shareholders vs. management 
shareholders 
Role of the board of directors Limited Important 
Role of hostile takeovers Very limited Potentially important 
.. Source: Berglof (1997) . 
The market for capital control operating over the public stock exchanges is an 
essential mechanism for the substitution of inefficient management. The role of the 
board of directors is very important and the use of mechanisms for separating control 
and capital base are limited, often by regulation. 
On the other hand, in insider systems, ownership is usually rather 
concentrated in the hands of majority shareholders who play an active role in the 
control of the firm. As a consequence, financial markets are rather illiquid and hostile 
takeovers are infrequent. Opportunities for diversification are much lower than in 
outsider systems and the use of mechanisms for separating ownership from control 
are very frequent. Conflicts of interest arise between majority and minority 
shareholders and, especially when the legal system does not properly protect the 
latter, "in the process of using his control rights to maximise his own welfare, the 
large investors can redistribute wealth - in both efficient and inefficient ways - from 
others" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.758). Finally the number of firms listed on the 
stock exchange is rather low. 
The US and the UK are typical outsider systems whereas all the Continental 
European countries and the whole of East Asia present an insider type of corporate 
governance. It is possible, however, to make further distinctions within each of these 
systems. In fact, even if the US and the UK are both outsider systems, the UK 
presents a much higher stock market capitalisation relative to national income and 
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much higher importance of pension funds on the stock market. On the other hand, 
recalling Tylecote and Con~sa (1999), in the US a large fraction of firms are not 
listed on the stock exchange and, for this reason they can be assumed to have an 
insider type of control. In addition, a large part of non-listed and newly listed firms 
are supported by venture capitalists, who usually use their stakes to exercise control 
over the companies they have invested in. 
As for the insider systems, it is possible to further distinguish between them 
according to the role played by employees, by families and by the state. 
Alan Fox (1974) distinguishes between countries with high and low trust 
industrial relations. Firms in countries belonging to the first group, such as Germany, 
the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and Japan, regard employees as important 
stakeholders and take care of their interests in the formulation of their strategies. In 
the other group of countries, which comprises France and the Mediterranean 
countries, there are low-trust industrial relations and the state in general intervenes 
by legislation to safeguard their by interests restricting the right to dismiss. 
Also, France and the Mediterranean countries differ in several ways. For 
example, whereas in the former, one of the most important shareholders is the State, 
in most of the latter countries and especially in (Northern) Italy firms are held and 
managed by families with a strong aversion to mergers and the presence of network 
of firms based on trust. 
1.5 Corporate governance, innovation systems and industrial 
performance 
As mentioned in Section 1.2, the theoretical framework adopted in this work 
is a "National- Technological System of Innovation" type of approach. According to 
the framework, different industries differ in the degree of visibility, appropriability 
and novelty of innovation. Systems of corporate governance and financial systems 
appear to differ in their ability to cope with these characteristics, which, in tum, 
affects the sectoral specialisation of a country. 
The three variables are not novel and they are essentially a combination of 
existing literature and studies on innovation. In particular, as it will be shown, they 
draw strongly from the literature on innovation recalled in the first few paragraphs of 
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Section 1.2. The uniqueness and the novelty of the framework involves considering 
all these aspects together in relation to the system of corporate governance. 
Table 1.2 Summary of the possible cases 
Visibility Appropriability Novelty 
High Low High Low High Low 
Requirements High Low High firm- Low firm- Inclusion of in terms of Shareholders Industry- industry-
specific specific the 
corporate first strategy specific specific perceptiveness perceptiveness stakeholders governance expertise expertise 
1.5.1 The degree of visibility 
The visibility of innovation measures "how easy is it for someone who is not 
closely involved in managing the development of a new product or process, to judge 
what resources are being devoted to it and how well they are being spent" (Tylecote 
and Conesa, 1999, p.2S). 
Table 1.3 Average percentage distribution of innovation costs of Italian innovating firms by 
item 
Design, Acquisition 
R&D engineering and Innovative Marketing of patents pre-production capital goods and 
developments licences 
Supplier dominated 
Clothing 16.5 36.2 27.1 18.9 1.3 
Leather and footwear 15.5 17 63.4 2.8 1.3 
Wood products 9.7 10.2 78.1 1.3 0.7 
Specialised supplier 
Machine-tools 47.6 27.6 22.2 2.1 0.5 
Industrial machinery 38.9 31.1 24.8 2.3 2.9 
Instruments 54 21.3 21.3 2 1.4 
Scale intensive 
Basic industrial 47.3 6.4 45 0.8 0.5 
chemicals 
Domestic appliances 27.2 14.7 54.1 l.l 2.9 
Motor vehicles 37.8 4 58.1 0.1 
Science based 
Pharmaceuticals 66.7 8.7 18 2.1 4.5 
Office machinery and 
computers 64.8 21.7 12.4 
0.1 
Radio, TV and 
communication 66.1 18.2 l3.7 1.2 0.8 
eguipment 
Source: ISTAT (l995:Table 11). 
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The level of visibility of an industry is influenced by several factors. A first 
and important one is the level of spending on physical capital as opposed to low 
visibility activities like production and marketing (See Table 1.3). In fact, as 
suggested by Tylecote and Conesa (1999) spending on physical capital and, 
depending on the accounting regime, also some elements of R&D expenditures are 
capitalised in the accounts and therefore not subtracted from profit. On the other 
hand, it is much more difficult for someone who is not directly involved in the 
innovation process to control whether higher expenses in production or marketing are 
justified or only due to inefficiency. 
There are several other factors that deeply influence the visibility of 
innovation, such as the level of centralisation of the innovative activity (which is 
easier for basic and applied research and more difficult for development); the degree 
of codifiability of the knowledge involved in the innovation process; the importance 
of economies of scale and therefore the firms' average size; the distance in space, the 
hierarchical and cultural distances between those who have direct responsibility for 
and direct knowledge of the conduct of the process of innovation and those who have 
control over the provision of finance; finally the distance in time between the 
expenditures for innovation, the market launch and the financial payoff. 
Industries vary greatly in the degree of visibility of their innovative activities. 
In general, industries characterised by more frequent incremental and component 
innovations present a much lower degree of visibility. This is because incremental 
and component innovations are based on the core capabilities of a firm, which are in 
large part tacit types of knowledge and, therefore very difficult to assess by an 
outsider. On the contrary, architectural and radical innovations often require a deep 
process of codification of the tacit knowledge in order to carry out the essential 
organisational reengineering. For example engineering industries are characterised 
by relatively higher spending in the low visibility areas of development, design and 
engineering. The process of innovation is generally decentralised and the low 
effectiveness of patents (See Table 1.5) requires the maintenance of a high level of 
secrecy, which inevitably reduces the degree of visibility. Other industries such as 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals exhibit a higher visibility. As shown in Table 1.3, the 
share of spending in highly visible activities (mainly R&D and fixed capital) is very 
high. Moreover, as illustrated in Table 1.4, both of the industries present a relatively 
large proportion of spending in the areas of basic and applied research. Moreover, for 
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the chemical sector, Moretti (1999) reports that the degree of cultural distance on 
average appears to be low and the degree of codifiability and the effectiveness of 
patenting are definitely high. As for the pharmaceutical sector Ramirez and Tylecote 
(1999) report that firms regularly display their expenditures on capital, R&D and 
marketing; the research and specially the development processes are extremely 
regulated20 and generally very centralised; and the final product embodies a high 
degree of codified knowledge. 
Table 1.4 Distribution of R&D activity in 1985, UK 
Sector Basic Applied Development Total 
research research 
Mechanical engineering 35.4 20.8 43.8 100 
Motor vehicles and other transport 29.2 20.5 50.3 100 
equipment 
Electrical and electronic engineering 29.3 24.9 45.8 100 
Aerospace 36.6 17.3 46.1 100 
Office machinery 0.8 24.4 74.8 100 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 30.4 54.7 14.9 100 
Food, drink and tobacco 48.2 38.6 13.2 100 
Source: Doudeyns and Hayman (1993). 
When the degree of visibility is low, an observer must be very perceptive "in 
order to judge whether the firm should be funded, and to monitor progress. In 
general, this perceptiveness needs to be firm-specific - the closer the acquaintance 
with that particular firm, the better; although no doubt a general knowledge of the 
industry will help too" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.27). Therefore, according to 
this theoretical framework, systems of corporate governance where insiders play an 
important role such as the German and the Italian ones will have an advantage in low 
visibility industries over outsider types of systems such as the American and British 
ones. On the other hand, in high visibility industries, such as chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, the German and Italian high firm-specific perceptiveness becomes 
redundant and all other things being equal, outsider systems present an advantage 
over the insider ones (see Section 1.5.3 for a thorough discussion on this topic). 
20 During the development process companies have to provide data and information to the regulatory 
authorities. 
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1.5.2 The degree of appropriability 
As mentioned also in Section 1.2, the appropriability of innovation refers to 
the level of appropriation of the returns on investment by those who provide capital. 
Arrow (1962) suggests that the production of new economic knowledge suffers from 
several causes of market failure one of which is its public nature, which means that it 
"inevitably involves spillovers to others besides the shareholders such as the 
employees and the customers/suppliers" (Arrow, 1962, p.10). This phenomenon is 
therefore extremely acute when instruments of appropriation such as patenting are 
not very effective and secrecy becomes more important, when innovation "requires 
and involves a large element of cumulative learning on the shop floor,,21 (Tylecote 
and Conesa, 1999, p.28) as in the object-oriented industries22 and, finally, when it 
"requires and involves close contact with suppliers or customers" (ibid. p.28). 
The concept of appropriability, especially with reference to the employees, is 
strictly connected with the various types of innovation described in Section 1.2. In 
fact, in sectors characterised by infrequent competence-destroying innovations and 
frequent competence-enhancing innovations, the importance of the core competences 
will be higher and the appropriability with respect to the employees will be lower. 
On the other hand, in sectors characterised by frequent competence-destroying 
innovations, the firm will need to frequently renew its core competences, which will 
often require a change in a large part of its workforce. 
Again, it is possible to distinguish between industries with a low level of 
appropriability such as engineering and industries with a high level of 
appropriability such as the chemical and pharmaceutical ones. The former group is 
in fact based on object-oriented technology (with a heavy demand of accumulation 
of skills on the shop floor and importance of core competences) and it is 
21 In sectors characterised by infrequent competence-destroying innovations (see Section 1.2), and 
frequent competence-enhancing innovations, the importance of the core competences will be higher 
and the appropriability with respect to the employees will be lower. 
22 Itami (1994) suggests that when the technology is object-oriented, or in other words, when it is 
aimed at producing a fixed object like in the steel and automobile industries, the importance of the 
accumulation of skills on the shop floor is much higher than when the technology is function-oriented 
that is, when it is aimed at producing something "with a fixed and targeted function, like a chemical to 
provide a certain reaction or a computer software to provide a certain information processing 
function" (ibid., p.5). 
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characterised by a need for close long-term inter-firm relationships due to the use of 
components and other sub-systems supplied by other firms. In addition, as mentioned 
before, means of appropriation such as patenting do not seem to be as effective as in 
other sectors and firms tend to rely more on secrecy. On the other hand, chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals are based on a function-oriented technology and the use of 
patents appears to be essential in the innovation process23 (See Table 1.5). At the 
same time, however, within engineering there are sectors, such as electronics, 
characterised by a high level of change of the key technologies, for which, as 
suggested by Tylecote and Conesa (1999, p.29) it can be assumed that the 
relationships with suppliers and customers need to change very rapidly, "in an almost 
kaleidoscopic way". On the other hand, within chemicals it is necessary to 
distinguish between volumes chemicals,24 "where one may expect to find arms-
length relationships with customers", chemicals effects,25 "where the needs of 
particular customers are likely to be of importance and CLIR (close long-term inter-
firm relationships) therefore seem likely to be helpful" and pharmaceuticals and 
agro-chemicals, "where the customers are too numerous for CLIR to be relevant, and 
relationships upstream are rather unimportant" (ibid., p.29). 
Table 1.5 Inventions that would not have been developed in the absence of patent protection (%) 
Sectors 
Electrical equipment 
Machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Fabricated metal products 
Instruments 
Office equipment 
Primary metals 
Rubber 
Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Source: Mansfield (1986). 
Number of inventions 
11 
17 
o 
12 
1 
o 
1 
o 
38 
60 
According to Tylecote and Conesa (1999) there are two polar approaches that 
can be used and that present different degrees of efficiency according to the level of 
23 See Archibugi and Pianta (1996). 
24 Bulk steel, glass production, etc. 
25 Paints, adhesives etc. 
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appropriability. When it is high, such as in the chemicals and pharmaceutical 
industries, the best strategy seems to be the shareholders first and last, where "the 
only stakeholders whose interests are considered are the shareholders. Accordingly, 
it is only them (or management on their behalf) who provide the resources for the 
innovation. Strategies of innovation and means of appropriation are chosen to 
maximise shareholders return" (ibid. p.27). On the other hand, when the degree of 
appropriability is low and there are many spillovers to others such as employees, 
suppliers and customers, the best strategy seems to be that of constructing some kind 
of coalition with the other beneficiaries of the innovation who therefore tum out to 
be included. 
1.5.3 The novelty of innovation 
The novelty of innovation indicates the extent to which an innovation requires 
"radically new means of development or production, and/or radically new markets or 
selling methods" (ibid., 1999, p.30). The degree of novelty of a particular industry 
therefore synthesises types of information such as the degree to which technological 
change is characterised by a recurrent or, unusual but ongoing, radical break with the 
past (for example the speed at which new technologies are being integrated into the 
industry's dominant processes and products, the introduction of new materials); the 
experience of fundamental changes in the nature or the behaviour of the market 
which affects the way technological processes are carried out (for example in 
defence electronics, the market is now shrinking and firms are more subject to 
normal costs and market disciplines encouraging a more active search for civil uses 
for technologies of defence origin); the occurrence of important changes in the 
methods of appropriation such as the shift in the software industry from copyright to 
patenting and so on. 
Referring to the characteristics of innovation introduced in Section 1.2, a 
sector is considered to have a high degree of novelty when the design discontinuities 
are very frequent, the technological cycles are very short and most of the innovations 
in the sector are competence-destroying. Moreover, the degree of novelty will be 
very high also if the innovations are not radical, but architectural or component, as 
long as the firm needs a profound organisational renewal and the development of 
new learning paths. 
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As reported by Tylecote and Conesa (1999) sectors such as electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and part of chemicals, present a much higher degree of novelty than 
the engineering industries in general (which however, have undergone quite 
important changes with the invention of NC26 and CNC27 machine-tools and the 
introduction of CAD28 and CAM29 technologies). 
When the degree of novelty is high, what is needed is not the firm-specific 
perceptiveness of the insiders but a different type of knowledge that Tylecote and 
Conesa (1999, p.30) define as industry-specific expertise, "that is a good 
understanding of what is happening in the relevant technologies and markets across 
the sector". When the degree of novelty is very high, new start-up firms might have 
an advantage as they do not have anything to unlearn. These firms will not have 
financers with a good firm-specific perceptiveness, as this requires time. They will 
therefore need someone within the system with access to capital who has a high level 
of industry-specific expertise. "That capital should then be put into selected firms -
all or most of it as equity, and the industry-specific expert should take a hand in 
corporate governance in at least the early stages of the firm's development. This is 
'venture capital'. The requirement for established firms is not dissimilar: industry-
specific expertise will allow a shareholder or other stakeholder to judge the firm's 
current plans and projects and organisation against what appears appropriate now in 
the industry - whatever the firm's track record" (ibid. p.36). 
Insider systems, with their coalitions of stakeholders, tend to be characterised 
by conservatism and continuity, which might be of danger and might pose serious 
restrictions on innovation. 
1.5.4 Systems of corporate governance in terms of industry-specific 
expertise, firm-specific perceptiveness and strategy of appropriation 
As mentioned above, the most important distinction between systems of 
corporate governance is between insider and outsider systems. 
26 Numerical controls. 
27 Computer numerical controls. 
28 Computer aided design. 
29 Computer aided manufacturing. 
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The insider shareholders (family members, banks or other firms) and the 
powerful stakeholders (employees, customers and suppliers) characterising the 
former systems are expected to present a good degree ofjirm-specific perceptiveness 
and as a consequence to deal well with low visibility activities. In addition, the 
presence of included stakeholders should allow coping with innovative activities 
characterised by low appropriability. At the same time, the presence of these same 
powerful stakeholders and of coalitions among them introduces some degree of 
conservatism and organisational slack within firms, which, therefore, will pose 
difficulties in innovating in sectors characterised by a high degree of novelty. 
On the contrary, outsider systems present a comparative advantage in high 
novelty sectors. In fact, in outsider systems, managers "can force through changes 
which employees might resist" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.35), and, as they are 
under constant pressure in various markets, they are also driven to the maximum 
efficiency. Certainly, firms in outsider systems need the support of financers with a 
high degree of industry-specific expertise to be successfully innovative. In this 
respect, US institutional investors appear to be more prepared than the British ones.30 
This could be one of the reasons behind the observed superiority of the US over the 
UK in sectors characterized by the highest degree of novelty. At the same time, 
outsider systems, with their outsider shareholders and arm's length type of 
relationships with the major stakeholders, will have a comparative disadvantage in 
sectors characterized by low visibility and low appropriability. 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the study of the relationship between corporate 
governance and product innovation is a new approach. To our knowledge only one 
other author has focused its research on the same type of relationship, namely Prof. 
William Lazonick. In the next section, we will highlight the main differences 
between the theoretical framework proposed by Prof. Tylecote and that suggested by 
Prof. Lazonick. 
1.6 Tylecote and Lazonick compared 
An in depth and thorough account of Lazonick's so-called "social 
organisation" approach to the study of innovation and corporate governance would 
30 See Tylecote (2000). 
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require a chapter on its own. Therefore, in this section we will summarise the main 
points of this approach focusing mainly on those aspects that are more relevant to the 
comparison with Prof. Tylecote's theoretical framework. 
In line with the National Systems of Innovation approach, innovation is seen 
by Lazonick as the result of a learning process, which, according to the author is 
cumulative, collective and uncertain. It is cumulative because the learning that takes 
place at a certain point in time is based on the learning process that took place in a 
previous period. It can be collective in the sense that it can be the result of a process 
of interaction among various people, as distinct from collections of learning. "The 
empirical evidence on the innovation process in the advanced economies 
demonstrates both the prevalence and importance of collective learning, as distinct 
from collections of learning, in the generation of new knowledge" (Lazonick, 1999, 
p.3). Finally, the learning process is uncertain both because it can fail to produce an 
innovation and because the innovation produced by a firm might be surpassed by one 
produced by a competitor. 
Given these characteristics of the learning process, firms that want to 
innovate effectively need to allocate resources and returns in ways that are 
developmental, organisational and strategic. In fact, as the learning process is 
cumulative, resources need to be allocated to it for a long length of time so that the 
production of new knowledge can be transformed into innovation. In addition, the 
collective character of the learning process requires resources to allow groups of 
individuals to learn interactively. Finally, the uncertainty of the learning process 
requires that the control over the allocation of resources be in the hands of strategists, 
who, according to Lazonick, have to be integrated into the cumulative and collective 
learning processes. 
Two social conditions satisfY the requirements of the cumulative and 
collective character of the learning process, namely financial commitment and 
organisational integration. The former refers to the "fundamental condition that the 
business enterprise has sufficient access to financial resources to sustain both the 
innovation process until it can generate returns and the business organisation so that 
it can engage in continuous innovation" (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1998, p.47). The 
latter is the condition that "the people involved in the process of organisational 
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learning be willing and able to provide their skills and efforts to the pursuit of 
organisational goals" (ibid., 1998, p.4 7). 
Different countries present different degrees of financial commitment (higher 
in Japan and Germany and lower in the US) and of organisational learning. Empirical 
evidence reveals national differences in the level of investment in the integration of 
the organisational learning. In some countries, the degree of integration is the highest 
with the governance system favouring the development of a learning process that 
integrates the capabilities of managerial and shop-floor employees. In other countries 
the level of interaction is very low and the learning process includes only a small 
number of highly educated employees. Countries differ also in the degree of 
horizontal-functional integration, between production and marketing, R&D and 
production and so on. "Although shaped by different product-market organisations, 
by making skill formation on the shop floor central to their investment strategies, the 
German and Japanese systems of integrating the skill and efforts of managers and 
workers both differ markedly from the American system. In the American case, the 
shop-floor investment strategy has been to substitute machines and materials for the 
knowledge and skill of workers. What all three systems - the German, the Japanese, 
and the American - have in common, however, is investment in managerial learning 
and organisational structures that are at its basis as the historical precondition for the 
shop-floor investment strategy, whether it be skill-creating as in Germany and Japan 
or skill-displacing as in the United States. And all three systems differ from the 
British case in having a strategy and structure of learning at the managerial level" 
(Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1998, p.4S). 
To summarise, for Lazonick innovation is the result of a learning process that 
takes place over time and requires the cooperation and integration of numerous 
individuals. For these conditions to be possible, corporate governance systems need 
both to favour the inclusion of the largest number of individuals in the learning 
process for a long length of time and to allow the long-term commitment of financial 
resources for this purpose. 
As explained thoroughly above, Tylecote's framework can be described as a 
National-Technological System approach. As much as Lazonick, Tylecote rejects the 
neo-classical view of technological change as an exogenous phenomenon and 
stresses the centrality of the firm in the process of innovation. A first important 
difference between the two authors is the relative low importance given by Lazonick 
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to the differences among various sectors. In fact, whereas Tylecote bases his whole 
theoretical framework on the different requirements of diverse technologies, 
Lazonick confronts this issue in a few lines. "Not only do national institutions and 
historical evolution matter. The organisational learning opportunities and 
requirements of particular technologies matter as well. The collective skill bases that, 
when organisationally integrated, generate innovation vary across industries 
characterised by different technologies that provide different opportunities for 
organisational learning. For example, organisational learning in the pharmaceutical 
industry relies on the integration of a different skill base than organisational learning 
in the automobile industry" (Lazonick, 1999, p.7). 
The above arguments are very similar to Tylecote's statements about the 
different degrees of appropriability of various sectors and the following need to 
include the more innovative employees in the strategy of the firm. Lazonick, 
however, never conceives the possibility of a shareholders first and last strategy (the 
situation where the appropriability is the highest) and argues: "An understanding of 
the social foundations of innovation - the need for organisational integration and 
financial commitment - to develop the relations between insiders in a process of 
organisational learning, leads one to question the fundamental premise of the market 
control perspective. That premise is that shareholders are the 'principals' in whose 
interests enterprises should be run. An understanding of the fact that financial 
shareholders are outsiders to the social process through which innovation and 
economic development are achieved is the basis for direct confrontation with the 
ideology of the market control perspective". "Contrast the liquid and diversified 
position of a public shareholder, the outsiders that the proponents of the market 
control perspective contend should bear title to the residual, with the position of an 
insider to the organisational learning process. Consider an employee who has worked 
for the company for a long period of time, who has skills that are specific to the 
products and processes of the company, and whose entire personal wealth is often 
dependent and continued success of the company. The assets of these employees are 
far more at risk than the assets of public shareholders. [ .. ] In applying their skills and 
efforts to the development and utilisation of products and process that may generate 
returns tomorrow or ten years from now, these employees expect to share in those 
returns in the forms of employment stability, promotion, higher pay, better work 
conditions, etc. Indeed, it can be argued that the expectations of these shares and the 
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existence of governance structures that will distribute them to the employees, are 
central to generating the residual revenues in the first place" (Lazonick and 
O'Sullivan, 1998, p.58). However, it must be said that even if in theory Tylecote's 
conceives the possibility of a shareholders first and last strategy, this is only an 
ideal. In fact, the empirical evidence collected in the first two years of the COPI 
project has proved that even if there is a difference in the degree of appropriability of 
different sectors, it is never total and as a consequence, there is always need for some 
degree of inclusion. 
As for the other stakeholders, namely those that according to Tylecote often 
need to be included (customers, suppliers, government, education system and so on), 
to the knowledge of the author, they are not mentioned by Lazonick. However, we 
imagine that if they prove to be important in the learning process of a particular 
sector he would suggest that they need to be integrated. 
It is in the ideas concerning the financing of innovation that we find the main 
differences between the two authors. As mentioned above, Tylecote argues that if the 
visibility of innovation is low, those who finance it need to have a firm-specific 
perceptiveness, or, in other words they need to know the firm with the same 
familiarity an insider has. Large majority shareholders, insider banks, powerful 
financial institutions and even small and dispersed minority shareholders but with a 
long-term perspective and trust in the management are the better financers of 
innovation in low visibility sectors. In addition, within an enterprise, the 
effectiveness of the allocation of resources to different investment projects depends 
on the type of information that reaches those who are in control, which is influenced 
by the complexity of the firm (geographical distance, hierarchical distance) and by 
the degree of interaction among individuals. When the visibility is high, the financers 
of innovation can be easily informed and as a consequence it should not be difficult 
to reach an appropriate and effective level of spending. 
Lazonick argues that those who are in control need to be well informed and to 
be integrated in the innovation process: "the identity of strategic decision makers, 
and in particular their comprehension of the complexities of the learning processes to 
which they commit resources, matters to the success of innovative strategies. [ .. ] To 
implement an innovative strategy, strategic decision makers require knowledge of 
particular organisations and technologies so that they can commit productive 
resources to an innovation process in accordance with their evaluation of the 
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potentialities and problems of alternative learning strategies. [ .. ] To pursue 
innovative strategies, the decision makers who control productive resources must be 
themselves integrated into the learning process that is the essence of an innovative 
strategy" (Lazonick, 1999, p.4). At the same time, however, Lazonick does not 
consider the identity and characteristics of those who finance the innovation. In 
addition, he argues that the corporate governance system should make sure that 
retained earnings (the most important source of finance of innovation) remain within 
the firm, and does not consider other sources of finance as being very relevant. "The 
experience of the most successful economies such as the United States, Germany, 
and Japan show, however, that enterprises that emerged to become dominant product 
markets and national economies in which they operated did so not because they used 
the returns from successful innovation to advance the interests of "owners", but 
because they retained them within the enterprise and channelled them back to finance 
the collective and cumulative learning process required for continuous innovation by 
the enterprise. [ .. ] Retained earnings have been the basic source of corporate finance 
during those periods when the corporations, and the national economies in which 
they are based, have experienced rapid growth. From the perspective of 
organisational control, retained earnings provide enterprises with the financial 
commitment that is essential for the successful implementation of innovative 
investment strategies" (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 1999, p.57). "National policy for 
corporate governance should ensure that current stakeholders, be they insiders or 
outsiders, do not extract so much of the returns from the business enterprise that its 
long-term potential for continuous innovation is effectively undermined" (ibid., 
p.59). Tylecote, on the other hand, focuses on the various characteristics that those 
who finance innovation (banks, financial institutions, shareholders and so on) should 
have in order to cope with the requirements of the different sectors. 
Both authors agree that local institutions play an important role in favouring 
innovations, and refer to the educational system, to the government, to the law 
system and so on as important elements influencing the innovative potential of a 
firm. 
According to Tylecote, sectors differ in the degree of novelty. When the 
technological change follows a predetermined path with no radical changes, the 
degree of novelty is low. On the other hand when there are radical breaks with the 
past the degree of novelty is high. In this latter case, according to Tylecote, new start 
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up firms might have an advantage as they have nothing to unlearn, whereas well 
established firms might have problems due to conservatism and long-term 
agreements with employees, suppliers and customers. Again, the neglect of the 
technological differences among sectors leads Lazonick to argue that immobility of 
capital and people within the enterprise are essential to the learning process and 
therefore to innovation. "The success of the innovation process therefore depends on 
the immobility of money and people to alternative uses via the market, and thus the 
social foundations of innovation require the innovative enterprise to control market 
forces rather than be controlled by them. The immobility of financial resources 
required for innovation occurs not because of market imperfections but because of 
the prospects ofthe success of particular organisations" (ibid., 1999, p.56). 
To conclude, the main differences between the two authors arise from the 
lack in Lazonick's theoretical framework, of a thorough analysis of the technological 
differences among sectors and as a consequence of the requirements in terms of 
corporate governance and financial systems to achieve the appropriate and effective 
spending in innovation. 
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2. Method 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 we presented a review of the literature on corporate governance 
and product innovation, introducing, in Section 1.5, the theoretical framework 
utilised in this thesis. The reminder of the thesis deals with the relationship between 
corporate governance and product innovation in Italy and in the machine-tool sector. 
This chapter reviews the method employed in collecting and studying the 
empirical data. In Section 2.3.1, we illustrate the main variables used in studying the 
Italian system of Corporate Governance from the point of view of the framework 
(Chapter 3), namely the degree offirm-specific perceptiveness] of those who finance 
innovation, their degree of industry-specific expertisi and the degree of inclusion of 
the stakeholders.3 We also explain what variables were investigated in the study of 
the machine-tool sector (Chapter 4), in order to draw conclusions about the degree of 
visibilitl, novelt/ and appropriabiliti of innovation in the sector. As the topic 
under investigation is very new, we felt the need to perform some exploratory 
analyses. This was done through two case studies, which are presented in Chapters 5 
and 6. Section 2.3.2 of this chapter illustrates the reasons for choosing the two firms 
and the way the data were collected and examined. Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 describe 
the two databases that were employed both in studying the machine-tool sector in 
Europe and Italy (Chapters 4 and 7) and in testing some hypotheses of the theoretical 
framework (Chapter 7). Finally Section 2.3.6 deals with the COPI survey. It explains 
1 Firm-specific perceptiveness is the ability to "judge whether the firm should be funded, and to 
monitor progress. In general, this perceptiveness needs to be firm-specific - the closer the 
acquaintance with that particular firm, the better; although no doubt a general knowledge of the 
industry will help too" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.27). See Chapter 1, Section 1.5.1. 
2 Industry-specific expertise consists on "a good understanding of what is happening in the relevant 
technologies and markets across the sector" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.30). See Chapter 1, 
Section 1.5.3. 
3 The degree of inclusion depends on the existence of a coalition with the main stakeholders in the 
innovation process. See Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2. 
4 The degree of visibility measures "how easy is it for someone who is not closely involved in 
managing the development of a new product or process, to judge what resources are being devoted to 
it and how well they are being spent" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.25). See Chapter 1, Section 
1.5.1. 
S The degree of novelty indicates the extent to which an innovation requires a "radically new means of 
development or production, and/or radically new markets or selling methods" (Tylecote and Conesa, 
1999, p.26). See Chapter 1, Section 1.5.3. 
6 The degree of appropriability refers to the level of appropriation of the returns on investment by 
those who provide capital. See Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2. 
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the main phases in the preparation of the questionnaire, the piloting and the sample 
of firms, and the response rate. The results of the questionnaire were used in Chapter 
7 to support the arguments about the Italian machine-tool sector. 
2.2 Research paradigm: the two philosophies 
At the beginning of any research project within the social SCIences, a 
researcher faces an important dilemma, namely which philosophical position to 
adopt. At the two extremes of a continuum there are in fact two very different 
philosophies, two ways of approaching reality and research that dictate the most 
appropriate methods to adopt. On one side there is the so-called positivistic 
paradigm.7 Those who adopt this philosophy believe that the social world exists 
externally and that its properties are to be studied through objective methods, instead 
of being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition. The social 
world, as much as the natural, is believed to be regulated by fundamental laws and 
the aim of research is to identify those laws and to explain regularities in human 
social behaviour. To do this, science proceeds by formulating hypotheses, which then 
are tested against quantitative data collected in large samples so as to allow 
generalisations. It follows that the most common methods of collecting data used by 
those who work within the positivistic paradigm, are cross-sectional studies, 
experimental studies, longitudinal studies and surveys. The data are then analysed 
through statistical techniques, which allow the determination of the confidence levels 
of stating that the characteristics found in the sample will be present in the 
population as well. 
The second paradigm emerged during the last half century, and it is called the 
phenomenological paradigm. It stems from the idea that the world and reality are 
socially constructed and given meaning by people. According to this philosophy it is 
not possible to identify the deterministic laws of behaviour as human beings have 
free will. The aim of the researcher is to appreciate the different meanings that 
people give to their experience and to understand why people have different 
experiences. From an epistemological point of view, it is argued that the presence of 
the researcher, his values, and beliefs cannot but influence the results of the study. In 
addition, the use of quantitative data is considered as an excessive simplification of 
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reality, as there are several qualitative aspects that cannot be expressed III 
quantitative terms. 
This thesis is essentially positivistic as it aims to test a set of hypotheses 
about the requirements of different technologies in terms of corporate governance. In 
the research process, however, we make extensive use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods of data collection (methodological triangulation). We also use 
data triangulation, "where data is collected at different times from different sources 
in the study ofa phenomenon" (Esterby-Smith et aI1.,1991, p. 133). 
2.3 The method 
2.3.1 The review of the literature 
The first stage consisted of a critical review of the literature on National 
Systems of Innovation and corporate governance.8 This highlights the scarce 
attention given by the existing literature to the relationship between Corporate 
Governance and Product Innovation. The use of a new theoretical framework was 
then justified. 
In the second stage, the literature on the Italian system of corporate 
governance and on the machine-tool sector were reviewed in light of the hypotheses 
of the framework. As for the review of the corporate governance system (Chapter 3), 
we tried to establish three main issues, namely to what extent Italian shareholders, 
lenders and other stakeholders have the firm-specific perceptiveness required to cope 
with low visibility; to what extent those same groups have the required industry-
specific expertise to cope with high degrees of novelty; and finally, what degree of 
inclusion the most important stakeholders in the innovation process possess. 
A high degree offirm-specific perceptiveness of the shareholders, lenders and 
other stakeholders derives from some sort of relationship with the firm, so a 
reasonable duration of such a relationship is regarded as necessary, even if not 
sufficient, for it. We therefore investigated whether there are any kinds of informed 
insiders, such as family shareholders, banks with a "relationship banking" tradition, 
active institutional investors or even well informed civil servants. 
7 For a thorough description of the two paradigms see Hussey and Hussey (1997). 
8 See Chapter 1. 
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With regard to the industry-specific expertise, we analysed the expertise of 
banks and other financial institutions, venture capitalists, or individual investment 
analysts and of the state institutions that provide grants for R&D. 
As for the degree of inclusion of customers, suppliers and employees, we 
studied the type of relationship firms have with these stakeholders. The issues 
investigated were the existence of networks of shareholdings with customers and 
suppliers, or of other forms of close long-term agreements, and also the degree of 
trust. As for the employees, we analysed their degree of permanence within the firm, 
their influence on the formulation of corporate strategy, and the type of relationship 
with the management. We investigated the system of wage determination and 
industrial relations to verifY if these favour investments in skills by workers and 
firms. We studied the degree of employment protection in order to see whether this 
makes it difficult or expensive to dispose of surplus labour. We have also considered 
the degree of conservatism of the employees that could hinder the innovation 
process. 
Correspondingly, in the analysis of the machine-tool sector (Chapter 4), we 
have tried to establish the degree of novelty and visibility of the technology utilised in 
this sector and the degree of appropriability of the returns of innovation. With 
particular reference to novelty, we tried to establish how far technological change in 
the sector is proceeding along an established trajectory. We did this by looking at the 
R&D intensity and at the rate of growth of industry sales and of patenting. We also 
interviewed an expert in the sector9 and made use of information contained in the 
CIS database. 1 0 
As for the degree of visibility, we investigated three main issues. First of all, 
we analysed the distance in space between the people who have direct responsibility 
for and are directly involved in the innovation process and those who have control 
over the provision of finance and indeed the firm itself. This type of distance can 
take several forms. For example there could be geographical distance, which reduces 
the possibility of having face-to-face meetings. Alternatively, there could be 
hierarchical distance, if the firm is very complex and there are several hierarchical 
9 In December 1999, we interviewed Dott. Battaglia, who is the economic expert of UCIMU, the 
Italian association of machine tool builders. 
10 See Section 2.3.5 of this chapter for more information on this database. 
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layers. There could also be cultural distance, both in terms of national culture and in 
terms of difficulties in communication between people with different backgrounds 
(technical and managerial). For obvious reasons, the distance in space is more likely 
to be small if firms are small and if innovative activities are centralised. In addition, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1, it will also be lower for basic research rather than for 
design and development. Secondly, we focused on the distance in time, that is the 
time that elapses between the expenditure of money and the returns in terms of 
profits or market share. Thirdly, we analysed the ease of evaluation of expenditure 
on innovation. This is strongly influenced by the degree of codifiability of 
knowledge, by the proportion of expenditures in highly visible activities such as 
fixed capital as opposed to less tangible ones, and by the degree of secrecy 
maintained on innovation. 
As for the degree of appropriability, we looked both at its level before the 
innovation and at that after the innovation takes place. In fact, the overall 
appropriability will be low even if patents or other forms of protection work 
effectively when the cooperation of other stakeholders is essential to achieve an 
innovation. We have investigated the effectiveness of forms of protection, like 
patents and secrecy, referring both to the literature and to the comments of the 
experts in the sector. We also studied the type of technology embodied in machine-
tools, in an attempt to categorise it as function oriented or object oriented (Itami, 
1994)11 and also to study whether it requires a cumulative knowledge on the shop 
floor (which needs the cooperation of employees) or whether it is characterised by 
radical breaks with the past (which is favoured by a low degree of inclusion of a 
large part of the employees). The important role played by suppliers and customers 
in the innovation process is another indication of a low degree of appropriability. 
Naturally, the available literature was not sufficient in order to gather 
satisfactory information about all of the issues under investigation especially those 
relating to the Italian case. This is because the data are usually collected in order to 
test particular theories and the theoretical framework utilised in this thesis is 
fundamentally new. For this reason, the following phase in the research was carried 
out through case studies. In fact, case studies, especially if of the illustrative type, are 
an essential tool during any type of exploratory analysis. Case studies allow the 
11 See Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2. 
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investigation of issues with which a researcher is not very familiar, such as when the 
literature is not extensive. In addition, as reported by Yin (1994) case studies are the 
preferred strategy when the research aims not only to explore certain phenomena, but 
also to understand them within a particular context, and more in general when "how" 
or "why" questions are being posed. At this stage it would not have been possible to 
proceed with a questionnaire for example, because our understanding of the 
mechanisms of product innovation and corporate governance in the sector was still 
not sufficient, and we could have risked asking inappropriate questions. Case studies 
were therefore used to improve our knowledge of the sector and of the type of 
pressures felt by the various parts of the organisation. For the same reason we carried 
out semi-structured interviews which, even if time consuming, allow us to explore 
answers in more depth. As summarised by Burgess (1982), semi-structured or 
unstructured interviews are an "opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to 
uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, 
accurate, inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience" (ibid., p.170). In 
addition, as suggested also by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991), 
unstructured and semi -structured interviews are an appropriate method when the 
subject matter is highly confidential and commercially sensitive and when the 
interviewee may be reluctant to be truthful about the issue under consideration other 
than confidentially in a one-to-one situation. Indeed, innovation in the machine-tool 
sector is undoubtedly a highly confidential matter. 
2.3.2 The case studies 
The premise was to analyse two case studies, one of a small, family-business 
firm and one of a large firm, possibly a group, with several subsidiaries positioned 
both in proximity to and far from the headquarters and possibly with outsider 
shareholders. The use of case studies at this stage of the analysis was not meant to 
test any hypotheses but attempt to widen our knowledge of the topic in order to 
proceed wisely and effectively to the next stage. Therefore the small sample size 
should not be of any concern. 
We did not have any difficulty in gaining access to the first firm, Stam. We 
contacted the majority shareholder and CEO via e-mail, explaining the aim of the 
project. He was enthusiastic and granted access immediately. 
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As for the second firm, we had a few problems. In fact, only one firm within 
the machine-tool sector is listed on the stock exchange but it is part of a much larger 
and diversified group (Fiat). Choosing this firm would have meant studying a rather 
complex bundle of relationships, synergies, and interests with no assurance of being 
able to understand the real lines of power and responsibility. In addition, due to its 
size (around 10,000 employees), this firm would not have been very representative of 
the Italian average firm. On the other hand, the other groups in the sector, even if of 
medium size, do not have firms listed on the stock exchange and we were very much 
interested in studying this aspect of corporate governance as a possible future option 
for other firms in this sector. For this reason, we decided to look at other sectors, 
which had similar characteristics to the machine tool sector. Most of the engineering 
sectors are rather similar in terms of novelty, visibility and appropriability. Within 
one of these sectors, the minimills one, we highlighted the Danieli Group, which 
seemed appropriate for this analysis. The headquarters of the group are listed on the 
stock exchange. The group is rather internationalised, though not of a considerable 
size and it is notoriously very innovative. Access was not easily obtained due to the 
extreme priorities given to secrecy. However, after the theoretical framework was 
thoroughly explained, the President proved to be very interested and provided a 
strong support. 
Among the various sources that are usually used in collecting data for a case 
study, such as documents, archive records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation and physical artefacts, we focused mainly on publicly available 
information and on semi-structured interviews. Secondary data comprised company 
annual reports, newspaper articles, journal articles and industry/market reports. 
These data were found by searching libraries and browsing the Internet. Internal 
reports were provided by the companies. 
In both firms, initial data was collected through semi-structured interviews 
carried out through a cascade, starting from the highest levels in the firms and 
proceeding to the lower ones. 
The topic of the research was thoroughly explained to the interviewees 
immediately before starting the interview. All interviews were conducted face-to-
face. We decided not to use the audio recorder both because the topic covered some 
confidential and commercially sensitive information and also because we thought 
that the interviewee would not have been as comfortable in conveying their personal 
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opinions. In addition, note taking is usually a very good means of data reduction. 
The questions towards the Managing Directors, which were prepared prior to 
the interviews, are illustrated in Table 2.1. The case studies include also the other 
issues that arose during the semi-structured interviews. Most of the questions ask 
about figures and explanations of company processes. Some are "yes or no" 
questions. In some cases, the questions require an evaluation from the interviewee, 
for example in question 5.b.i which concerns the ability of the shareholders to assess 
the information they get from the firm. For these types of questions the possibilities 
offered to the interviewees were threefold, ranging from Null through Medium to 
High. We could have used a 5 or 7 point Likert scale. However, as mentioned several 
times before, case studies were used during the research process to gain better 
understanding of the topic and to widen our knowledge of it, not just to test a set of 
hypotheses. We were interested in understanding the average situation. For example, 
it was important to us to find out whether the understanding of the shareholders was 
High or Low. A Likert scale with 7 options, for example, could have given us an idea 
that the understanding of the shareholders was Rather High (6) instead of Very High 
(7), however this would not have made a huge difference. 
Table 2.1 Interviews with the top management and majority shareholders 
1. Overview of firm's activities 
2. Structure of the firm 
a. Structure of ownership (presence of insider shareholders and their involvement in 
activities such as influencing the general strategy, influencing the remuneration of the 
top management and its composition.) 
b. Managerial lines of command, from the top management down to those who generate 
the innovations. 
c. Number of R&D centres. 
3. Financial and accounting matters 
a. Number of profit centres or cost centres. 
b. Type of evaluation and control. 
c. Financial structure 
d. Forms of financing of R&D and more in general innovation. 
4. Product innovation 
a. Who has the first new idea? (Customers, suppliers, employees or other?) 
b. Who decides whether the idea is feasible and on what basis? 
c. How long does it take to bring a product innovation to market, from initial conception 
to launch? 
d. Is there a system of rewarding those who produce a good idea? And if yes, of what 
type? 
e. How is R&D and all other activities connected to the innovation, financed? 
f. Which is the most effective means of protecting product innovation from the 
competitors: patents on products and processes, secrecy or long-term contracts? Do 
you use any other form of rotection? 
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g. Does the need for secrecy represent a real obstacle in explaining to shareholders the 
work on product innovation taking place in your company? 
h. Do you think you are sufficiently investing in all the activities connected to product 
innovation? And if not, what are the main reasons? 
1. How would you defme the technology employed in your sector? Are there frequent 
and radical breaks with the past, or is the technology proceeding along an established 
path? And in comparison to 5 years ago? 
5. Relationship with shareholders and lenders and other stakeholders 
a. What information do the shareholders and lenders ask for and get? (Purely financial 
information? Broader information about its market position? In depth analysis of its 
technology strategy and progress in achieving it? 
b. How well able are they to assess it? 
1. Do they have a null, medium or high understanding of the firm and its 
managers, such that they can at least decide whether their information about 
the firm can be believed? In particular, what is their understanding of the 
company's fmancial and competitive position, its corporate strategy; its 
short and long-term technology strategy and the quality and competence of 
the current management team? 
ii. Do they have a null, medium or high understanding of the industry and the 
technology? In particular what is their understanding of the market trends 
and the nature of the key technologies and the way they are developing? 
c. What are the consequences for the firm of them receiving various types of 
information about its performance? In other words, how would they react if the firm 
intended to cut its dividends in order to raise its R&D? 
d. Is the priority given in the formulation of the corporate strategy to the main 
stakeholders of the firm such as customers, suppliers, employees, society at large and 
government, null, medium or high? Is the company's priority that of maximising the 
shareholders' value even at the expense of the interests of these stakeholders? 
e. Has your company ever carried out/might it consider carrying out a major 
restructuring operation which involved/would involve dismissing a substantial 
number of employees? If yes, would the following considerations influence your 
decision? Problems of conscience: the inner feeling of responsibility to the 
employees; the social position in the local community would make it difficult; it 
would throwaway skills which are likely to be valuable and thus in the long-run 
might be self-defeating; effectively blocked by our legal obligations to the workforce. 
These interviews were conducted in order to gain an overview of the firms' 
activities and organisation and also to identify the main steps of the innovation 
process, the financing of innovation and the current and ideal level of spending in 
R&D and innovative activities in general. At the same time, managerial lines of 
command were identified, through departments and subsidiaries, down to middle 
managers and other stakeholders with hands-on involvement in the innovation. This 
allowed us to identify the best candidates for the successive interviews, which were 
arranged and planned during the first interview. During the interviews with the top 
managers we were also interested in finding out about the relationship of the firm 
with shareholders, lenders and powerful stakeholders. The focus was on information 
flows and understanding, and their consequences. For example, we asked what type 
of information the shareholders, lenders and other stakeholders required and 
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subsequently obtained and how well they were able to assess it. We were also 
interested in their usual reaction to long-tenn investment projects, or in other words, 
whether they were patient or not. We also asked about the role played by the 
interests of other stakeholders in the fonnulation of the corporate strategy. We 
focused mainly on the customers, suppliers and employees, as, from the literature 
review of the sector, these appeared to be the main stakeholders in the innovation 
process. 
These interviews proved to be very important as they kept us appraised of the 
important issues in the workflow and enabled us to ask more infonned questions in 
the subsequent interviews. In the following interviews, the central issue was the 
pattern of perfonnance pressures imposed from the level above in the company 
hierarchy (See Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Interviews with middle managers 
1. Product Innovation 
a. Is enough being spent on innovation? Ifnot, are the top managers aware of it? 
b. How strong are the performance pressures? (Null, Medium, High) In what way are they 
influencing the innovation process? Has the situation changed over the years? 
c. What is the system of remuneration? Are there profit-based bonuses? Is this influencing 
your incentives and perceptions? 
d. What considerations have played the most important role in deciding to pursue or 
discontinue an innovation project? For example, is more importance given to short-term 
profit or to long-term profit? To the interests of the employment, to those of the manager 
in charge ofthe project, or to a fair share between divisions and departments? 
e. How often is there a flow of information between the top management and the lower 
levels in the organisation? What kind of information is circulated? Purely fmancial 
information or more detailed reports, which include more technical information about 
the new product? 
2. Interaction among functions 
a. The interaction among which functions is considered important for an effective 
innovation process in this sector? (Not important, Medium, Very Important) 
b. Is the level of interaction among such functions redundant, sufficient or lower than what 
is necessary? Ifit is lower, why do you think it is so? 
3. Employees 
a. To what extent are the skills of the various categories of employees specific to the firm 
or relevant throughout the industry? (Not important, Medium, Very Important) 
b. What degree of autonomy do the technicians and blue-collar workers have in carrying 
out their activity? (Null, Medium, High) 
c. Is there any form of incentive for this class of employees to contribute to the innovation 
process? 
d. Would their suggestions be considered? And rewarded? 
4. Relationship with the subsidiary 
a. How many times per year are there face-to-face meetings with the Headquarters of the 
group? 
b. What is the degree of autonomy from the Headquarters? (Null, Medium, High) 
c. What performance measures do the Headquarters employ in the evaluation of the 
subsidiary? 
d. How tight do you perceive the financial control from Headquarters, in terms of how they 
respond to a failure to meet fmancial targets? (Not tight, Medium, Very tight) And what 
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about the non-fmancial control? 
e. How would you defme the activities of your company relative to those of the group? 
Central or peripheral? 
f. Are there any factors that reduce the amount spent on innovation by the subsidiary, such 
as for example: Tightness of fmancial targets; Remuneration by profit centre results; 
Lack of centre's attention to/understanding of the underlying non-financial performance 
of the company; Difficulty of getting funding for product innovation. 
The questions were similar to those mentioned above with the difference that 
in place of the shareholders were the higher levels in the organisation. For example, 
we asked how the performance pressures affected innovation and if enough was 
being spent in any type of activity connected to product innovation. We also asked 
about the system of remuneration and whether it was influencing managers' 
incentives and perceptions. We tried to understand what considerations played the 
most important role in deciding to pursue or discontinue an innovation project. For 
example, was more importance given to short-term profit or to long-term profit? To 
the interests of the employment, to those of the manager in the lead of the project, or 
to a fair share between divisions and departments? 
We also wanted to know what type of skills are important for product 
innovation in this sector (firm-specific or industrial specific) and if those who had the 
ability to contribute to innovation were free to do it and had the incentive to do it. 
We asked what control measures were used by the higher levels in the organisation 
and whether such measures were perceived as short-term pressures. We also focused 
on the importance of interaction among various functions within the organisation, 
asking whether the current level was near the ideal level or lower. 
While interviewing the top manager of a subsidiary we asked about the type 
of relationship that existed with the Headquarters, trying to uncover problems of 
distance in space and whether this had changed over time, due to mergers or 
acquisitions. We also asked about the type of control measures in place and how they 
were influencing the investment in innovation. We were also interested in knowing 
whether the subsidiary's business was at the core of the group's business or at its 
periphery, as this could influence the degree of industry-specific expertise of the 
Headquarters. 
The qualitative information noted down during the interviews was processed 
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immediately afterwards. The interviews were typed, then the data was categorised 
and interrelated, and finally a summary of the interview was produced. Interviewees 
were allowed to read draft reports as a check on interpretations, and if required, to 
make changes. 
Table 2.3 Interviews 
Starn 
Danieli 
3 interviews with 
• The President, Major Shareholder and 
Salesman; 
• A member of the technical department; 
• The managing director. 
5 interviews in the Headquarters. 
• President 
• Financial Director 
• Production manager 
• R&D Director 
• Legal Advisor 
1 interview in and Italian subsidiary 
• President and general director 
8 interviews in the Swedish subsidiary 
• General director 
• Sales manager 
• Financial director 
• Sales manager and responsible for innovative 
projects 
• Production manager 
• Shop floor worker 
• Secretary of the General director 
• Secretary 
At Starn, due to its rather limited size, we carried out three interviews, one 
with the owner and President, the second with an employee of the technical unit, and 
the third with the production manager. The interviews took place in December 1999 
and lasted one and a half hours each, on average. (See Table 2.3). 
In the second case study, the number of interviews was much higher. In fact, 
not only were we able to interview five individuals within the Headquarters12 but we 
also obtained an interview with the president of one of the Italian subsidiaries. 13 The 
interviews took place during July-August 1999 and lasted between one and one and a 
12 Ing. Pattarini, the current President; Dott. Bianchi a legal advisor; Dott. Facchini, the financial 
director and President of the Swedish subsidiary; Dott. Alzetta, the responsible for a line of products, 
and Mr. Poloni, the R&D director. 
13 Mr Della Vedova. 
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half hours each. In November 1999 we went to visit the Swedish subsidiary of the 
group. Eight other interviews were held there. We also had the possibility to spend 
several hours with two of the secretaries and two of the managers (not 
simultaneously) outside the firm. This experience proved to be very important. They 
had all worked for the firm for 15 or more years, knew a lot about it and were willing 
to tell me as much as possible. In exchange, they wanted to know a lot from me. The 
cultural differences between the subsidiary and the Headquarters appeared to be 
rather high, and as will be thoroughly explained later, there was a strong need for an 
informal exchange of information. For example, we were asked how things actually 
work in the Headquarters in Italy, what the employees think of the firm, and what 
type of atmosphere is present in the work place. Moreover, they wanted to know 
what, in general, are the most important values for Italians and what type of 
relationship exists between those who manage and those who obey. 
We visited the workshops of both the Italian and Swedish subsidiaries and 
this helped us to gain a better understanding of the products and of the production 
process. In fact, as we do not have a technical background, at the beginning we had 
some difficulties in following the explanation of the various steps of the innovation 
process. The terminology used was rather complicated and in any case it was 
different in each firm, being in a way rather firm-specific. The visit to the workshops 
made everything much clearer. 
2.3.3 Further interviews 
Further semi-structured interviews were carried out with different individuals 
in order to develop some specific aspects of the research. 
Dott. Battaglia, the Economic advisor of UCIMU (the Italian association of 
machine-tool builders) was interviewed in his office of Milan in December 1999. His 
help was of great importance for several reasons. In fact, he gave us a general 
overview of the sector and of the services that UCIMU offers to its associates. In 
addition, he highlighted those that are considered the most important problems in the 
sector, which inspired the section of this thesis that contains the econometric 
I . 14 ana YSIS. 
Further interviews were held with three of the top managers of Banca 
14 See Chapter 7. 
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Antoniana Popalare Veneta, the headquarters of one of the largest banking groups in 
Italy and with the director of one of the hundreds of branch offices. The interviews 
took place both in Padua and in Udine in April 2000. These interviews were aimed at 
studying the relationship between corporate governance and product innovation in 
the banking sector within the COPI project. However, during these interviews we 
could also ask about the degree of industry-specific expertise and firm-specific 
perceptiveness of large banks and of their attitude towards their clients' investments 
in innovation. We were very interested in understanding whether Italian banks invest 
in the formation of expertise in particular sectors as the literature review seemed to 
suggest that the degree of industry-specific expertise ofItalian banks is very low. 
Another series of interviews took place in another smaller bank located in the 
North East ofItaly at the centre of one of the most famous industrial districts, namely 
the Chair district. Recent studies suggest that banks within industrial districts played 
a central role in the development of the districts. During these interviews, therefore, 
we tried to understand in what way the activities of this bank differed from those of 
the larger bank. The main goal was to check whether there was any possibility that 
some bank could play a central role for the financing of firms in the machine-tool 
sector. 
2.3.4 The Mediocredito database. 
manifatturiere italiane (Structural 
enterprises) 
Indagine 
analysis 
strutturale 
of Italian 
sulle imprese 
manufacturing 
The database is based on a representative sample of around 5000 Italian firms 
with more than 10 employees. IS Its aim is to gather information of qualitative and 
quantitative type concerning the Italian industrial system and in particular the small 
and medium enterprises. 
An English translation of the questionnaire is reported in Appendix 1. It 
comprises questions regarding the structure of ownership and control, the structure of 
employment, the existence of the group-form; types of investment and financing; the 
R&D activity, innovation and training; the propensity to use financial instruments; 
the existence of inter-firm agreements, the use of public and European forms of 
support. In addition, it contains balance sheet data for a three-year period. 
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The questionnaire used in the construction of the database, was not built in 
order to gain data to test particular hypotheses, but it was an attempt to give an 
overview of several aspects concerning Italian small and medium firms. 
The database is certainly the largest source of information about small and 
medium firms in Italy. It is built by the Osservatorio of the Mediocredito Centrale. 16 
Up until now, the Osservatorio has carried out three investigations. The first 
concerned the 1989-91 period and was completed in 1994. The second concerned the 
1992-94 period and was completed at the beginning of 1997. In the second semester 
of 1999 the third investigation concerning the period 1995-97 period was completed. 
In this work, we used the Mediocredito database for the 1992-94 period. 
Obtaining permission to use the database was a great achievement but the whole 
procedure took several months. It would have been very interesting to obtain the 
third database but it only became available to the public quite recently, and further 
analyses would have delayed the completion of this thesis. 
Among the 5000 firms within the database, we worked with those belonging 
to the machine-tool sector. We encountered several difficulties in identifying these 
firms as the database used a very old form of classification called Atec081 and we 
could not find any reference to this form of codification. Fortunately, in one of our 
trips to Italy we finally found a table of conversion between the old classification and 
the Nace codes, for which we had the codification. The number of firms belonging to 
the machine-tool sector turned out to be 124, a quarter of the entire population of the 
sector. 
The Mediocredito database, together with the CIS database,17 were used at 
two stages of the research. Firstly, together with a review of the literature, they were 
used to try and obtain a preliminary understanding of the machine-tool sector in 
Italy. Secondly, once we had carried out the case studies and consulted several 
experts in the sector, the database was used to carry out further investigations and to 
test some of the hypotheses of the theoretical framework. 
It must be highlighted that the structure of this thesis does not necessarily 
reflect the chronology of the research. For example, Chapter 4 does not only contain 
a review of the literature on the machine tool sector but it also includes 
15 The sample consists of fIrms randomly chosen after a stratifIcation based on turnover, industry and 
geographical distribution. 
16 Mediocredito Centrale is a merchant banle 
51 
considerations that could only be made after carrying out the case studies. 
2.3.5 The CIS database 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) was the first survey on innovation 
carried out on a large scale in a harmonised way in the 12 Member States of the EU 
at that time plus Norway and Iceland (CIS database, 1997). It was also the first time 
that data of different surveys on innovation were stored in a common database. The 
survey was jointly initiated and implemented by Eurostat and DG XIII under the 
aegis of the European Innovation Monitoring System (ElMS), part of the Innovation 
Programme. It was developed between 1991 and 1993 in cooperation with 
independent experts and the OECD. The questionnaire was developed on the basis of 
the 'OECD Guidelines for collecting and interpreting data on technological 
innovation - the Oslo manual' (OECD, 1992). 
For many years, studies on innovation were carried out on the basis of the so-
called linear model of innovation, or, in other words, the idea that there is direct, 
positive relationship between investments in R&D and technological and economic 
development. More recently, new theories of innovation have stressed that R&D is 
not the only source of the continuous development of the knowledge base of an 
enterprise. Statistics on R&D and patents (which were used for a long time as a 
proxy for the innovativeness of a firm) became insufficient to describe the innovation 
process of the enterprise. During the eighties new survey instruments were developed 
in many European countries (Germany, Italy, France, the Netherlands and the Nordic 
countries) to find new and more complete information about firms' innovation 
process (CIS database, 1997). The Oslo Manual (OECD, 1992) was a result of the 
strongly felt need for international comparability and the Community Innovation 
Survey is the biggest effort to implement the guidelines contained in the manual. 
The Survey (CIS) collected data from about 40,000 firms in all EU Member 
States, Norway and Iceland. Italy contributed greatly to such a high number as more 
than 22,000 of the firms were Italian. 18 The database comprises general information 
about the structure of the enterprise, its economic activities and information about 
innovation activities; the sources of information for innovation; the objectives of 
innovation; the acquisition and transfer of technology; the level of R&D expenditure; 
17 See next section. 
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factors hampering innovation; the cost of innovation; the impact of innovation. 
The database contains only macro-classifications. In other words we only 
have data about the macro-category 29-Manufacture of machinery and equipment, 
which does not only contain the subcategory 29.4-Manufacture of machine tools, but 
also 29. I-Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical power, 
29.2-Manufacture of other general purpose machinery, 29.3-Manufacture of 
agricultural and forestry machinery, 29.5-Manufacture of other special purpose 
machinery 29.7-Manufacture of domestic appliances. However, given the strong 
similarity between these sectors, we think that we did not include a strong bias in 
using these data as a proxy for the machine-tool sector. 
The data in the database are presented only in aggregate form, with the mean 
and standard deviation for each variable. 
The CIS CD was loaned us by the University of Sheffield. Istat (the Italian 
statistical public organisation) provided a few specific tables on the Italian case. 
2.3.6 The COPI survey 
The questionnaire for the survey was developed between January and 
October 2000. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2. It comprises 
four different sections. The first is dedicated to the relationship of the firm with its 
shareholders and major stakeholders. The second refers to R&D and the third to the 
relationships with employment. The fourth section was to be answered in place of the 
first one in case the firm was a subsidiary of a group or multinational. The first draft 
of the questionnaire was prepared by the British team with a strong contribution from 
the author of this thesis. This draft was discussed and revised in two subsequent 
workshops, in Sheffield (April 2000) and in Halle, Germany (May, 2000). The final 
revised draft was ready for piloting in June 2000. Each country was free to add 
country specific questions to investigate certain aspects that were specific only to 
that country. In addition, each pair of countries working on the same sector could 
agree to joint marginal modifications linked to the specificity of the sector. The 
COPI survey is therefore composed of a harmonised questionnaire and of several 
national specific and sectoral specific versions of the questionnaire. The final 
18 It is in fact compulsory answering to questionnaires coming from lstat. 
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harmonised questionnaire, following modifications resulting from the piloting, was 
ready in November 2000. 
The piloting of the machine tool questionnaire for Italy was carried out in two 
different firms in August 2000. As a result of the piloting, several questions were 
modified. In particular, several country specific questions needed to be added due to 
the small size of the firms and to the absence of listed firms. Questions on the 
relationship with outsider shareholders were therefore not applicable and other 
questions on the identity of the majority shareholders, their role in the firm, the 
percentage of shares and the existence of family links among the shareholders were 
added. In addition, in the harmonised questionnaire, not much stress was put on the 
type of relationship with customers and suppliers, especially suppliers of CNCs. A 
few questions were therefore added on these issues. 
The questionnaire was sent out in November 2000 to 106 machine-tool 
producers. The sample was representativel9 and accounted for nearly a quarter of the 
whole population. The questionnaires were sent to the CEO or to the President, who 
were asked to answer section 1 or 4 and to distribute section 2 and 3 to the R&D 
director and to the Personnel director respectively. In order to find out the names of 
the CEO or President, each company was contacted by telephone over a period of 10 
days. A pre-paid envelope with the return address was included with the 
questionnaire. We also included a letter explaining the purpose of the questionnaire 
and assured the confidentiality of the information provided by the respondents. The 
firms were asked to answer within 4 weeks. After 4 weeks only 1 firm had answered. 
All the other firms were contacted by phone. Around 50 of them said they were not 
interested in participating. The others asked to be sent the questionnaire again. This 
was done in December. More reminder phone calls were made during January and 
February. In February the questionnaire was sent again bye-mail or fax. 
Of the 106 questionnaires there were 21 responses, giving a response rate of 
19.8%. Given the small number of responses, no econometric analysis was carried 
out on these data. Instead, the data were used with other evidence to support some of 
the arguments made on the Italian machine tool sector in Chapter 7. 
19 The stratification variables have been the following: dimension both in tenns of employment and of 
turnover, geographical localisation, and association with UClMU. 
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3. The Italian system of corporate governance and sectoral 
specialisation 
3.1 Introduction 
As explained in the first chapter, according to Tylecote and Conesa (1999, 
p.25) ''variations in national systems of corporate governance (broadly defined) can 
help to explain national patterns of sectoral specialisation". Each sector, according to 
the two authors, differs in the degree of visibility, novelty and appropriability of its 
innovations and different systems of corporate governance differ in their ability to 
cope with these characteristics. 
In this chapter, we will first analyse the Italian system of corporate 
governance. Referring to the taxonomy of systems of corporate governance presented 
by BerglOf (1997),1 we will explain why the Italian system is usually ranked among 
the insider systems. Moreover, in line with the underlying theoretical framework, we 
will try to determine the degree of firm-specific perceptiveness and industry-specific 
expertise of those who finance or could finance innovation. We will also assess the 
degree of inclusion of the stakeholders, investigating the type of industrial relations 
and the existing links between firms, their customers and suppliers. 
Second, we will compare the current Italian industrial specialisation with that 
expected on the basis of the framework, extending to the Italian case an analysis that 
was made by Tylecote and Conesa (1999) for the American, British, French and 
German cases. 
3.2 Firm-specific perceptiveness and industry-specific expertise 
Firm-specific perceptivenesi and industry-specific expertise3 are two 
different types of knowledge on which an investor can base hislher investment 
decisions. 
1 See Chapter 1, Section 1.4. 
2 The ability to judge "whether the fIrm should be funded, and to monitor progress. In general, this 
perceptiveness needs to be fIrm-specifIc - the closer the acquaintance with that particular fIrm, the 
better; although no doubt a general knowledge of the industry will help too" (Tylecote and Conesa, 
1999, p.27). 
3 "That is a good understanding of what is happening in the relevant technologies and markets across 
the sector" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.30). 
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The level of firm-specific perceptiveness depends on the type of relationship 
the investor has with the firm. An insider shareholder, a bank with a "relationship 
banking" tradition, and any type of investor that has had a close long-term 
relationship with the firm, is assumed to have a high degree of firm-specific 
perceptiveness. This type of perceptiveness does not coincide with the concept of 
insider knowledge, even if the latter implies the former, but it comprises also other 
types of knowledge. For example, an investor might decide to invest in a firm for its 
past history of successes or because he/she trusts the abilities and integrity of the 
management, without needing to have information about the particular technicalities 
of the investment project. 
Industry-specific expertise, on the other hand, refers to the specific 
knowledge an investor has of the sector and to hislher ability to evaluate other 
aspects of an innovative project in addition to financial indicators. A clear example 
of high industry-specific expertise is that offered by the Californian venture 
capitalists and their in-depth understanding of the computer industry (See Manigart, 
et ai., 2000). 
In this section, we will do the following. Firstly, we will refer to the structure 
of ownership and control to highlight the presence of insider shareholders. Secondly, 
we will study the type of relationship with banks and other financial institutions to 
check whether these have close long-term relationships with firms that could account 
for firm-specific perceptiveness or whether they appear to have invested in industry-
specific expertise. Thirdly, we will focus on other forms of financing, analysing the 
type of expertise venture capitalists have of their target sectors, and the functioning 
of the stock exchange. In connection with the latter we will study the importance of 
equity capital in the financing of Italian firms, the functioning of the market for 
corporate control and the presence of short-term pressures that could reduce the 
amount spent on innovation. Fourthly, we will analyse the criteria followed by public 
agencies in deciding which private firms' investment projects deserve to be financed. 
Finally, we will study the structure of public conglomerates and try to understand 
whether the state could be considered an informed shareholder and whether public 
managers had the necessary firm-specific perceptiveness and industry-specific 
expertise to choose the appropriate investments. 
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3.2.1 The main company organs 
In the Anglo-Saxon tradition (outsider systems), the main focus of studies on 
corporate governance is usually on the structure and functioning of the board of 
directors. This is because the board is considered to be the most important instrument 
of control over the management and therefore a source of reduction of agency costs. 
In insider systems, the board of directors does not have the same importance 
because insider shareholders have the power to control directly the management of 
their companies. The Italian situation is very similar to this latter system. 
The Italian system is of the two tiers type. The board of directors (consiglio di 
amministrazione) has the function of ratifying decisions that have been previously 
taken by the controlling group, and is supplemented by a board of auditors (collegio 
sindacale), which is responsible for internal monitoring. The latter, however, cannot 
be compared to a proper supervisory board as its main duty is to safeguard corporate 
property, with respect to accounting issues, and it has no voice on strategic decisions. 
The managing boards are usually composed of majority shareholders' 
representatives. The directors can either be executive or non-executive (the vast 
majority) and they are appointed by the shareholders' meeting, usually on suggestion 
of the President of the board and/or the majority shareholder. According to Barca et 
al. (1994a) in 90% of the cases, directors are chosen from among company 
employees or others who have close relations with the members of the controlling 
group. The assembly of shareholders can dismiss the members of the board with a 
simple majority. Board sizes average 12 members and this size increases with the 
scale of the firm. As suggested by Berg16f (1997), in insider systems the role of the 
board of directors is very limited, the meetings are not frequent and of poor quality 
and information is generally scarce and incomplete. As a matter of fact, according to 
Molteni (1997), in Italy the non-executive directors have serious difficulties in 
verifying the activity of the executive ones. This is not only because they cannot get 
access to such information but also because control would be perceived as breaking 
the implicit rules within the board. Even though board members and managers are 
supposed to use the "agent's diligence" in the management of the company, 
responsibility is effectively taken only in cases of insolvency or criminal acts. As 
shown in Table 3.1, along with the managing boards there are often many other 
managing units. As expected, the management of larger organisations requires a 
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larger number of managing units, with more decentralisation and delegation of 
responsibilities. This can be inferred from the fact that the percentage of firms with 
more than two managing units rises gradually from 21.7 for the smaller firms (up to 
49 employees) to a maximum of76.7 for the larger ones (more than 200 employees). 
T bl 31 M a e . (%) anagmg umts 0 
Number ofmanaj!inj! units 
Number of 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
employees 
20-49 43.3 35.1 18.6 3.1 0 100 
50-199 21.1 22.6 40.6 15.0 0.8 100 
>200 12.5 10.7 37.5 32.1 7.1 100 
Total 26.9 24.5 32.5 14.3 1.7 100 
Source: Barca et a1. (l994a). 
A peculiarity of the Italian system is the widespread diffusion of interlocking 
directorates, which consist of individuals with the position of directors in several 
companies. As reported by Ferri and Trento (1997), the average number of positions 
held by directors in listed companies was 14 in 1995, and the majority of them were 
established across companies belonging to the same group. 
In general the chairman of the Board (Presidente) and the CEO 
(arnministratore delegato) are two different people.4 This should allow the 
independence of the Board, but more often than not, the chairman is also an 
executive director and one of the majority shareholders. 
The board of auditors is composed of either three or five members (sindaci) 
who are to be chosen among certified public accountants (revisori contabili). The 
latter are elected by the assembly of shareholders and cannot be dismissed without 
cause before the end of the term. Listed firms are also subjected to external 
monitoring and sometimes the two forms of control overlap, giving rise to several 
problems of competence. 
In the last few years, with the development of the Italian capital markets,5 the 
presence of minority shareholders and of institutional investors has progressively 
grown stronger. This has made the role of the board of directors much more 
important as a form of protection of the interests of outsider shareholders. It is for 
4 The latest Code of conduct on corporate governance expressly suggests keeping these two figures 
separate. See Section 3.6. 
5 See Section 3.2.3.2. 
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this reason that the Draghi refonn (D.Leb. 24th Feb. 1998, N. 58 )6 and the new code 
of conduct for listed finns have paid so much attention to this company organ, to its 
independence and its transparency. 7 
3.2.2 The structure of ownership and controlS 
The structure of ownership is in Italy rather peculiar if compared to that of 
the other OECD countries. First, as shown in Table 3.2, financial institutions playa 
much more limited role than in most of the other countries. Banks, insurance 
companies, pension and investment funds own only 12% of the shares, a percentage 
well below the British, Japanese, American and Gennan figures. Only in France, 
where 6.5% of the shares are owned, do financial institutions play a more limited 
role. 
Table 3.2 Direct ownership of listed companies in major industrial countries, (%) 
Italy United Japan Germany France United States Kingdom 
Financial Institutions 12.0 39.8 47.0 19.5 6.5 60.8 
Banks 10.9 0.3 25.2 8.9 4.3 0.9 
Insurance fIrms 0.8 5.2 17.3 10.6 2.2 18.4 
Pension funds - 24.8 0.9 - - 30.4 
Other 0.3 9.5 3.6 - 1.9 ILl 
Non financial institutions 83.7 53.5 48.8 62.8 79.7 26.9 
Households 34.1 53.5 23.1 16.8 20.7 21.3 
Non-fmancial enterprises 21.6 - 25.1 39.2 54.5 3.6 
Public authorities 28.0 - 0.6 6.8 4.5 2.0 
Non residents 4.3 6.7 4.2 17.7 13.8 12.3 
Source: Barca, et al. (1994a). 
Second, the role played by the domestic non-financial sector is far more 
significant than in the other countries (83.7%). Aside from the extremely large public 
enterprise sector (28.0%), a distinguishing feature is the widespread diffusion of 
shares among households (34.1%). Among other major OECD countries, only the 
US presents a higher percentage (53.5%). The importance of the non-financial 
6 This act was passed in 1998. It concerns the whole fInancial sector and, among others, fInancial 
brokerage activity, open-end and closed-end investment funds, and contains specifIc rules applying to 
listed companies. The Draghi reform has also introduced, for the fIrst time in Italy, a complete set of 
corporate governance provisions. The reform and the implementing provisions by Consob (the 
controlling authority for capital markets and listed fIrms) and the Bank of Italy, had the main aim of 
bringing Italian fIrms and the Italian capital market into line with the more developed ones (e.g. in the 
UK and USA), progressively reducing the differences with these countries. See Section 3.2.5. 
7 The same act has also partially reformed the discipline of the board of auditors. The most important 
modifIcation concerns the compulsory presence on the board of at least one representative of minority 
shareholders. 
8 This Section draws in large part from OECD (I 995). 
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enterprise sector (21.6%) is largely due to the presence of group holdings and cross-
holdings, both among finns belonging to the same group and across top holdings of 
different groups. Finally, foreign ownership is quite small by international standards 
(4.3%). This percentage however has been increasing in the last few years after the 
complete removal of capital controls in May 1990. 
In line with the insider systems, Italy is characterised by a high concentration 
of ownership. Figure 3.1 below shows that single majority stakes account for nearly 
60% of stock market capitalisation. Among the insider systems, only Gennany has a 
higher concentration of ownership. In addition, Table 3.3 shows that when 
considering listed and non-listed finns with more than 10 employees, the controlling 
agent owns more than 80% of the company. This percentage increases to more than 
90% if family links and voting agreements are considered and the percentage does 
not change considerably across all six classes of finns. Therefore, less than 10% of 
the capital ofItalian companies is available to be exchanged on the market.9 
Figure 3.1 Largest Owners' share over 50% 
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Source: OEeD (1995). 
Minority shareholders are estimated to hold financial claims in only a small 
number of listed finns (2% in 1994), especially in the motor vehicle and data 
processing sectors (OEeD, 1995). 
9 The most updated data refer to 1994. Things have probably changed in the last few years with the 
improvements in the stock exchange. 
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Table 3.3 Percentage of shares owned by controlling agent in manufacturing companies 
Size classes Controlling Together with those Together with relatives and linked by voting those linked by voting (employees) shareholders 
agreements a2:reements 
11-49 87.24 93.0 94.5 
50-99 86.62 93.0 94.4 
100-199 86.04 91.2 92.9 
200-499 88.05 92.8 93.9 
500-999 90.81 93.7 93.9 
1000- 88.49 92.0 92.0 
Total 88.10 92.4 93.2 
Source: BIanchi, et al. (1997). 
In Italy there are several fonns of control. The relative diffusion of each of 
them is shown in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 Diffusion of forms of control in Italian firms according to firm size 
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Source: Barca, et al. (1994b). 
• Absolute control is more widespread among smaller finns accounting for 
approximately 14.8% of the activity of manufacturing finns with less than 
200 employees. 
• Family control is much more widespread. This fonn allows a separation 
between ownership and control and it is based on family links among 
those in control or between the latter and the non-controlling 
shareholders. Nearly 40% of the finns with less 200 employees are 
controlled through this fonn. The percentage is much lower for larger 
finns. 
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• Coalition control is also common: links among shareholders are based on 
common values (shared within the same district, the same political party 
etc.), or on formal agreements. This model accounts for 11.6% of the 
shares of firms with less than 200 employees. The recent Draghi reform 
has disciplined rather strictly the use ofthis device. 
• State ownership accounts for approximately 20% of the shares of firms 
with more than 500 employees. Firms owned by the state experienced an 
intense period of growth during the 1960s and 1970s. However, in the last 
20 years they have met serious difficulties that are possibly linked to a 
failure of the "political market" which led to a failure of the governance 
system. 
• The Financial supervision model is practically absent. The same is true 
for Public companies. 
• Indirect control is exercised through the financial mechanism of the 
pyramidal group. High ownership concentration depends on the wide 
diffusion of this mechanism. Upstream firms along the chain of control, 
directly own majority stakes in "downstream" firms. In addition, any 
direct share holding in a firm also gives rise to an (indirect) shareholding 
in all those firms in which the former owns shares and this cascading 
effect increases the measured degree of concentration. 
As the concentration of ownership is very high and mainly in the hands of 
individuals who are insiders, we can expect their firm-specific perceptiveness and 
industry-specific expertise to be rather high. However, given the limited dimension 
of most Italian firms we can also expect their internal capital not to be sufficient to 
finance R&D and, more general, innovative projects. Other sources of finance are 
therefore necessary and these can take the form of bank loans, equity capital, private 
capital or public funds. The degree of firm-specific perceptiveness and of industry-
specific expertise of external investors, are therefore the issues considered next. 
3.2.3 Structure of corporate finance 
As it is shown in Figure 3.3, internally generated funds provide in Italy most 
of the investment capital to firms, as in any other European country, but their share in 
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total financial resources is on average lower than in the rest of continental Europe. 10 
Bank loans are the most important external sources of finance and although the 
leverage has converged to the OEeD average in the last 15 years, it is still the 
highest after the Japanese one. 
Figure 3.3 Corporate financial structure 1989-1992 
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The high degree of leverage in Italy is due to several reasons. Firstly, as in 
many OEeD economies borrowing in Italy enjoys a clear fiscal advantage over 
equity. In 1994, the after tax return for each lira of profits was 0.8 lira when financed 
through debt as against 0.45 lira when the investment was financed through retained 
earnings or equity (OEeD, 1995).11 In addition, extensive government intervention 
during the 1980s lowered and dispersed the costs of corporate distress, this way 
reducing the risk premium on bank loans. 12 The fear of losing control over firms is 
another factor that has played an important role in restraining owners from stock 
market listings. The same reason is also at the base of the widespread diffusion 
among listed firms of dual-class shares deprived of voting rights. Finally, raising 
money on the market could also be more costly because of the low protection granted 
to minority shareholders 13 who are perfectly aware of the opportunistic behaviour of 
the majority shareholders. 
10 The data refer to the year 1992. In the last few years the proportions have probably changed but the 
OECD does not have more updated data. 
l! Since July 1998 taxes on capital gains have been simplified and this facilitates the choice among 
different fmancial instruments. 
12 Empirical support for these explanations of high leverage ratios in Italian firms is provided by 
Bonato, Hamaui and Ratti (1991). 
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3.2.3.1 Bank-firm relations and corporate governance 
Due to the bank law of 1936 (R.D.L. 12 March 1936 n.375 converted in law 
141138), until 1993 Italian banks were not allowed to own equity shares in non-
financial firms, as it was possible at the beginning of the century, when there was in 
Italy a much stronger integration between banks and firms. In fact, as extensively 
reported by Barca and Trento (1997), German style universal banks initially provided 
the massive infusions of capital needed to reduce the gap between Italy and the first 
movers in the process of industrialisation. At the same time, industrial firms also 
owned equity shares in these banks causing several problems of conflicts of interest. 
The crisis of 1930s ended that experience. Mixed banks were salvaged by state 
intervention. The banking law of 1936 introduced a difference between banking 
institutions in the short-term sector (up to 18 months), with no right to own shares in 
non-financial companies (aziende di credito) and those operating beyond the short-
term period, that were allowed to intervene in the client firm's equity capital (istituti 
di credito speciale). 
Until 1992, public banks (casse di risparmio, ex istituti di diritto pubblico, 
banche di proprieta pubblica, etc.) dominated the banking sector. These accounted 
for about 60% of total employment, 90% of total financial investment and 80% of 
total deposits. Few ordinary credit banks, the majority of special credit institutions 
(public agencies, joint companies controlled by the state or public holdings) and the 
vast majority of saving banks (Casse di Risparmio) were controlled in some way by 
the state. The state also controlled the so-called public-law credit institutions like 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca di Roma and two other big credit institutions, 
namely Credito Italiano and Banca Commercial Italiana. These institutions played an 
important role in the financing of public enterprises and in general they demonstrated 
a good capacity for making profits. 
During the 1990s the process of privatisation of public banks and that of 
consolidation completely changed the structure of the Italian banking system. 
Various mergers and acquisitions have considerably increased the dimension of 
Italian banks, the largest of which, until two years ago, did not rank among the first 
50 banks in Europe (The Economist, 1999). Currently, Banca Intesa, the largest 
Italian group, born from the merger of Cariplo and Ambroveneto and the acquisition 
13 See next sections. 
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of Banca Commerciale Italiana, ranks among the first ten in Europe. Gruppo 
Unicredito, the second largest group in Italy, born from the merger of Credito 
Italiano and Rolo Banca, ranks among the 15 largest European banks. 
Because of the predominant role played by credit institutions in corporate 
external financing and little development of corporate financial markets, Italy has 
conventionally (but perhaps not accurately) been grouped with bank-based systems, 
such as Germany and Japan. However, in contrast with those systems bank-firm 
relations have been weak in Italy and much closer to the arm's length type of the US 
and UK than to a relationship kind of banking. Thus the system is insider dominated 
but not relational so far as banking goes. A study of the baking sector by Capra, et al. 
(1994) uncovered several facts that in addition to the prohibition of owning equity 
shares in non-financial firms were keeping low the incentives for banks to get 
involved in the corporate governance ofItalian firms.14 As shown in Table 3.4 Italian 
firms tend to borrow from several banks (each lira lent in 1987 was granted on 
average by 21 banks and by 14 in 1994). The situation has been progressively 
improving over the years and, especially for the larger loans (50 billion or over), the 
number of lenders has been reduced. At the same time, as Italian banks are rather 
small, it might be that this phenomenon is due to a reduced credit granted by each 
bank, which drives the firms to get loans from different lenders. 
T bl 34 A b fl d a e verage num er 0 en fi . I fi ers per non- manCla lrm 
Size class of loans 1987 1990 1994 
0-0.08 billion lire 2.1 1.9 2.0 
0.08-0.25 billion lire 1.2 1.2 1.2 
0.25-0.5 billion lire 1.9 1.8 1.8 
0.5-1 billion lire 2.8 2.6 2.5 
1-5 billion lire 4.8 4.3 4.0 
5-10 billion lire 8.3 7.4 6.5 
10-50 billion lire 12.5 10.8 9.2 
50-200 billion lire 21.5 18.7 14.9 
200 billion lire and above 44.9 36.1 26.4 
Source: Fern and PesareSI (1996). 
Firms also tend to change their lenders quite often, which makes co-operative 
arrangements among the lending banks very difficult. In addition, as illustrated in 
Table 3.5, as many as 84.3% of the loans take the form of overdrafts and advances. 
These allow banks to call back their loans in case of firms facing bad times, which 
14 Since 1987 commercial banks could hold shares in non-fmancial fIrms through separate banks 
subsidiaries. 
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does not provide a strong incentive to monitor the activity of the firm. In particular, it 
seems that when a firm undergoes a temporary crisis, banks are very rarely involved 
in the financial restructuring of the firm and do not usually suggest new managers or 
a share capitalisation restructuring. IS 
T bi 35 C a e . . I b k I ommerCla an oans 0 non-b ks an d' t t accor mg 0 rype 0 f t t D con rac . b 1992 ecem er 
Bills on Current account Current account Mortgages Total 
hand overdrafts advances 
3.9 61.9 22.4 11.8 100 
Source: Capra, et al. (1994). 
Moreover, the legal subdivision between short-term and long-term lending 
has caused a fragmentation of the information available to commercial banks and 
special credit institutions. Not only do banks not build up strong relationships with 
firms but they do not even collect data concerning the structure of ownership. As 
shown in Table 3.6, in 93.1% of the cases, banks do not learn about ownership 
changes at the beginning of the operation and in most of the cases they learn about it 
only after it has taken place. Very few banks get informed about the operation when 
the owner has decided to sell the firm or during the bargaining. 
T bl 3 6 Wh d b ks I a e en 0 an earn 0 f h' h owners lp c anO'es a tb orrowmg fi ? lrms. 
Inception When owner During When After 
decides to bargaining contract is 
sell signed 
Almost never 93.1 57.7 38.6 36.4 18.7 
Less than 1/3 of the 5.6 37.7 52.5 50.5 21.6 
cases 
1/3 to 2/3 of the 1.0 3.0 4.6 10.5 23.3 
cases 
More than 2/3 of 0.3 1.6 3.0 2.3 17.4 
the cases 
Almost always 0 0.7 1.3 0.3 19.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Capra, et al. (1994). 
Finally, the widespread practice of loan collateralisation (See Table 3.7) even 
if it could provide information concerning a debtor's equity, therefore helping the 
assessment of debtors, it could put less pressure on banks to exercise an active 
monitoring role. Loan collateralisation is typically 100% by special credit 
institutions. Commercial banks require full collateral in 32.5% of the cases and 
15 This on the other hand causes very few problems of short-termism as attested by Brunetti and 
Cescon (1998). 
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partial collateral in 15.7%.16 At commercial banks collateral is mainly personal, and 
only in a much smaller percentage rea1. 
Table 3.7 Commercial bank collateralisation of loans. December 1992 
Extent of collateral backing 
Full collateral Partial collateral No collateral Total 
32.5 15.7 51.8 100.0 
Type of collateral backing 
Real Personal Other Total 
32.6 61.1 6.3 100.0 
Source: Capra, et al. (1994). 
The study by Capra, et al. (1994), therefore, seems to suggest that Italian 
banks did not have many incentives to invest in industry-specific expertise. As a 
consequence they could not be of any help for small start up firms in high 
technologylhigh novelty sectors. In addition, due to the short-term/arm's length 
relationship with firms, they also did not have a strong firm-specific perceptiveness, 
which means that they also could not play an important role in sectors characterised 
by low visibility. Very recently, however, it has been shown that, at least for the case 
of large firms, particular forms of long-term links, which were not based on equity 
shares, but on interlocking directorates and on trust, were in place and functioning. 
Ferri and Trento (1997) found that the percentage of interlocking directorates 
between banks and private firms accounted for an average of 45% of the total 
number between 1950 and 1995. For example, Giovanni Agnelli who was the 
president of IFI, the financial holding controlling the Fiat group, was also involved 
with Montecatini, Montedison, Bastogi and with Mediobanca and Credito Italiano. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the net of interconnections based on interlocking 
directorates between public and private banks and firms in 1990. The darts represent 
hierarchical interconnections, and go from the firm or bank where the director had a 
more important office to the firm or bank where the office was less influentia1. The 
net of interconnections is particularly complex between public banks and private 
firms. In addition, a private merchant bank, namely Mediobanca, appears to have had 
a large set of interconnections both with private firms .and with public bank. 
16 Commercial banks operate can only credit loans up to 18 months, usually for much smaller 
amounts. 
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Figure 3.4 Interlocking directorates in 1990. Source: Ferri and Trento (1997) 
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Mediobanca was established in 1946 with the aIm of boosting the 
reconstruction after the war and it has been the most active in relationship banking. 17 
Since its set up, it progressively acquired stakes in all the largest Italian industrial 
and insurance groups (placed mainly in the Northern regions) and had a strong 
involvement in their controlling coalitions. On the other hand, since 19Si8 many 
Italian groups and several foreign banks have had equity shares and a seat in the 
governing bodies of Mediobanca. This, therefore, has operated as a sort of 
clearinghouse and repository for all the interwoven shareholdings in key private 
enterprises. The wide networks of equity linkages of Mediobanca with industrial 
firms, banks, insurance companies and financial companies are shown in Figure 3.5. 
The managers and large shareholders controlling this immense and articulated 
network of firms composed the well known "salotto buono", where in a typical 
Italian way of doing business, strategic alliances were set up and other relevant 
decisions were taken. 
Mediobanca has also been active in formulating long-run financial strategies, 
co-ordinating financial support and monitoring and favouring mergers and 
acquisitions. All major reorganisations (for example the merger between Montecatini 
and Edison and that between Pirelli and Dunlop) in Italian corporate history and most 
debt rescheduling have seen the involvement of this bank. Its activity has been 
widely supported by three important commercial banks (Banca Commerciale 
Italiana, Credito Italiano and Banca di Roma), which have collected large amounts of 
capital for Mediobanca, selling certificates of deposit through their branch network. 
17 Also 1MI developed wide-ranging merchant bank activities, but it was specialised in assets 
management and it has rarely been involved in corporate governance and mergers and acquisitions. 
18 Mediobanca was a public bank until 1987 when it was partly privatised. After that the state kept a 
stake of 25%, another 25% was bought by a stable core of Italian and foreign investors, and the 
remaining 50% was bought by smaller shareholders. 
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Figure 3.5 The role of Mediobanca 
Source: OEeD (1995). 
Arrows go from firms that own 
the equity shares to those that are 
participated. 
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In the last few years, however, the role of this merchant bank has 
progressively faded away. In fact, even if in 1999 it acted for Olivetti's takeover of 
Telecom Italia and succeeded in blocking the attempted takeovers by Unicredito 
Italiano of Banca Commerciale Italiana and by SanPaolo IMI of Banca di Roma, the 
role of the bank has now become almost irrelevant and other Italian and foreigner 
merchant banks are taking its place. "In the past, Mediobanca twisted the arms of 
Italy's commercial banks to persuade them to finance its shareholder-clients. But 
Mediobanca and its network are no longer the only sources of capital, so the value of 
being a friend of the bank has been much diminished" (The Economist, 2000a). 
According to Conti and Ferri (1997) local banks have instead played a 
determining role in the development of industrial districts. In particular, it seems that 
between local banks and small firms the division decreed by the bank law never took 
place. Most of the time, those who were in charge of deciding whether to grant a 
bank loan or not were also those who were applying for the loan. In addition, this 
type of long-term relation helped the banks to accumulate considerable experience in 
the sector. 
For example, when we interviewed the general director of Banca di Credito 
Cooperativo di Manzano, the bank of the Chair District, he declared that not only did 
his bank finance the purchase of innovative machinery and investments in R&D, but 
very often it also offered consultancy services on the merit of the investment. These 
kinds of relations were important not only for firms, which did not suffer from 
particular financial constraints but also for banks. On the one hand, they could take 
advantage of their firm-specific perceptiveness and industry-specific expertise, and 
on the other they enjoyed a particular position of monopoly in their territory. 
Following the EC harmonisation of Banking Law, the Italian banking system 
is now moving back to a model of universal banking very close to the one operating 
before 1936 (See D.L 11911993 n.385 T.u.). Banks are now allowed to invest part of 
their capital in shares of non-financial companies 19 and to engage directly in 
activities such as leasing, factoring and merchant banking. It is still too early to see 
any considerable change but the acquisition of shares by banks (Italian and not) may 
19 The percentages depend on the capital of the bank and on that of the participated fIrms. 
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lead to a deeper monitoring involvement in business strategies and to a closer 
relationship also with small-medium firms outside industrial districts.2o 
To conclude, in general Italian banks do not appear to have invested in 
industry-specific expertise, with the exception of local banks within industrial 
districts, which means that they could not cope with high novelty. On the other hand, 
their degree of firm-specific perceptiveness also does not appear to have been 
sufficiently high to cope with low visibility. In fact only Mediobanca, those banks 
that developed a particular close relation with large firms due to interlocking 
directorates and a few local banks within the industrial districts appear to have 
carried on a relationship type of banking. 
3.2.3.2 The Italian equity market 
One of the characteristics identified by Berg16f (1997) to describe insider 
systems is the low dimension of capital markets. The Italian Stock Exchange, in line 
with those of the other continental European countries, has always been rather small 
in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon countries where the stock market is one of the 
major corporate finance sources.21 However, in the last few years, the Italian Stock 
Exchange has been progressively growing. As 
Table 3.8 shows, in terms of capitalisation it is now the fifth largest Stock 
Exchange in Europe after London, Paris, Frankfurt and Zurich. 
Table 3.8 Number of Listed Companies by Country, capitalisation at the end of 2000, and newly 
r t d .. 1999 IS e compames In 
Country Capitalisation (in N. Listed Companies Newly listed 
millions of Euro) com~anies in 1999 
France 1,639,726 1186 119 
Germany 1,454,316 968 183 
Italy 818,384 242 36 
Holland 735,229 384 23 
Switzerland 832,674 417 19 
UK 3,069,747 2980 187 
NYSE 13,333,641 3025 151 
Source: FederatIOn of European Stock Exchanges (2001). 
20 This is even more probable now that the Draghi reform has reintroduced proxy voting for banks and 
other [mancial institutions after it had been abolished in 1974. 
21 For example in 1979 the number of companies listed on the London Stock exchange was 1565 
whereas the number in Milan was 145. Ten years later in London the number had gone up to 1720 and 
in Milan to 235. 
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In the last 25 years the Italian Stock exchange has undergone a huge increase 
in scale (See Table 3.9). Listed finns have grown by 88 reaching a number of 242 at 
the end of 2000. The market capitalisation has gone up by more than 212% and now 
accounts for more than 70% of GDP (5.4% in 1975 and 13.8% in 1990). In addition, 
during the second half of the 1990s also the quality of listed companies has changed 
with an increase in the number of medium and small sized finns not belonging to 
groups and of foreign companies. 
Table 3.9 Main Indicators (Main market -figures in billion of lire) 
Capitalisation Turnover value Turnover New Mib 
Listed Italian ratio capital index 
companies companies raised yearly 
return 
Millions %of Total D.avg 
ofEuro GDP 
1975 154 3835 5.4 1 119 5 15.1 230 -5.1 
1980 141 18228 6.0 7343 29 43.5 3004 122.1 
1985 161 54786 12.1 26315 104 35.6 4035 98.5 
1990 229 94333 12.8 50700 204 26.4 9408 -25.1 
1991 231 99081 12.4 31057 126 17.9 4854 -2.2 
1992 229 95781 11.5 34649 136 19.7 3027 -11.7 
1993 222 128470 15.1 103 554 406 50.8 16192 37.4 
1994 223 155811 17.9 190009 754 72.0 15058 3.3 
1995 221 171668 18.4 140341 561 45.3 8689 -6.9 
1996 217 202732 20.6 156521 621 44.0 3045 13.1 
1997 213 314720 30.8 337548 1345 68.5 7933 58.2 
1998 223 485187 45.4 466567 3733 106.7 16035 40.96 
1999 247 726566 65.6 - - - - -
2000 242 818384 70.2 - - - - -
Source: Borsaitalia (2000). 
The large improvements of the last few years are the result of a mixture of 
factors. The decrease in interest rates in connection with Italy joining the ED has 
increased the appeal of equity investments. The privatisation process has increased 
the amount of shares on the stock exchange. The recent revolution of the banking 
sector (See Section 3.2.3.1) has favoured a more active role of credit institutions in 
the acquisition of shares. The Stock Market law of January 1991 (Law n. 1191, now 
substituted by the Draghi refonn) refonned the legal functioning of the securities 
market and introduced a new type of multi-functional investment finn (Sllv1) with the 
exclusive right of trading in organised security markets. The settlement system was 
modernised in successive steps and in 1995 the cash settlement was introduced. 
Since 1994 trading has become fully 'on screen'. Finally the Draghi refonn of 1998 
made OPA (offerta pubblica di acquisto or take-over bid) compulsory for any 
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shareholder who reaches 30 per cent of the capital of a firm, which represented a first 
important step in the direction of a much stronger protection of minority 
shareholders.22 
Notwithstanding the recent growth in the Italian Stock Exchange, there is still 
much scope for further improvements from the point of view of efficiency. Recently, 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1996) have studied the costs and benefits of going 
public in order to understand the reasons why many Italian firms might still prefer 
not to sell their equity on the stock exchange. Among the benefits of going public 
seems to be that it enables firms to borrow more cheaply. In fact, around the IPO 
(Initial public offering) date, the interest rate on their short-term credit falls and the 
number of banks willing to lend to them rises. This probably happens for three 
reasons: listed companies may become safer borrowers because they reduce their 
leverage; more information is publicly available so that lenders spend less to assess 
their creditworthiness; finally, stock exchange listing offers an outside financing 
option that curtails the bargaining power of banks. Among the costs, one is that the 
tax burden increases considerably around the date of the IPO, presumably because 
public companies are more visible to tax authorities. Given the high level of tax 
evasion in Italy, especially among small and medium-sized business, the greater 
visibility to tax authorities may help explaining the low propensity of Italian 
companies to go public. 
The consistent growth in the stock exchange over the last few years has 
already started to generate beneficial effects. In fact, as it will be explained in the 
next few sections, the increased liquidity of the stock exchange has favoured the 
development of the venture and private equity capital markets, it has attracted capital 
from abroad and it will certainly favour the development of investment funds and 
other institutional investors. Italian firms, therefore, will be able to rely more than 
ever before on external finance capital for their investment projects. At the same time 
they will need to become more transparent and to improve the relationship with the 
investors. As mentioned by the Economist (1998b): "In anticipation of the euro, 
institutional investors are already starting to allocate their European equity portfolios 
by sector, rather than by country, and they will compare the quality of information 
provided by listed firms. 'Money flows towards transparency', says John Andrew, a 
22 See next section. 
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director of Schroder Italia SIM, a securities house. Italian firms are starting to grasp 
that, if they fail to unmask, they will lose ground to foreign rivals". As it will be 
explained in the last section of this chapter, a new code of corporate governance and 
a new law on financial markets and listed firms are playing an essential role in 
bringing Italy up to European standards. The performance of the stock exchange is 
one of the direct results. 
3.2.3.3 Financial institutions 
After the Great Crash of the 193 as no other financial institution took over the 
role of banks in the ownership structure of Italian companies. Pension funds, 
insurance companies, open and closed end funds, all together in 1992 owned only 1.4 
per cent of the total stock market capitalisation. This situation was the result of a 
combination of different elements ranging from the weakness of the stock market, to 
the fiscal burden, to the low transparency of fiscal rules and corporate information. In 
particular, the development of pension funds has been delayed both by the "country's 
broad-coverage, pay-as-you-go public pension system" and by the growth of 
government deficit (financed by government bonds) (Barca and Trento, 1997). The 
role of these institutions is likely to increase in the next few years thanks to the 
adoption in 1993 of new legislation (DL 19931124). This regulates and promotes 
them with a more generous tax regime, but it is certainly not going to be central 
before the next decade. However, in comparison to other European countries, the 
amount of resources invested in Italy in share SUbscriptions of non-financial firms by 
financial institutions is still very small. 
3.2.3.4 The venture capital market and the "Nuovo mercato" 
A couple of years ago the Economist (1998a) stated that: "The industry seems 
to be shaping up at last. Suddenly, Europe is awash in venture capital [ .. J One 
explanation is that Europeans are increasingly eager to invest in equities. Europe's 
myriad growth-company stock markets now provide a handy means for venture 
capitalists to cash out as their investments mature, so encouraging them to invest 
more in young firms. Stock exchanges in Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Ireland all have launched small-company markets. [ .. J These markets are 
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sizzling." 
As it can be seen in Figure 3.6, the dimension ofthe European venture capital 
market has in fact increased consistently since 1996. Compared to 1998, total funds 
raised in 1999 increased by 20.19% - from € 20.3 billion to € 24.4 billion, with total 
investment up 74% from €14.5 billion to € 25.1 billion. 
The European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (2000) reports 
that buy-outs and expansion are still the largest investment stages in terms of amount 
invested, but the amount committed to start-up investments increased by 89% in 
1999. Funds raised for investment in high-technology companies at the early and 
expansion/development stages, almost tripled in one year, from € 2.9 billion in 1998 
to € 8.4 billion in 1999. Banks and pension funds were the two largest sources of 
capital, contributing 29% and 19% of the total respectively. Insurance companies 
increased their contribution to total funds raised, from 9% in 1998 to 13% in 1999. 
Within Europe, Britain has the leading position, accounting for € 9.9 billion (39%) of 
total funds raised and € 11.5 billion (46%) of the total invested. France and Germany 
follow with respectively € 4.3 billion (17%) and € 3.8 billion (15%) of total funds 
raised and € 2.8 billion (11%) and € 3.2 billion (13%) of total funds invested. 
Denmark, with an increase of 267%, Switzerland (170%), Iceland (156%) and 
Germany (103%), all more than doubled the funds raised. 
Figure 3.6 Annual European Private Equity Investment (€ million) 
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Source: EVCA (2000). 
In Italy the first operations of venture capital were made at the beginning of 
the 1980s. The Italian market of venture capital is therefore very young if compared 
76 
to those of the other advanced economies. However, in line with the other European 
countries, also the Italian market has undergone a consistent development in the last 
two or three years. As it is shown in Figure 3.7, the members of the Italian venture 
capital association have increased from 34 in 1996 to 71 in 2000. The total amount 
invested increased by 214% between 1998 and 2000, reaching a level of 5,748 billion 
lira (€ 2.96 billion). In the same year the number of operations financed was 490. As 
many as 50% of the operations concerned firms with less than 100 employees even 
though the amount invested in these firms represented only 24% of total investments. 
Figure 3.7 Private Equity investments. Number of operations, number of firms and amount 
invested 
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In 1999 the largest amount of investments went towards buy-outs (50%) but 
start-up projects were the most numerous (39%) (See Figure 3.8). 
Until 1993, Italian banks with specific requisites were allowed to purchase 
shares of other firms only through a subsidiary. Since 1994, however, banks have 
been allowed to acquire directly minority shareholdings in companies. Since 1998, 
the number of Italian banks playing a leading role in the private equity market has 
sharply grown. As shown in Figure 3.9, banks and their subsidiaries accounted for 
approximately 25% of raised funds. They are particularly active in expansion and 
replacement financing. Investment companies, both private and those linked to large 
corporations, also play a very active role. In particular, especially in the last 5-7 
years, they have developed deeper skills and expertise, through investments in shares 
or by supplying advisory or brokerage services (Aifi, 1999). 
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Figure 3.8 Fund Distribution by Stage of Investments 1999 
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Pension funds and insurance companies also played an important role. The 
public sector, which until few years ago was one of the major financers, seems to 
have reduced its investments in the private sector. Public players operate mainly at 
the start up level and their activity is mainly dedicated to promote new 
entrepreneurship and to finance the Italian economic growth. 
Figure 3.9 Origin of the funds invested 
30%~----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
25%+--r~~----------------------------------------------------------~ 
20% 
15% 
10% 
5% 
0%+--c~~-r~~~-T~~~~--~~--~~~--~~~L-,--U~~~~~~--1 
Source: Aifi (1999). 
The sefVlces provided are the normal ones: early stage financing (seed 
financing, start up financing and first stage financing), expansion financing (second-
stage financing, third-stage financing, bridging financing) and management financing 
(management buy-out financing, management buy-in financing and family buy-out 
financing). Moreover, venture capitalists also grant long-term loans and offer 
78 
consulting services. 
As for the sectoral distribution of investments, manufacturing industries are 
those which obtain the largest amount of funds (See Figure 3.10). However, in line 
with the rest of Europe, in the last three years also the amount spent in high-tech 
sectors has considerably increased. 
Figure 3.10 Sectoral distribution of investments in 1998-1999 
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As it is shown in Figure 3.11, in companson to 1998 the percentage of 
operations in high-tech industries has doubled and in 1999 it accounted for 30% of 
the total number of operations and 18% of the amount invested. This is however still 
lower than the European average. Within the high-tech industries, the largest amount 
was invested in telecom (carriers) and in Internet related business. 
Figure 3.11 Percentage of investments in high-tech firms. *Inc1udes: communications, infonnation 
technology, electronics, biotechnologies, and healthcare 
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One of the reasons for the high growth of the venture capital market is 
probably the launching of the new stock market for SMEs, the Nuovo Mercato. Its 
rapid development and excellent perfonnance have consistently increased the exit 
opportunities of investors, thereby stimulating venture capital and private equity 
investments. 
Table 3.10 The European markets for small and medium firms in 1999 
Market Number of firms Capitalisation (mil. €) 
Italy 27 26,610 
Belgium 16 458 
France 151 34,638 
Germany 318 182,943 
Holland 15 1,356 
Easdaq 62 47,839 
Source: Borsa Italla (2000). 
The Nuovo Mercato was opened in June 1999. Its main goal is to respond to 
the financial necessities of small and medium sized finns that want to grow. Its main 
target are innovative finns, active in high-tech sectors or in traditional sectors but 
with innovative products, processes or services. With its current 27 finns and € 
26,610 mil, Nuovo Mercato is the third stock market for small and medium sized 
finns in Europe (Table 3.10), after Gennany and France. Its perfonnance has been 
very good. Two of the listed finns have been among the ten best perfonning finns of 
2000 in Europe. One of these, Tiscali, since its listing last year grew by 770%. The 
annual index of the market gained 8% from the beginning of 2000, which is higher 
than the rates in Belgium (5.76%), Gennany (6.58%) and the Easdaq (-17.45%). 
The data seems to suggest that, in the last few years, Italian venture capitalists 
have been investing in industry-specific expertise related to the high technology 
sectors. Therefore, even if up until now there was not any type of support in Italy for 
operating finns or new start up finns in sectors characterised by a high degree of 
novelty, things are now starting to change and also in Italy these sectors might 
undergo an important development. 
3.2.3.5 The importance and diffusion of pyramidal groups 
As reported by BerglOf (1997), insider systems make extensive use of 
instruments for separating ownership and control. Also in Italy, there is a widespread 
diffusion of one of these instruments, namely the organisational fonn of the group of 
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finns. This fonn has a long history in Italian industry. Already in the 1950s, Ifi, the 
financial holding of the Agnelli family was at the top of a pyramid of around 180 
finns and the Edison group embraced 97 companies. The major expansion, however, 
took place in the second half of this century, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. 
In the post war period, the high inflation, the facilitations granted by the state, and 
the unexpected and uncommon growth, allowed finns to self-finance their own 
investments. Therefore, in the first two decades after the war, Italian finns did not 
suffer enonnously from the divorce from the bank system that took place in 1936. 
With the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, however, self-financing became insufficient 
and Italian finns, especially the largest ones, started to rely more than ever before on 
the market.23 The group form became the best instrument to avoid loss of control and 
at the same time to collect capital both in the fonn of equity shares and bank loans. 
Currently, group membership is widespread among finns of all sizes, but it is 
still more common among large finns. Nearly all manufacturing finns with more 
than 1000 employees belong to groups (the vast majority of listed companies do), 
and so do over 30% of finns with size ranging between 50 and 100 employees. 
According to ISTAT (1994) (Italian Centre for statistical studies), in 1991 87% of 
finns with more than 500 billion lira sales had equity stakes in other finns. At that 
time 151 groups in Italy with at least one listed finn, were controlling almost 6,500 
finns. 
Groups of finns can take two mam fonns (Goto, 1982).24 The A-type 
associative groups, typical of Japan consist of a number of finns, with basically equal 
power, connected through a network of cross-shareholdings. The coordination of 
activities in this type of groups is secured through more or less infonnal mechanisms, 
infonnation exchanges and tacit rules of conduct. The B-type hierarchical groups, 
which prevail in Europe, instead, centre around a parent holding company. They are 
essentially characterised by a pyramidal structure and monitoring and decision-
making are organised hierarchically. 
In Italy groups take the B-type hierarchical fonn. Equity linkages are vertical 
and unidirectional: a financial holding company controls (either directly or 
indirectly) all finns belonging to the same group. Reciprocal shareholdings are quite 
23 This is also the period when Mediobanca becomes progressively more important. 
24 For a comprehensive study ofItalian groups of fIrms see Buzzacchi and Colombo (1996). 
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common between different groups, offering scope to establishing mutual influence,25 
or to diversifY portfolios. In general, a holding company controls, through the chain 
of equity shares all the :firms belonging to the group with a minimum amount of 
capital invested. For example, in a four level pyramidal group, the last-level 
subsidiary can be controlled with as little as 7% of shares, if each intermediate 
subsidiary owns 51 % of shares in the firm at the following levels. On average, the 
top shareholders of private non-financial groups control seven lira of capital for each 
lira invested in equity. For example, as it can be seen in Table 3.11 in the Berlusconi 
group the top shareholders control 3.66 lira of capital for each lira invested. The 
leverage is even higher for the Agnelli group, where each lira of capital controls 8.86 
lira of capital invested. 
Table 3.11 Deg f ree 0 separation between ownership and control 
Degree of separation of ownership and control 
1. De Benedetti Carlo 10.33 
2. Giovanni Agnelli & C S.a.p.a 8.86 
3. Pininfarina Sergio 5.93 
4. Ligresti Salvatore - 4.83 
5. Compart S.p.a. 4.35 
6. Radici Pesenti Rosalia 4.15 
7. Berlusconi Silvio 3.66 
8. Pirelli 1.95 
9. Bulgari S.p.a 1.80 
10. Tanzi Calisto 1.68 
11. Benetton 1.46 
12. Bosatelli Domenico 1.39 
Source: Consob (1996). 
Through the mechanism of the group form, hostile take-overs, and undesired 
changes in management, are nearly irnpossible.26 Family and coalition control is 
perpetuated generation after generation?7 Moreover, minority shareholding can be 
used at all levels of the pyramid to ensure funding without giving up contro1.28 
25 For the same goal see also interlocking directorates and monitoring bodies. 
26 Very few hostile takeovers took place in Italy. One of the most famous took place in 1980s when 
Montedison took control over the BI-Invest holding of the Bonomi group. A few years later 
Montedison was taken over by the Ferruzzi group. After the privatisation of public companies the 
possibility of hostile takeovers has increased considerably (see for example, the hostile takeover of 
Olivetti over Telecom Italia in 1999) but the number is still very low. 
27 For a comprehensive study of the market for corporate control in Italy see Barca, et al. (1994a,b). 
28 A recent survey showed that the fear of losing control was the main motivation restraining firms' 
owners from stock market listings. See Mariani (1993). 
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Figure 3.12 Diffusion of groups among manufacturing firms 
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A recent study by Bianco, Casavola and Ferrando (1997), however, shows 
that the pyramidal group structure does not prove to be a very effective way to obtain 
external capital and that the level of separation between ownership and control could 
be even higher. The main reason for this inefficiency, Bianco, et al. (1997) suggest, 
is the existence of agency costs. In fact, compared to other situations where 
separation between ownership and control exists, a pyramidal group poses more 
serious agency problems. This is because the interests of the controlling agent are 
linked to the profitability of the share of the group they own. They diverge from 
those of minority shareholders of subsidiaries, who are interested in the performance 
of the subsidiary alone. In general, the controlling agent tries to maximise the profit 
of the higher level of the firm, where his stakes are larger. Frequently, this is 
achieved at the expenses of the subsidiaries?9 
As reported by Bianchi, et al. (1996), there are several other benefits in the 
adoption of a group-form. First, this mechanism allows the exploitation of internal 
capital markets, the share of external funds in total resources being matched by the 
share of funds provided by infra-group financial transactions. The most commonly 
used mechanisms are internal transfers of fixed assets and shareholdings, under-
writing of private placements by subsidiaries with easier access to capital markets 
29 The protection of the minority shareholders is one of the main concerns of the Draghi reform. See 
Section 3.2.5. 
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and subsequent reallocation to the more risky ones,30 and internal loans at rates more 
favourable that the external ones.31 The widespread diffusion of groups in the high-
technology sectors (high risky) and in those characterised by scale economies 
(capital intensive) gives evidence of the importance played by internal capital 
markets. 
Figure 3.13 Diffusion of groups in different sectors 
Scale Hi-tech Specialised Traditional 
Source: Bianchi, et al. (1997). 
In the absence of a comprehensive legislation on groups, these operations 
reduce the level of transparency and the direct result could be that it is more difficult 
to raise external capital among investors, as they might not feel sufficiently 
protected. A proof of this has been given by Zingales (1994) who suggested that the 
expropriation problem must be very large in Italy as the voting premium is much 
higher (82%) than that in any other country. Therefore, on the one hand groups are a 
result of the inefficiency of Italian capital markets and on the other hand, this 
controlling form might have contributed to that inefficiency. 
Another reason for the use of groups of firms is that, since subsidiaries are 
juridically autonomous, the parent company has fewer liabilities than in the case 
where the companies in the group are organised as divisions of one large company. 
In addition, groups of firms can also be used as "evasive" devices, facilitating a 
reduced disclosure of information to markets and government. This form could help 
to maintain different identities (brands), for products with different levels of quality, 
30 In this case, the group allocates capital to those activities that to the eyes of an insider appear 
profitable, but that could seem too risky to an outsider. 
31 Internal capital markets are studied by Buzzacchi and Colombo (1994), Buzzacchi and Colombo 
(1996), Buzzacchi and Pagnini (1995), Impenna and Pagnini (1993). For a study of the effect of 
internal capital markets on firms' fmancial constraints see Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1995). 
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and it could favour the obtaining of credit from banks, when the creditworthiness of 
each firm is higher than that of the group as a whole. Finally, it may be used in order 
to obtain either tax benefits or subsidies, and it may contribute to reach long-term 
agreements, as it increases the number of board directors for whom the controlling 
shareholder interacts with other relevant shareholders.32 
From the point of view of this thesis, there are three aspects to be taken into 
consideration. First, the use of groups of firms reduces the visibility to the outsiders 
due to the lack of transparency characterising this organisational form, and this might 
increase the cost of obtaining external capital.33 At the same time, firms belonging to 
groups have the advantage of using the so-called internal capital market. High 
technology firms, in particular, which usually suffer much stronger financial 
constraints than firms operating in more traditional sectors, could have a strong 
advantage in belonging to a group of firms. In fact, especially in the less diversified 
family businesses, the members of the family are expected to have a very highfirm-
specific perceptiveness, which allows them to transfer capital from those firms which 
are considered less risky by the market (and therefore do not have high capital 
constraints) to those that are more involved in highly innovative projects. As a matter 
of fact, the group form seems to be widely used within high-tech sectors. At the same 
time, however, the multiplication of hierarchical levels might also cause an increase 
in the geographical and hierarchical distance, or in other words, a reduction of 
internal visibility. As it will be shown later in this work, exploiting all the advantages 
in terms of innovation that the group form can offer, requires a lean organisation with 
a strong delegation of responsibilities and a low tendency to use financial types of 
control. 
3.2.4 The market for corporate control 
A peculiarity of insider systems is the very limited role played by hostile 
takeovers. Also in Italy, family-run businesses, high concentration of ownership, and 
formal and informal agreements have impeded the reallocation of control to agents 
not belonging to the dominant group. Small and medium-sized firms are frequently 
32 Shareholders of the various firms belonging to the group. 
33 Bianco, et al. (1996) argue that the group form is not a very efficient way to collect capital due to 
the diffidence of minority shareholders who might tend to prefer individual firms. 
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reallocated to members of the same family;34 large firms are rarely threatened by 
hostile take-overs, and mergers and acquisitions are less frequent than in other 
advanced economies. In 1997, the Italian financial newspaper 11 Sole 24 Ore noted 
that companies controlled by a single subject represented almost two thirds of the 
Milan Stock Exchange capitalisation in 1995, and the rest could not be targeted by 
hostile takeovers for various reasons (such as agreements or family links among 
various shareholders). As a matter of fact, as reported by OECD (1995), the number 
of mergers and acquisitions that took place in Italy over the 1990-1992 period was 
less than half that of France, less than one third that of Germany and around one 
fourth that of the United Kingdom. In the few cases in which the reallocation occurs 
through the market, specialised institutions do not play a very important role in 
circulating the necessary information and providing the necessary funds. It has been 
estimated that only 17% of reallocations of small and medium sized enterprises 
involve a specialised institution, and in only 10% of the cases are the funds used for 
the acquisition provided by a financial institution (80% of the reallocations are 
financed using the resources of the buyer). As for banks, Capra, et aL (1994) found 
that in more than 113 of the cases only a small percentage (6%) of the banks searches 
a buyer, only a few of them (5%) are in charge of evaluating the firm, only 1 % is 
asked for fiscal and legal advice or for help in the search of new managers. Similar 
results are also found by Ferri and Pesaresi (1996). 
Capra, et al. (1994) found also that a much more important role is played by 
business consultants (commercialisti) and fiscal experts. As many as 50.4% of firms 
involved in ownership changes use at least one service supplied by these experts, 
namely, the search for a buyer/seller (7.4 %), the evaluation of target firms (16.3 %), 
and the negotiation during the acquisition (14.8 %). Nevertheless, as the scale of the 
operations of these consultants is usually very limited, the likelihood of missed 
opportunities and market inefficiencies is high. 
The limited extent of reallocation within the private sector in the last 50 years 
IS also a result of the bankruptcy law (OECD, 1995). An efficient market for 
corporate control would operate in order to replace the management of the firms that 
34 According to Barca, et al. (1994a), at least half of the reallocations take place among members of 
the same family. 
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are continuously under-performing.35 The Italian bankruptcy law, originally designed 
to favour creditors over the other stakeholders, has frequently been amended so as to 
avoid plant closures and support employment, especially through government 
intervention. This has obviously impeded efficient reallocation and in many cases 
has led the public sector to take over the under-performing companies. 
In last two or three years, however, in Italy too the number of mergers and 
acquisitions (both local and from foreign companies) has slightly increased, 
especially in connection with the process of privatisation and with the consolidation 
of the banking sector. For example in 1999, Olivetti, the Italian computer and 
communications equipment producers, succeeded in its takeover of Telecom Italia, 
Italy's biggest phone company. 
3.2.5 The Draghi reform and the Code of conduct 
As mentioned in one of the previous sections, the Italian capital market has 
historically been shallow and small. Only in the last few years, due especially to the 
privatisation of the numerous state owned companies, has the Italian stock exchange 
grown progressively and become more liquid. By the end of 1998, the market 
capitalisation of the stock exchange had risen to nearly 50% of GDP, and the 
institutionalisation of savings had become of major importance. In line with these 
profound developments of the capital markets, in 1998 the Government passed the 
Unified Finance Act known as the Draghi reform (D.Leb. 24th Feb. 1998, N. 58). 
As mentioned on several occasions in the previous sections, Italian corporate 
governance is characterised by strong conflicts of interest between the minority 
shareholders and the majority shareholders. This type of agency problem, firmly 
linked to the lack of transparency of groups of firms, has always been held 
responsible for the underdevelopment of Italian capital markets and the 
undercapitalisation of Italian firms. Among other things, the Draghi reform was 
meant to improve the conditions of minority shareholders of Italian firms, so as to 
increase their ability to acquire capital both in Italy and abroad. 
The first main part of the reform regards the composition and activity of the 
internal audit committee. This will be composed by a minimum of three members, at 
35 At the same time an efficient market would distinguish between a temporary crisis and a terminal 
one. 
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least one of which has to be a representative of the minority shareholders (two if the 
committee is composed of more than three members). In addition, as few as two 
members of the committee have the power to call a shareholders' meeting if they 
think that the senior managers are not acting in the interests of all the shareholders. 
The role of the internal audit committee is now in a certain way overlapping 
with that of the non-executive directors and this, according to Montalenti (1997) has 
transformed the Italian system into something between a unitary board system and a 
two-tier board system. 
The second section of the reform that aims at strengthening the role of the 
minority shareholders is the new regulation of public bids. Now, any shareholder 
who owns more than 30% of the total shares in a company has to offer a public bid 
for the total amount of shares. In this way, the minority shareholders of a target 
company have the same opportunity to gain an economic advantage as the majority 
shareholder. This modification has been strongly criticised by academics and other 
experts, as it could obstruct even further the achievement of an efficient functioning 
of the market for corporate control, making takeovers too expensive, or discouraging 
the listing on the stock exchange of companies that could be the target of a takeover 
(Montalenti 1998). Of the same opinion is Debenedetti (1998), who argues that the 
interests of the minority shareholders would be better safeguarded by a market for 
corporate control in which the public bidder would find it easier, rather than more 
difficult, to bid. 
The third part of the reform that concerns the minority shareholders, grants to 
ten percent of the shareholders the right to call a shareholders' meeting. 
Another point of the reform deals with the agreements among shareholders. 
The power of such agreements has been greatly weakened as an instrument to 
maintain the control over the company. The length of the agreement cannot be longer 
than three years at the end of which the agreement has to be renegotiated. In case of 
public bids, the signatories of the agreement have the right to withdraw. This latter 
right, which in theory should favour the occurring of takeovers, in practice will not 
necessarily operate in this way, as shareholders' agreements have never been only 
contracts but also a sort of gentlemen's agreements among members of important 
coalitions. 
In addition to the Draghi reform and the various regulations laid down by 
Consob and the Bank of Italy, a Code of Conduct for listed firms was laid down 
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during 1999 by a group of experts on corporate governance.36 Following the Code of 
Conduct is not compulsory for firms but, according to the members of the committee, 
it would "further reduce the cost of raising funds in the capital market [ .. J and be a 
means for fostering the proper control of business risk and dealing adequately with 
the conflicts of interest that are liable to interfere in relations between directors and 
shareholders and between majority and minority interests". 
The Code of Conduct resembles extensively the various Codes of Conduct 
that have been developed in the last seven years both in Europe and outside Europe.37 
It deals with such topics as the role and composition of the board of directors; the 
number and role of the non-executive directors; the importance of various 
committees (for suggestions on the appointment of directors, for the establishment of 
directors salaries, for internal and external control); the relationship with the 
shareholders and the board of auditors. In reading and comparing the various codes, 
however, a key characteristic of the Italian one appears to be its traditionalism and its 
strong Anglo-Saxon orientation. For all the comments made before about the 
differences between insider systems and outsider systems, one would have expected 
the Italian code to resemble in part the German or the Japanese one, with differences 
due to legislation, common practice and so on. However, even in the first few lines 
we find a statement that not only does not reflect the latest developments in the 
corporate governance debate, but also reflects an orientation that is much more 
outsider than that of the British one. 
In the premise to the report, in fact, we find the following statement: "The 
Committee has identified the maximisation of shareholder value as the primary 
objective of good Corporate Governance, considering that in the longer term the 
pursuit of this goal can give rise to a virtuous circle in terms of efficiency and 
company integrity with beneficial effects for other stakeholders - such as customers, 
creditors, consumers, suppliers, employees, local communities and the environment -
whose interests are already protected in the Italian legal system." The main goal of 
management should be, according to this Code of Conduct, the traditional 
maximisation of shareholders' value. In the long-term, the maximisation of 
shareholders' value could benefit other stakeholders, such as customers, employees 
36 See http://www.borsaitalia.it/91122/132/570.htrnl. 
37 See for example the Hampel Code (1998) for Britain, the CalPERS Code (1998) for the United 
States and so on. 
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and so on. Their interests are in any case already protected by the legal system. The 
code makes no reference to the reasons why the stakeholders' interests need to be 
protected, letting us infer that there is some sort of underlying social responsibility. 
Not a single comment is made on the importance played by the stakeholders in the 
increase of value of the whole finn. As argued by Margaret Blair (1995), for 
example, the shareholders' value does not necessarily coincide with the value of the 
whole finn. Trying to maximise only the shareholders' value, in the long run might 
undennine the capability of the finn to generate profits and to be competitive in the 
market. 
A different approach can be found in the latest British Code of Conduct, 
namely the Hampel report (1998). In the introduction to the report it is stated: "The 
single overriding objective shared by all listed companies, whatever their size or type 
of business, is the preservation and the greatest practicable enhancement over time of 
their shareholders' investment. All boards have this responsibility and their policies, 
structure, composition and governing processes should reflect this. A company must 
develop relationships relevant to its success. These will depend on the nature of the 
company's business; but they will include those with employees, customers, 
suppliers, credit providers, local communities and governments. It is management's 
responsibility to develop policies that address these matters; in doing so they must 
have regard to the overriding objective of preserving and enhancing the shareholders' 
investments over time. [ .. J This does not mean, of course that directors must run the 
company exclusively in the short-tenn interests of today's shareholders. As we 
explain later, the directors' duty is to shareholders both present and future. The 
shareholders, many of whose holdings remain largely stable over time, are interested 
in a company's sustained prosperity. As regards stakeholders, different types of 
company will have different relationships, and directors can meet their legal duties to 
shareholders, and can pursue the objective of long-tenn shareholder value 
successfully, only by developing and sustaining these stakeholder relationships. We 
believe that shareholders recognise that it is in their interests, for companies to do 
this and - increasingly - to have regard to the broader public acceptability of their 
conduct" (Hampel, 1998, p.12). 
As it appears clear from this extract, the British Code recognises that the role 
of customers, suppliers, employees and so on, is essential in ensuring the company's 
success (with different degrees according to the sector) and that in most cases, taking 
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care of their interests is in the interests of the shareholders' too. In other words, 
benefits to the stakeholders should not be the results of the firms' social 
responsibility or a side effect of the management of the firm but an essential building 
block of the strategy of the firm. 
It appears, therefore, that in their hurry to bring Italian listed firms and the 
Italian capital market up to international standards, the Committee, while diligently 
following the main technical aspects of the other codes, such as the importance of 
independent non-executive directors, or of a committee in charge of establishing the 
remuneration of the directors and so on, did not perceive the profound difference in 
the main underlying goals of the firm. 
3.2.6 Public enterprises 
Together with industrial districts, groups of firms and independent firms, a 
fundamental part of the Italian economy is represented by the public sector. Before 
the beginning of the privatisation process,38 public firms employed 1.5 million 
people, accounted for around 15% of non-agricultural employment, for 20% of value 
added and for almost 25% of fixed investments. As it is shown in Figure 3.14, before 
the privatisation period, the employment share of Italian public enterprises was well 
above the European average in all sectors with the exception of the distribution one. 
In particular, public firms were very widespread in the service sectors. Before the 
privatisation process started, at least two thirds of the banking system, three fourths 
of transportation and communication, and almost all of the activities related to 
electricity, natural gas and water, were public. In addition state-owned enterprises 
were also present in the industry sector in particular in electronics, food, chemicals 
and transport equipment. 
The first public conglomerate (lRI) was created in 1933 with the stakes of the 
three major all-purpose banks that were facing a serious financial crisis. Originally, 
the main aim was to allow a separation between ownership and control. In fact, it 
was estimated that the private sector was too undercapitalised to sustain the growth 
of the major firms that belonged in large part to the banking sector before the crisis. 
The first public entrepreneurs were typically professionals (Alberto Beneduce, 
Donato Menichella, Francesco Giordani etc.) and, at least in the first few years ofthe 
38 The privatisation process started in 1994 with the privatisation ofIMI, Bel e IMA. The most recent 
privatisations occurred in summer 2000. 
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Republic a lot of effort was put in order to avoid political interference. Later on, 
during the 1950s, IRl started to be used as an instrument of political economy and its 
managers were chosen more on the basis of their political inclinations than their 
management skills. After that, the public sector progressively expanded, and reached 
its widest dimension during the 1970s. This was favoured by several factors such as 
the availability, until the mid-1960s, of current accounts savings, which enabled the 
constitution of public capital; the enduring incapability of financial markets to 
channel funds from households to the enterprise sector; the rigid separation between 
banks and firms until the early 1990s and finally the low level of integration in 
international capital markets. 
Figure 3.14 Employment share of public enterprises in Italy and the EC by main branches, 
percentage shares in 1987 
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Unfortunately, an exhaustive description of the activities of Italian public 
enterprises would require too much space, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis. In 
addition, the information is also not always available, given the lack of transparency 
characterising these firms, and, as extensively illustrated by Barca and Trento (1997), 
the network of relations between public and private bodies. With these qualifications, 
a few issues do need to be addressed. 
In this thesis, when speaking about corporate governance, we refer to the 
system by which companies are controlled, directed and made accountable to 
shareholders and other stockholders. Corporate governance in public firms IS 
necessarily different from that in private ones, as goals, incentives to managers, and 
forms of monitoring and control, are different. Moreover, the traditional principal-
agent relationship between shareholders (taxpayers), and managers is compounded 
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by a more complex hierarchy of principal-agent relationships involving the interests 
of other subjects such as politicians and bureaucrats. 
As anticipated before, starting in the 1950s, macroeconomic objectives (trade 
balance, inflation and employment), or the development of strategic sectors took the 
place of efficiency and profitability as the main goals of these firms. In addition, 
even if in some cases there have been positive outcomes as in the steel and energy 
sectors, most of the time, under goals defined as "of public interest" particular 
interests of political parties or single persons were concealed. For example, the 
strategic motive has often been used to justify incorporation or to avoid the sale of 
enterprises. In fact, motives were not strategic at all in many cases, such as in the 
case of IRI' s food and catering sub-holdings. Support to employment was one of the 
reasons adduced for continuing to finance the loss-making EFIM (the large public 
conglomerate liquidated in July 1992). However, it was estimated that providing 
social subsidies to the 37,000 employees of the conglomerate would have been less 
expensIve. 
Monitoring and control, both by the market and by the state, have been much 
more difficult and less effective than in private enterprises. In fact, on the one hand, 
the number of public enterprises quoted on the stock exchange was too small to 
allow evaluation based on the movements in the share prices. On the other hand, the 
intricate structure of public conglomerates, with several levels of legislative and 
managerial bodies in the decision-making position (often influenced by changing 
political parties), resulted in a low level of transparency. Moreover, public 
conglomerates such as IRI and EFIM did not need to provide consolidate balance 
sheets until the mid-1970s, impeding in this way other forms of control, such as 
frequently revised current-cost valuations. 
Further, the structure of incentives has been different from that in private 
companies. In fact, not only were public companies shielded from the threat of 
hostile take-overs and bankruptcies, but they also had less stringent budget 
constraints. This obviously reduced the incentive for profit seeking behaviour. As a 
matter of fact, the endowment funds given at the beginning were periodically 
increased, and the state received no interest or dividend payment in return. 
Notwithstanding the notorious productive inefficiencies of public enterprises, 
they seem to have played quite an important role in the process of technological 
innovation in Italy. This is probably due to several factors: their privileged contacts 
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with public financial sources; a capacity to tolerate long handling times of 
application; and better-than-average possibilities of in-house financing. In particular, 
according to the data on R&D expenditure, in the last 15 years, state controlled 
enterprises made a significant contribution to the total spending, amounting on 
average to 20%. 
The general strategy of these :firms has been to raise the technological level of 
domestic producers in those sectors where they were already heavily involved, 
namely information systems and telecommunications, chemicals, energy, aerospace, 
new means of transport, new materials and biotechnology. At the same time, 
however, it is difficult to judge whether expenditures in R&D and other forms of 
investment for innovations were made on the basis of accurate economic evaluation, 
or just on the basis of political interests. In fact, it is more probable that funds were 
allocated not to those sectors or :firms that were proving to have important and useful 
innovative projects but to those sectors or particular :firms that were part of a large 
and political project. It is also fairly difficult to believe that the managers of public 
:firms had the necessary technical skills to understand the processes of innovation 
taking place in their :firms. Furthermore, the lack of transparency certainly 
contributed to reducing the degree of visibility to levels much lower than those 
normally characterising such industries. 
The process of privatisation has profoundly reduced state involvement in 
Italian industry. The year 1999, with the privatisation of Enel, the electricity 
company and of Societa Autostrade, the company that runs the highways, 
represented probably one of the most significant steps in the whole process. 
It is still too early to evaluate the effect on the efficiency of:firms of private property. 
However, as mentioned several times, this process has already produced a profound 
effect on the size and liquidity of capital markets and on the activity of the market for 
corporate control (see case Olivetti-Telecom). 
3.2.7 The role of the public sector in innovation39 
Italy does not have a long tradition in terms of public intervention for 
innovation. In fact, as Italy was a late industrialiser, until the second half of the 
39 This section draws in large part from OEeD (1992). 
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twentieth century neither private :firms nor the state spent considerable sums of 
money on R&D. Even if during the 1970s and especially 1980s a lot of effort was put 
to reduce the gap between Italy and the other advanced countries, as Figure 3.15 
illustrates, the difference was still considerable. In 1995 the R&D expenditures were 
just above 1% of GDP. All the other advanced economies spent at least twice that 
amount. In the same year, Japan spent as much as 3% of GDP in R&D activities. 
Figure 3.15 R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
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The first public policies in favour of innovation were introduced during the 
1950s and 1960s. However, they were fragmented and incoherent, with an irrational 
division of resources. Moreover, the little funds provided for innovation activities 
were mainly for basic research with hardly any funds devoted to applied research. 
The lack of funding to finance complementary activities such as applied research, 
design and marketing led many :firms to quit highly innovative activities started 
during the 1950s and 1960s (examples include the production of computers by 
Olivetti, the studies on nuclear power by Cnen and on the laser technology by Cise 
and the Polytechnic of Milan.) Their efforts were directed to less cutting edge 
technologies. Only in the second half of 1960s (law 1089/1968 on applied research; 
Sabatini law 1965 (n.1329, 28111/65), for the diffusion of machine tools) and during 
the 1970s (Dpr 902/1976; law 67511977 on applied research; law 6961 1983 on the 
purchase of new capital assets) did the State seem to realise the importance of 
complementary activities in the process of innovation. Fundamental was the role 
played by the Applied Research Fund, which is still in use and it is administered by 
Murst (Ministry for Universities and Scientific and Technological Research). This 
instrument provides funds in the form of outright grants, low interest loans and in 
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some cases risk capital for applied research projects carried out by industrial 
companies, consortia of such companies, public bodies engaging in productive 
activities and other industrial research companies. The application for funding has to 
be sent to WI and the evaluation is carried out by a committee of specialists (mainly 
university professors) who are replaced every three years. In the first decades the 
fund sustained especially the oligopolistic core, namely Fiat, Olivetti and IRI but in 
the last few years, especially since the introduction of a simplified application 
procedure for SMEs, it has been used by a larger number of firms in several sectors 
of the economy. 
Act 108911968 was modified by Act 4611982, which established the 
Technological Innovation Fund. The latter is administered by MIT! (Minister of 
Industry) and it is designed to finance projects for the introduction of new products 
or processes or the improvement of existing ones. The fund is aimed at financing all 
those activities, such as design, experimentation, development and pre-production, 
which are necessary for the implementation of applied research projects. It provides 
low-interest loans and subsidies and permits the funding of programs already begun. 
Although these schemes favoured mainly large firms (90 per cent for the Applied 
Research Fund and 80 per cent for Technological Innovation Fund in 1987), they 
were also designed to finance projects carried out by SMEs (for example through 
easier processes of assessment). 
These two funds have played a very important role in increasing the 
technological and research capabilities of Italian firms over the past 20 years. At the 
same time, as argued by Malerba (1993) there remain several major problems. First, 
the two funds are not very well co-ordinated and for this reason not very effective. 
Second, they are not used to stimulate new projects, but only as a support for already 
existing ones. Third, the vast majority of projects is characterised by a medium level 
of innovativeness, and is not at the technological frontier. Fourth, new high 
technology firms are not favoured at all. Fifth, funds are provided in the form of 
direct financial support to firms' activities instead of offering a broader range of 
policy tools. Finally, too many sectors are supported and the bureaucratic procedures 
which firms must handle in order to obtain the funds are still too long. 
To conclude, the industry-specific expertise of public agencies in charge of 
providing public forms of financing for innovation is rather high. Nonetheless, up 
until now, due to the length and complexity of bureaucratic procedures, public funds 
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do not seem to have played a determining role within the set of funding sources for 
innovation. This deficiency is especially evident among established medium and 
small firms and also in new high technology start-ups. 
3.3 Inclusion of the stakeholders 
The degree of appropriation of the returns to an innovation depends, among 
other things, on the role played by other stakeholders in the innovation process itself. 
In numerous sectors, where the degree of appropriability is rather low, suppliers, 
customers and employees play an essential role in the innovation process. In 
particular they might be required to make specific investments (in machinery or 
research or in the accumulation of expertise), which cannot be used in other ways. 
This strongly enhances the degree of innovativeness of the firm. In situations like 
these, the best strategy is to build up some sort of coalition with those stakeholders. 
These coalitions do not need to take the form of a joint venture or of an exchange of 
shareholding. In many cases, they can be based on trust or on informal agreements. 
For example, the innovative firm may agree to pay a higher price to the supplier, may 
finance part of its R&D expenditure, or may offer support in other ways. 
As for the employees, the coalition might take an obviously institutionalised 
form, as in Germany for example, or else a more subtle form. In this latter case, there 
could be an informal promise of a lifetime employment (see Japan)40 or, in small 
firms, a strong relationship of trust with the entrepreneur, or finally the legislation for 
the protection of employees might pose serious obstacles in laying off workers. 
All these forms of coalition play an essential role in obtaining the 
collaboration of the various stakeholders (firm-specific investments by the suppliers, 
or accumulation of firm-specific skills by the employees and an active role in the 
innovation process, etc), collaboration that a pure shareholders first strategy would 
not achieve. This, however, does not mean that coalitions are always necessary. In 
fact, there are several highly innovative sectors where long-term relationships would 
obstruct change, and impede the achievement of the most effective process of 
change. 
40 efr. Blair (1999). 
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3.3.1 Customers and suppliers 
One of the main characteristics of Italian industry is the importance of close 
long-tenn relationship of finns with suppliers and customers. These relationships 
spread in every direction, horizontally and vertically. In fact, on the one hand there 
are numerous groups of finns, which we mentioned before. Moreover, there are the 
famous industrial districts.41 As extensively explained by Brusco (1982), within 
those areas, several hundred finns specialise in one or two stages of the process of 
industrialisation of a particular product (chairs, glasses, tiles, gold jewellery and so 
on), which are then assembled and marked by only a few them. The division of 
labour among so many finns gives rise to a strong network of close long-tenn 
relationships. This is also enforced by a common culture, a similar level of capability 
and the capacity to transmit and assimilate tacit and non-codified knowledge. The 
presence of strong interconnections, however, does not mean that finns are adopting 
a collusive strategy. On the contrary, one of the driving forces of innovation within 
districts is definitely the high degree of competition among these finns. Regional and 
local governments, banks and professional schools that provide public support, 
financial resources and qualified labour force to finns, favour the good functioning 
of districts. Moreover, export and distribution associations contribute to the process 
of internationalisation of small finns, helping them to sell their final products abroad. 
A good example of the functioning of a district is that offered by the Chair 
District of Manzano. There, a number of finns and the local bank have recently set 
up their own inter-district IT network. Through radio devices, most of the finns of 
the district and the bank are now connected. Infonnation concerning stocks, billing, 
drawings and so on are spread in real time across the district and to the bank. This 
means that orders no longer need, as the program, which also provides for the billing, 
sends them automatically. On the other hand, the bank is immediately and 
automatically infonned of the operation and promptly makes the payment. 
41 Districts are more widespread in the Northeast, in Lombardia, in some part of Piemonte and in the 
Centre, especially on the Adriatic cost. In the Mezzogiomo there are hardly any district with the 
exception of Puglia, Campania and Sardinia. Some of them have been in existence for decades, such 
as the textile districts in northern Italy. Others grew up more recently as Sassuolo, Prato and Valdarno 
Inferiore. In 1991 they employed 34% of total employment among firms with less than 200 
employees. 
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In addition to districts, there is in Italy a small number of very large firms that 
are surrounded by hundreds of subcontractors. These subcontractors are totally 
dominated (and often exploited) by the large firms, but usually cannot survive 
without this type of relationship. The subcontractors are not usually very innovative 
and strictly follow the guidelines coming from the large firm. The relationship is 
often close, long-term and exclusive. 
Both the districts and the larger firms are sustained by a second, less visible 
layer of activity. It consists of all those firms that make the machines that are utilised 
in the production process. These equipment suppliers usually have a close long-term 
relationship with the firms. They know their needs, and work together with them for 
the introduction of new high technology machinery. Thanks to their high capability 
to absorb new electronics technologies in their products and their advanced technical 
and design skills, these firms generate a continuous stream of incremental 
innovations in equipment, and contribute to the flexibility of the users of their 
machines. The importance of the close long-term relationships of machine suppliers 
and producers is attested by their geographical localisation. For example, near 
Valenza Po there is both a cluster of gold jewellery producers and of gold forging 
machines builders. The same is true for spectacles in Veneto and for tiles in the 
Modena area. As reported by the Economist (1998c): "Northern Italy's long-standing 
clusters are proof of the value of collaboration. Elena Ferraro of IECO, which makes 
machines for melting and electroforming gold, underlines the importance of 
exchanging information with her customers. Of the firm's sales, 60% are within 
Italy. Most of those are of customised machines, rather than the off-the-shelf models 
and complete turnkey factories that IECO sells abroad. The need to keep up with the 
demands of the more sophisticated Italian goldsmiths has enabled Italian suppliers 
such as IECO, and nearby Sisma, to dominate their business, supplying about 80% of 
the total world market for machinery for making gold jewellery". There is therefore, 
a mutual exchange of information that generates those that Malerba (1993) called the 
innovative spirals where high requirements of firms, draw out the innovativeness of 
machine builders, whose inventions allow firms to be even more innovative. 
This type of relationship, however, seems to be fading away, due the 
globalisation of the markets. In fact, in an article that appeared just a couple of years 
ago on the Economist (1998c), it was reported that there is great fear among Italian 
industrialists that globalisation will weaken the country's clusters. "Rather than use 
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machines that might be sold to their competitors, some bigger firms prefer to rely on 
equipment from in-house workshops". Barilla, Safilo and many other firms are 
developing in-house machines shaped to their own needs because, they claim, 
machine producers are now selling machines everywhere in the world, including to 
their direct competitors in Asia, for example. 
3.3.2 Labour market 
Together with the importance of close long-term inter-firm relationships with 
customers and suppliers, another issue that needs to be addressed is the type of 
relation with employees and their level of inclusion. 
The structure of the labour market in Italy is very similar to those in Germany 
and Japan (See Table 3.12). The average duration of employment is very high, 14 
years which is twice as long as in the US, for example. The reason is to be found first 
in the employment legislation (Art. 2119 c.c. and Art. 1 law 604/66 allow employers 
to dismiss an employee respectively only for giusta causa42 or giustificato motivo43 ). 
Second, it arises from the widespread diffusion of family-run businesses, which are 
characterised by the loyalty of the employees and by trust relationships. 
Table 3.12 Human resources management. On average the data refer to the year 1994. 
Italy United Japan Germany France 
States 
Average duration of 14.0 6.7 10.9 10.4 10.1 
employment (years) 
Wage profile (production 1.09 0.95 1.26 0.95 -
workers) 1 
Wage profile (office 1.42 1.03 1.5 1.00 -
workers)1 
Earnings dispersion 2 1.56 3 2.14 4 1.73 - -
Ratio of CEO compensation 
over manufacturing workers' 14.20 25.02 13.01 9.95 16.94 
compensation 
1 Raho of wage for employees aged 50-54 years to wage of employees aged 30-34. 
2 Ratio of ninth over fifth decile. 
3 1987. 
4 1989. 
5 1991. 
Source: OEeD (1995). 
United 
Kingdom 
7.9 
-
-
1.99 5 
16.43 
42 The notion of giusta causa refers to a default of the employee and more in general to each episode 
that diminishes the degree of trust existing between the employer and the employee (See L. 15/7 1966, 
n.604). 
43 Giustificato motivo refers to reasons concerning the correct functioning of the firm and the 
organisation oflabour (See art. 3, L.604/1966). 
100 
Employment turnover is higher in smaller firms than in larger ones. 
Considering only manufacturing firms, the rate of turnover per year is 49.1044 in 
those with less than 20 employees, 28.60 in those with 20 to 199 employees, 19.10 in 
those with 200 to 1000 employees and 13.10 in those with more than a 1000 
employees. This phenomenon was even more evident before May 1990 when 
legislation against unfair dismissals did not apply to firms with less than 15 
employees. These firms were therefore able to hire and fire as the volume of orders 
changed.45 
By contrast, III large firms, laying off workers is almost impossible. The 
strength of the unions ensures that labour legislation is strongly respected. Shop-floor 
representatives are recognised, and this guarantees an average wage higher than in 
small firms. Employees' representatives do not have the right to sit in the managing 
boards, but the power of the unions guarantees that once an agreement is reached 
with the employer, its terms will be enforced without subsequent localised conflict 
among the workers.46 This is important especially because it allows the entrepreneur 
to plan with more precision the volume of production and investment. 
The rate of turnover changes also in accordance with the sector in 
consideration. Turnover is higher in traditional sectors and in sectors characterised 
by a low level of technology, and it is usually lower in highly innovative sectors.47 It 
is also seen that the rate of turnover is higher for younger employees, for blue collars 
than for white-collar workers, for women than for men, in the Mezzogiorno and in 
the Northeast than in the other regions.48 
A low level of turnover prevents a large outflow of resources from one firm 
to the other and it is therefore important in the process of technological innovation 
and appropriation, especially in those sectors characterised by an incremental type of 
innovation. At the same time, though, it could also cause a strong tendency of 
conservatism, impeding liberal structural changes often necessary in the adoption of 
new technologies. In fact, according to the recent survey on technological 
44 Calculated as the nwnber of employees leaving the frr:rn, divided by the total nwnber of employees 
and multiplied by 100. 
45 However, the high rate of turnover in small fIrms is more due to the fact that workers usually aim 
for better jobs in larger fIrms than to a decision of the entrepreneurs. The latter group in fact, due to 
the position usually played in the community feels the obligation to maintain and as far as possible 
increase and improve employment. 
46 See Brusco (1982). 
47 High innovative fIrms seem to use more incentives to keep their employees. 
48 See Pacelli and Rapiti (1995). 
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innovation,49 Italian industrialists rank among the major obstacles to innovation the 
inability of their firms to adapt to the needed changes. 
In Italy, dispersion of wages is very low and the wage profile, both for 
manual workers and for office workers is based on seniority5o (see Table 3.12). In 
particular, as hostile take-overs are very unlikely, the ratio of executive 
compensation to production wages is only 14.20, which is much lower than the US 
(25) (see Table 3.12). For the same reason, the use of stock options and other forms 
of long-term incentives (very common in market-based systems) is not needed and 
therefore not very common. Offers of equity shares to employees have always had a 
financial connotation and were never aimed at encouraging employees' participation 
in the corporate governance of Italian firms. In general, the level of participation is 
higher in the North West, among managers, within the financial sector and in firms 
with 41-50 employees.51 
Even though on average large high-technology firms tend to have the lowest 
level of turnover, there is a phenomenon that deserves to be mentioned. There are a 
few small and medium sized high-tech enterprises in the electronics, software, and 
service sectors, which have been set up by technicians and engineers who left their 
previous occupation in a large company to meet some customer demand. These firms 
usually do not have their own research laboratory and incorporate (often 
successfully) already existing components and software in new systems or products 
especially designed to satisfy the client's needs. 
To conclude, even if the Italian employees do not have the same power of co-
determination as the German ones, their degree of inclusion appears to be quite high. 
In fact, as much as in Germany, the entrepreneur has a feeling of social responsibility 
towards the community in which the firm is set and where he/she usually lives52 and 
in hislher decisions the interests of the employees are considered as an important 
variable. Moreover this attitude is strengthened by the feeling of trust that grows 
between the employer and the employees due to the low level of employment 
turnover within firms. 
49 See Iammarino, Prisco and Silvani (1996). 
50 In small firms, there is a much higher dispersion of wages, going from the maintenance workers 
who can earn twice as much as their factory fellows, to the immigrant home workers who get less than 
one-third of what they would receive in the factory. 
51 See http://www.cfi.itljorumJ00000017.htm 
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3.4 Matching corporate governance and industrial specialisation 
In the previous sections the main characteristics of the Italian corporate 
governance system have been explored. In this section we will try to draw some 
conclusions about the degree of firm-specific perceptiveness, industry-specific 
expertise and inclusion of the stakeholders. Moreover, we will compare the effective 
specialisation of the Italian industry with that expected on the basis of the 
characteristics of the corporate governance and of the theoretical framework. 
In Italy there is a very high firm-specific perceptiveness among shareholders 
of both small and large firms. Family control is one of the most widespread forms of 
control and the owners and their families usually operate actively within the firm. 
Codified and tacit knowledge is transferred from one generation to the other in a 
process which starts very early in the life of the family members. Short-term 
pressures coming from the shareholders are therefore very unlikely and in general do 
not prevent firms from investing in innovative projects. Moreover, as in practical 
terms there are no threats of take-overs, short-term pressures are also not performed 
by the market for corporate control. Even when control is indirect and exercised 
through the chain of equity shares (i.e. groups of firms), at the end of the chain there 
is usually a family (for example Agnelli family) exercising influence. In this case, the 
firm-specific perceptiveness allows firms to overcome the inefficiencies of the capital 
market. Thus, the capital acquired by one firm could be re-directed to another firm 
within the same group to ameliorate problems of liquidity. Banks and other financial 
institutions have never played a central role in the corporate governance of Italian 
firms. The only exceptions have been Mediobanca, banks within districts, and banks 
related to large firms through interlocking directorates. 
A peculiarity of the Italian system is the role played by the state. As 
explained in Section 3.2.6, before the beginning of the privatisation process public 
firms were present in several industrial and service sectors, accounting for 20 per 
cent of the value added. Nevertheless, as public managers were usually appointed for 
political reasons and very often they were politicians rather than managers, it can be 
argued that, much as in France, they have "no more capacity than outsider investors 
to monitor and evaluate innovation carried out in a multitude of smallish firms or 
subdivisions of large firms" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.34). Moreover, in many 
52 See Danieli case study, Chapter 6. 
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cases, investments were not made on the basis of the expected future profits, but 
were inspired by other aims such as macroeconomic objectives or the development 
of strategic sectors. 
The most widely adopted strategy in Italy is certainly the inclusion of 
stakeholders one, both with regards to the employees and the customers/suppliers. In 
fact, even though representatives of Italian employees do not have the right of 
codetermination as they do in Germany and they cannot sit in the management 
boards, it appears that the interests of the employees are taken into consideration in 
the decision making processes. This is for several reasons. Firstly, for legal reasons 
firms are allowed to fire employees only for giusta causa or giustifzcato motivo, 
which are two reasons that are very difficult to sustain. In addition, as the employee-
employer relationship is usually based on loyalty and trust, especially in small and 
medium sized firms, employers hardly ever make use of their limited right to fire 
employees. Moreover, as in Germany, entrepreneurs usually have a feeling of social 
responsibility towards the community they live in and they do not usually consider 
the price of the equity shares as more- important than the employment level. 
Furthermore, especially among large firms, workers organisations are very powerful 
and operate to make sure that the interests of the employees are respected. 
Suppliers and customers play a very important role in the process of 
innovation of Italian firms and close long-term inter-firm relationships are very 
common. Especially among groups of firms, and within districts, co-operation is 
essential and in many cases innovative projects are carried out by two or more firms 
along the value chain. Moreover, as indicated by the Community Innovation Survey, 
in many of the traditional sectors, the purchase of high technology machinery 
represents the largest part of the costs for innovation. As explained in Section 3.3.1, 
equipment producers usually know the needs of the users and work together with 
them for the introduction of new high technology machinery. 
As much as for the German system, the inclusion of the employees in Italy 
has the direct effect of encouraging a high level of conservatism, and this makes this 
system weak when innovation requires radical change. As a matter of fact, resistance 
to change within the firm was one of the obstacles to innovation, after financial 
reasons, indicated by Italian managers in the 1990-1992 Community Innovation 
Survey. At the same time new start up firms in the high technology sectors seem to 
encounter serious difficulties in finding capital as the venture capital market is still 
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young, and tends to finance more traditional sectors. In addition, banks and other 
financial institutions in general lack any sort of industry-specific expertise as, for 
legal reasons (they could not acquire equity shares in non-financial firms) they have 
never found it convenient to invest in this kind of knowledge. Only within industrial 
districts does the situation appear to be different, as the presence of interlocking 
directorates between banks and firms should mean that a certain level of industry-
specific expertise islhas been available. The state seems to have a certain degree of 
industry-specific expertise as the public agencies in charge of evaluating innovative 
projects for financing are composed of professionals and experts of the various 
sectors. However, as mentioned in Section 3.2.7, until now, public schemes have 
mainly been used by large firms, for already existing projects and only in a small 
percentage by small new-start up firms. This suggests that the public sector's 
industry-specific expertise has not been used to cope with novelty. 
Given the above considerations, the Italian system of corporate governance is 
expected to be specialised in sectors characterised by a low level of visibility, a low 
level of appropriability and a low level of novelty. According to Tylecote and 
Conesa (1999, P .45)53 the mechanical and electrical engineering sectors seem to be 
the ones that match, more than others, these requirements. In fact in such sectors 
"generally the process of innovation is decentralised, with innovations very 
dependent on low visibility activities", the innovations are "too difficult to protect by 
patent" and there is a tendency towards close long-term inter firm relationships. 
Moreover, their objected-oriented character and low level of growth "favour systems 
with a high inclusion of stakeholders." On the other hand, the electronic capital and 
intermediate goods sectors present a high level of novelty, which is at odds with the 
low level of industry-specific expertise and the high level of inclusion of 
stakeholders characterising the Italian system. As for the chemistry-based group, it is 
indispensable to make further distinctions, as it comprehends rather different sectors. 
In fact, although all of the sectors present a high level of visibility (which makes the 
Italian firm-specific perceptiveness redundant),54 only the pharmaceutical one is so 
high-tech as to have high novelty (eft. Frequent and radical breaks with the past). At 
53 For a description of the characteristics of the various sectors in tenns of visibility, appropriability 
and novelty, see Chapter 1, Sections 1.5.1, 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. 
54 See Tylecote and Conesa (1999) for the same considerations about Germany. 
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the same time, even though most of the sectors are function-oriented55 and therefore 
do not require a cumulative learning on the shop floor, the "volumes" one (bulk steel, 
glass production, standard petrochemicals, etc.)56 because of the inclusion of metals 
and glass, does. Finally, the use of close long-term inter-firm relationships are by far 
more important for chemical effects (paints, adhesives, etc) than for volumes and 
consumer goods (shampoo, etc) and pharmaceuticals. Italy is therefore expected to 
be much more specialised in volumes, due to the low visibility, the importance of the 
cumulative learning on the shop floor, the medium importance of close long-term 
inter-firm relationships and low level of novelty. At the same time, it is expected to 
perform quite well in chemical effects due to the importance of close long-term inter-
firm relationships, worse in consumer goods and quite poorly in pharmaceuticals. 
3.5 The Italian sectoral specialisation 
Even if in the last two decades a lot of effort has been spent to reduce the 
technological gap between Italy and the other advanced countries there is still a lot 
that needs to be done. In fact, OEeD (1996) reports that in 1995 Italy was the sixth 
country among the OEeD in terms of total volume of R&D expenditure. At the same 
time, the intensity of R&D measured as a percentage of GDP and the share of R&D 
expenditures carried out by private enterprises were much lower than the average of 
the OEeD countries. 
T bi 313 Sh a e are 0 f h' h t h I d t 1 ec no ogy pro uc s on ttl t o a expor s 
1980-82 1989-91 1993-95 
Italy 11.4 14.7 14.7 
France 15.5 25.0 27.6 
Germany 17.9 21.6 22.5 
United Kingdom 23.8 33.0 36.8 
Spain 8.8 13.9 14.6 
EU (15) 16.9 22.4 24.3 
United States 31.5 41.4 40.7 
Japan 21.1 31.9 32.5 
Total 19.5 25.9 28.3 
Source: Trentl (1999). 
In terms of sectoral specialisation, a preliminary insight is offered by the data 
that relate the share of high technology products to the total level of exports. As it 
can be seen in Table 3.13, this percentage is by far lower in Italy than in the other G7 
55 Cfr. Itarni (1994). See also Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2. 
56 See Chapter 1. 
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countries and, contrary to them, the level has remained unchanged during the 1989-
1995 period. As suggested by Trenti (1999) this means that Italy has undergone a 
progressive process of specialisation in the traditional sectors, with a substantial 
reduction of the efforts put in during the 1980s to reduce the technological gap. 
Moreover, Trenti (1999) also reports that in the case of Italy, unlike Germany and 
France, there has been a strong reduction of the importance in terms of value added 
and employment in sectors characterised by a medium-high level of technology, 
namely chemicals, electrical machinery, instrumental mechanics, means of transport. 
Further such reduction has not been accompanied by a similar increase in the sectors 
at the technological frontier such as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and 
informatics as it happened in the other advanced countries. Bearing this in mind 
(namely that Italy is more specialised in traditional sectors than in high technology 
ones), we will now direct our attention to the high technology sectors. 
Tabl 3 14 T hi· I d t d e ec no oglca an ra e S{!eCla lsa lOn, -. r t" 1987 91 
Technological Trade specialisation 
specialisation 
87-91 87-91 
Mechanical and electric capital l36 145 
Mechanical and electric intermediate 81 166 
Mechanical and electrical consumer 214 247 
Auto vehicles 106 74 
Electronics capital intermediate goods 62 52 
Chemistry-based volumes 85 107 
Chemical effects 154 74 
Chemical consumer 65 78 
Drugs and biotechnology 196 70 
All industries 100 100 
Source: Guemen and Tylecote (1998). 
In general studies on industrial specialisation use either trade categories (e.g. 
exports) or technology categories ( e.g. patents), 57 or more often a combination of the 
twO.58 We will borrow the indicators calculated by Guerrieri and Tylecote (1998), 
which consist of one indicator for trade and one for technological specialisation. For 
trade, the indicator they use is the Trade specialisation, which is the ratio of a 
57 See Archibugi and Pianta (1992) for a comparative analysis based on patent data. 
58 See ENEA-Cespri-Politecnico di Milano (1998). 
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country's share of world exports in product group i to the share of the same country 
in total world exports (the Balassa index for trade specialisation). For technological 
specialisation, the indicator is the Technological specialisation, which is the ratio of a 
country's share of patents registered in the USA in product group i to the share of the 
same country in total US patents. As it can be seen in Table 3.14, the indicators refer 
to the 1987-1991 period and comprehend three main groups of sectors namely the 
engineering, the chemicals and the electronics ones. 
As expected, Italy presents a high level of both technological and trade 
specialisation in the mechanical and electrical engineering sectors. In fact, all the 
sectors score far more than 100 in the trade specialisation category. Two out of three 
score more than 100 also in the technological specialisation category. The 
importance and high innovativeness of this sector for the Italian industry is 
confirmed by the results of the CIS survey. In fact, on the one hand it appears that the 
mechanical sector presents the highest percentage of innovative firms within the 
Italian industry even though the chemicals sector spends more on R&D. On the other 
hand, Italian firms ranked "embodied technical change in terms of investments in 
new machinery" as the major source of innovation. This is because, as explained at 
length by Malerba (1993), both firms within the districts and firms in the traditional 
sectors are highly reliant for their innovations on new and innovative equipment (and 
machinery in particular), produced ad hoc for their needs, generally in collaboration 
with the suppliers. This in turn, has started "virtuous vertical innovative cycles" 
where the equipment producers became more and more innovative as 
"technologically progressive and highly competitive users requested new advanced 
capital equipment to upstream producers that were therefore stimulated to satisfy 
users' demand with innovative equipment" (Malerba, 1993, p.255). A clear example 
of this symbiosis relationship is offered by the textile equipment firms in the textile 
district of Biella in Piemonte. 
As expected, the level of specialisation in the chemicals sectors is on average 
lower than that in the mechanical ones. Among the chemicals sectors we were 
expecting quite a high specialisation in volumes (bulk steel, glass production, 
standard petrochemicals, etc), lower in chemical effects (paints, adhesives, etc) and 
in consumer goods (shampoo, etc) and a very limited specialisation in drugs and 
biotechnology. The results in terms of trade specialisation appear to totally fulfil 
these expectations. In fact, chemical volumes presents a value higher than 100 (107) 
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whereas chemical consumer goods (78), chemical effects (74) and drugs and 
biotechnology (70) have much lower values.59 As expected the electronics sector 
scores lower than any other sector. 
As for the technological innovation index, the results are on average 
satisfactory with the exception of the high score in drugs and biotechnology and in 
chemical effects. These sectors score well above 100. This is surprising but not 
difficult to explain. In fact, as suggested by Malerba (1991), the index of 
technological specialisation based on patents counts the number of patents and not 
their importance. Italian firms in the drugs and biotechnology and chemical effects 
sectors might be patenting marginal and incremental innovations. And this is 
confirmed also by the low score in the trade specialisation. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have analysed the Italian system of corporate governance. 
We have shown that the principal variables indicated by Berg16f (1997) as being 
partiCUlar of the insider group can be found in the Italian system. In fact, Italian firms 
depend heavily on bank finance (even though very few banks have ever played an 
important role in the corporate governance of firms) (See 3.2.3.1); financial markets 
have historically been shallow and small (albeit they have grown and become more 
liquid) (See 3.2.3.2); ownership and control are concentrated (the role of the state is 
important) (See 3.2.2); groups of firms are very widespread and used as a mechanism 
to separate ownership and control which cause conflicts of interest between minority 
and majority shareholders (See 3.2.3.5); boards of directors playa limited role (See 
3.2.1); the market for corporate control is not active, and hostile take-overs are 
difficult and unlikely (See 3.2.4). 
In terms of the theoretical framework, the Italian system of corporate 
governance appears to be characterised on average by a high firm-specific 
perceptiveness, a high inclusion of the stakeholders and a low industry-specific 
expertise. This, as shown in Section 3.5, helps to explain the Italian industrial 
specialisation in sectors characterised by low visibility, low appropriability and low 
novelty such as the mechanical engineering sectors. It also offers an explanation for 
59 We were however expecting a higher value for chemical effects than consumer goods. 
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the low specialisation in sectors characterised by radical innovations such as with 
electronics, drugs and biotechnologies. 
In this chapter, however, it has also been shown that Italy, along with the 
other insider systems60 has slowly begun to move towards the outsider position. The 
process of privatisation has been reducing the role of the state and will continue to 
result in increasing the number of listed firms as well as increasing the stock market 
capitalisation. This can be seen as the Italian stock market has developed to a much 
higher level of liquidity and transparency than has historically been the case. The 
role of financial institutions is increasing and firms are experiencing new forms of 
financing in addition to bank loans. The private equity and venture capital markets 
underwent a spectacular development. Many groups have undergone processes of 
restructuring, reducing the number of levels and therefore increasing transparency. In 
addition, the new Draghi reform on financial markets has introduced new 
mechanisms for the protection of minority shareholders, therefore reducing conflicts 
of interest between them and the majority shareholders. Globalisation is reducing the 
strength of close long-term inter-firm relationships. Firms tend to make a 
progressively larger use of unskilled employees coming from the underdeveloped 
countries, who are hired with short-term contracts and not included. 
"However innovation systems are not naturally given" (Metcalfe, 2000, p.7). 
They are not static entities and evolve as a result of the activity and interaction of 
individuals. They can improve but they can also become less effective in delivering 
innovations. The latest developments in Italian corporate governance have been 
unanimously welcomed as a sign of the progressive evolution of Italy. However, the 
same developments, if not appropriately dealt with, could even reduce the degree of 
innovativeness of Italian firms. In fact, if with the shift towards the outsider end of 
the continuum, the presence of insider shareholders is reduced and banks and other 
financial institutions do not assume a long-term perspective; and if the role played by 
the important stakeholders is neglected and firms adopt a strategy for the 
maximisation of the shareholders' value (as suggested by the Code of conduct), the. 
strengths of Italy in sectors characterised by low visibility, low appropriability and 
low novelty could vanish. On the other hand, Italy's strengths in sectors characterised 
by high visibility, high appropriability and high novelty are still rather 
60 For example Germany and Sweden. 
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underdeveloped in comparison with the outsider countries. In fact, the Italian private 
equity and venture capital markets are developing but are still very small in 
comparison with the American and the British ones. Furthermore, legislation on job 
protection would prevent firms from pursuing the latest developments in the market, 
dismantling subsidiaries and laying off large sections of the work force if needed. 
Borrowing Porter's (1985) expression, Italy would find itself "stuck in the middle",6! 
which would be deleterious for the whole economy. 
61 "A fIrm that engages in each generic strategy but fails to achieve any of them is 'stuck in the 
middle'. It possesses no competitive advantage. This strategic position is usually a recipe for below-
average performance" (Porter, 1985, p.16). 
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4. The machine-tool sector 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have introduced the theoretical framework and 
given an overview of the Italian system of corporate governance. In this chapter and 
in the following the focus will mainly be on the machine-tool sector. 
In Section 4.2, we will give a general overview of the sector. We will define 
machine-tools and present the structure of industry and its current trends. In Section 
4.3, we will present the historical background of the sector, focusing mainly on the 
decline of importance of the US and the upsurge of Japan. Then, in Section 4.4, we 
will proceed with the analysis of the sector in terms of novelty, appropriability, and 
visibility, paying a particular attention to the role played by the introduction of NCs 
(numeric controls) and CNCs (computerised numeric controls). Finally, Section 4.5 
contains an attempted explanation, on the basis of Tylecote's framework, of the 
upsurge of Japan to a leadership position in the machine-tool sector and the decline 
of the US during the 1970s and 1980s. 
4.2 General characteristics of the sector 
As reported by Sciberras and Payne (1985, p.19), "there are two kinds of 
machine-tools used in metal working. The first shapes metal by cutting it to the 
correct shape and correct size. [ ... ] The second kind of machine-tool shapes the 
metal in one of two ways, either by shearing, or by hammering or squeezing the 
metal into shape. Such machines are known as metal-forming tools." The Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC), codes 3541, 3542, 3545 and 3549, includes also the 
associated accessories, but metal-cutting and metal-forming machines represent the 
core of the sector. Sciberras and Payne (1985) offer also a four-dimensional 
classification of machine-tools. They distinguish between general purpose and 
special purpose tools according to the level of flexibility. They also distinguish 
between standard and custom engineered according to the degree of standardisation 
of the constituting components. Further distinctions are made between systems and 
stand-alone machine-tools; and finally between conventionally and numerically 
controlled (NC/CNC). 
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The machine-tool sector is one of the smallest in the manufacturing sectors. 
In Japan in 1989, metal cutting! machine-tools represented only 1.7% of the 
production value of total machinery and equipment (Wieandt, 1994) and in 1992, the 
entire US machine-tool industry, if controlled by one company, would not have made 
the Fortune 100 (CTr r, 1994). Also the scale of the firms is rather limited. In 1997 in 
the Cecimo Area2 there were 1,449 machine-tool establishments. In total 154,920 
people were employed in the sector, with an average of just 106.92 employees per 
establishment. The largest number of firms in the Cecimo area is found in Italy. It 
has 450 establishments and an average of only 66 employees per establishment. The 
other major producer in Europe is Germany with just 320 firms, but a much higher, 
though still small, average size of 200 employees. The average scale of such firms in 
Japan is 271. 
In spite of its limited dimension, however, this sector is one of the most 
strategic in the manufacturing sectors. In fact, as machine-tools are employed in the 
production of other machines,3 they represent the primary production equipment for 
the metal working industry. On average, this industry generates 40% of the whole 
value added of manufacturing industries (Carlsson, 1989). A strong domestic 
machine-tool sector can provide user industries with a competitive advantage4 in 
production techniques vis-a.-vis their foreign competitors. Having to rely on imported 
tools would mean exporting a wide range of manufacturing know-how. It would also 
mean ignoring the advantage of the geographical proximity between producer and 
user, an important factor when machines become highly engineering intensive. 
Some authors have argued that greater globalisation, with the associated 
reduction of trade barriers, lower costs of transport and better communications, have 
progressively eliminated some basic advantages enjoyed by local suppliers. This is 
because new technologies are available to potential users in any part of the world, 
I In 1990 metal cutting machine-tools accounted for 76.4% of the total world machine-tool production 
(American Machinist, 1991, p.36). 
2 Cecimo comprises 14 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK) and in 1997 
accounted for 46.8% of world production of machine-tools (Japan, 27.6% and the US l3%) and 
36.7% of world consumption (Japan 10.6% and the US 20.5%). 
3 The Chinese call them "mother machines" (Miao, 1993). 
4 "Though a finn can have a myriad of strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis its competitors, there are 
two basic types of competitive advantage a finn can possess: low cost or differentiation. The 
significance of any strength or weakness a finn possesses is ultimately a function of its impact on 
relative cost or differentiation" (Porter, 1985, p.11). A strong domestic machine-tool sector is 
important for both strategies, low cost and differentiation. 
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with either negligible or short time lags (Carlsson, 1989).5 However, gIVen the 
strategic importance of close, long-term relationship between producers and users of 
machine-tools in the innovation process, we think that a strong domestic machine-
tool sector is still essential to the success of a country's metal working industry. 
Typically, innovations in this sector are of an incremental type and this is 
confirmed also by the very low value of R&D intensity (e.g. R&D to turnover ratio). 
In fact, as reported by Sciberras and Payne (1985, p.83), formal research and 
development does not play an important role in the degree of innovativeness of 
machine-tool firms. With very few exceptions, most of the machine-tool builders do 
not maintain formal R&D activities. The level of R&D expenditure is generally 
around 1 to 2% of turnover and only few firms in Japan were found to devote a 
higher share of turnover to research activities. More recently, Grosse (1999) reported 
for German firms a R&D intensity of around 3.6% in this sector with an increase of 
nearly one percentage point since 1979. 
This situation is not only the result of the characteristics of the technology 
utilised in the production of machine-tools but also of the average dimension of the 
machine-tool builders and of the extreme cyclicity of the sector which "leave the 
machine-tool builders unable to sustain internally financed R&D programs over the 
long run" (Wieandt 1994, p.427). In fact, as argued by the National Academy of 
Engineering, "perhaps the most important trait associated with the machine-tool 
industry is the extreme cyclicity of its income, profits and cash flow" (NRC, 1983, 
p.10). This is mainly due to the high cyclicity in the investment patterns of the two 
main important customers, namely the automobile and aerospace industries. 
Other important aspects of the sector under consideration are the high capital 
intensity of its manufacturing process, as also machine-tool builders employ 
machine-tools, and as it can be seen in Table 4.1, the high level of total exports.6 For 
example, in the Cecimo area, between 1990 and 1997, firms have always exported 
more than 50% oftheir production. 
5 A real-time transfer of technology is more realistic now than in 1989 when Carlsson wrote his 
article. In fact, according to a 1990 machine-tool study at General Motors the time lag between the 
US, Japan and Germany was still one-to-two years (Chaponniere, 1990). 
6 Given the average low dimension of machine-tool fIrms, foreign direct investment is not common 
and builders tend to rely mainly on local distributors. 
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Table 4.1 Ratio Export/ Production 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Cecimo 0.60 0.59 0.63 0.73 0.72 0.65 0.68 0.66 
Japan 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.54 0.64 0.73 0.76 0.69 
Korea 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.39 0.35 
US 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.35 0.30 0.32 0.26 
Taiwan 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.75 
China 0.31 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 1.19 
Source: Ceclmo (1998). 
4.3 Historical background 
The first machine-tool was built in the late eighteenth century in Britain by 
John Wilkinson, who developed a new type of boring mill for the cylinders of James 
Watt's improved steam engine. Since then and up to the middle of the nineteenth 
century, Britain has been the leader in the sector and British machine-tools became to 
be regarded as standard all over the world. However, with the shift in demand 
towards more specialised, faster and more precise machines caused by the diffusion 
of the "American System" of mass production, the highly customised British 
machines progressively lost their leadership and the US took over as the leading 
producer. 
Further developments in the US came during the second half of the nineteenth 
and beginning of the twentieth century encouraged by the fast expansion first of the 
bicycle and later of the automobile industries. The outbreak of WWI and the Great 
Depression stopped the growth of the industry, and between 1929 and 1932 machine-
tool production in the US declined from 50,000 units to one tenth of that figure 
(Sciberras and Payne, 1985). 
The downturn period ended with the outbreak of WWII, which stimulated 
both US arms and military aircraft productions and as a consequence domestic 
machine-tools demand. In 1955 around 40% of the world's production of machine-
tools took place in the US, which managed to keep its leadership position until the 
end of the 1970s, even if with a much lower percentage (17.7%). 
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Table 4.2 Shares of machine-tools production in some producing nations 1975-1987. (%) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Japan 7.8 8.3 10.6 12.3 12.6 14.3 18.3 17.0 18.1 23.2 24.2 23.8 
US 18.0 16.0 16.1 15.8 17.7 18.0 19.5 16.8 10.8 12.6 12.4 9.5 
F.R.G 17.6 17.8 17.4 17.8 17.5 17.6 15.1 15.7 16.4 14.6 14.5 17.9 
Italy 6.4 5.5 5.8 5.6 5.9 6.5 5.9 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.6 
France 5.0 4.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.1 7.8 2.9 2.0 2.3 2.3 
UK 5.3 4.8 3.9 4.3 4.4 5.2 2.7 3.5 2.9 2.0 2.5 1.3 
Switzerland 3.9 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.7 3.2 3.6 3.9 3.4 4.3 4.9 
Source: Amencan MachIlllst, vanous Issues. 
As shown in Table 4.2, by 1987, the US share of world machine-tools 
production had dropped to 7.8%, nearly one third of the Japanese (20.5%)and less 
than half of the German ones (19.9%). In the same year, the Italian percentage share 
was 6.8%, just 1% lower than the American one. In only 12 years the Japanese 
percentage share of world machine-tools production rose from 7.8% to 20.5%, 
whereas the British one dropped from 5.3% to 2.8%. In only seven years (1980-
1987), US imports of machine-tools rose from 24% to 54% of total sales (See Figure 
4.1). In the same period, more than two-thirds of US machine-tool producers with 
fewer than 20 employees closed down, and the US government had to resort to 
protectionism to defend the domestic market. Most of the world market share lost by 
the US was gained by Japan, which between 1965 and 1982 rose from sixth ranking 
to top producer and progressively expanded its share of the US domestic market. 
Germany and Italy, the other two leading nations, did not suffer much from the 
Japanese competition during the 1980s and grew in unison with world production. 
Figure 4.1 Growing Japanese Import Penetration of US machine-tool market (in % of annual 
US machine-tools consumption), 1974-1989 
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The 1991-1993 period witnessed one of the worst crises of the sector. The 
consumption, and as a consequence the production of machine-tools, dropped in 
most countries (See Table 4.3). Japan, Germany and Italy were all hit rather strongly 
and in 1998 had not yet gone back to the production levels of 1990. Only China and 
Taiwan were not hit by the crisis and they even managed to increase their production 
between 1991 and 1993. In spite of the crisis, Japan did not lose its leadership 
position, and in 1998 was still the world's largest producer and exporter, even if with 
a much smaller percentage share, followed by Germany, the US and Italy. 
Table 4.3 Evolution of machine-tools production in the first ten manufacturing countries in the 
world (million US dollars) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Japan 10,945 11,639 8,355 6,968 6,707 8,998 9,183 9,984 8,975 
Germany 8,751 8,813 7,670 5,432 5,332 7,267 7,559 6,788 7,560 
USA 3,472 3,123 3,073 3,087 3,701 4,547 4,522 4,905 4,619 
Italy 3,706 3,470 3,092 2,109 2,326 3,278 3,765 3,446 3,645 
Switzerland 2,320 2,092 1,714 1,362 1,726 2,144 2,104 1,964 2,120 
China 822 1,446 1,685 2,970 1,904 1,857 1,742 1,700 1,702 
Taiwan 944 963 1,040 1,112 1,230 1,629 1,977 1,817 1,589 
United 1,681 1,292 1,102 967 852 1,019 1,343 1,303 1,195 Kingdom 
France 1,392 913 955 672 724 966 1,051 945 1,066 
Spain 1,015 751 613 394 450 662 802 815 945 
Source: UCIMU (1999). 
4.4 Characteristics of the sector in terms of novelty, appropriability and 
visibility 
Novelty 
Until the introduction of numerical controls in the 1970s, the machine-tool 
sector was characterised by a very low degree of novelty, having a very stable 
product technology, market structure and competitive environment. Innovations were 
mainly of an incremental type, realised by skilled machinists. The same basic lines of 
tools were sold for over 20 years and the design of a new line of products used to 
take several years (CTl l, 1994). The rate of growth of the industry was quite slow, 
especially if compared to the following period (See Figure 4.2). 
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Figure 4.2 Rising World Production and Trade of machine-tools, 1964-19907 
50000 
45000 
40000 
rn 
r---
-+- Production volume 
'- 35000 m r---
(5 30000 0 
(f) 25000 ::::) 
c:i 20000 
:2 15000 
.,;:: 
10000 
5000 
0 ~. . . . . 
"<t <D 
<D <D 
OJ OJ 
Source: Wieandt (1994). 
Trade volume 
/' 
.......... ~ ... .? 
AL 
.....,....-
-~ - -
~~ 
co 0 N "<t <D 
<D I'- I'- I'- I'-
OJ OJ OJ OJ OJ 
co 
I'-
OJ 
6--A. 
/ 
o 
co 
OJ 
'\.. 
N 
co 
OJ 
-..." 
7 
.I 
7 
<D 
co 
OJ 
I ., 
ff'1 
/ I I I 
I 
I 
, 
i 
I 
---; 
I 
I 
1 
i 
I 
I 
co 0 
co OJ 
OJ OJ 
During the 1970s, however, the diffusion of NCs (numerical controls) first 
and then of CNCs (computer numerically controlled machines) brought about a 
radical transformation in the system of production of the sector, so much so that 
several authors talk about a new technological paradigm. This new technology was 
first developed in the US in the early 1950s by the John C. Parsons Corporation, the 
US Air Force and the Servomechanisms Laboratory at MIT to produce highly 
complex metallic parts for the US Air Force. When first invented, NCs consisted of 
punched tapes, cards or operator push buttons that allowed programming and 
directing the operations of the machine (Wieandt, 1994). NC machine-tools 
permitted achieving a much higher flexibility than the previous specialised machine-
tools. However, their diffusion remained quite limited, as they were very expensive 
and not reliable. Further, shifting from one type of production to the other required 
the substitution of hardware components (Carlsson, 1989). 
The significant diffusion of NCs occurred only with their evolution into 
CNCs, after the invention of the microprocessor (See Figure 4.3). A Japanese firm, 
F ANUC, the current leader in controls production, was the first to apply the new 
7The graph is sourced from a published article and as a consequence it was kept unchanged. However, 
it must be noticed that the use of "volume" in the legend of the graph contradicts the use of $ millions 
on the vertical axis. 
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computer technology to machine-tools, starting in this way a new era in the history of 
the sector, with Japan as major producer and exporter. 
During the 1980s, the production of CNCs as a percentage of total production 
of machine tools in Japan was always far above 50%, whereas in the US it never 
grew above 35%. Also Germany witnessed a profound growth in the production of 
CNC machine-tools and, in 1989, CNC machine-tools represented 50% of total 
production. 
Figure 4.3 Production of CNCs as a percentage of total production of machine-tools 
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The US, which originally had developed the NCs, failed to exploit the shift 
towards the CNC technology and in this way lost its former leadership. Japanese 
firms, in fact, used the new computer technology to produce low cost, general 
purpose, highly flexible machine-tools for the needs of small job shops, first in Japan 
and then in the rest of the world. "By simplifying the product, making it more 
general purpose, and aiming it at small and medium sized firms, they completely 
changed the market. The potential number of customers now suddenly numbered in 
thousands, rather than the hundreds" (Carlsson, 1989, p.184). By 1977 the 
production (number) of NC and CNC machine-tools in Japan had surpassed that of 
the US and only three years later it was nearly three times as great. 
The US and Western Europe, on the contrary, were mainly oriented towards 
the largest, most sophisticated users of machine-tools. As a consequence, they 
concentrated on production, in small batches, of high-performance special-purpose 
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machines. As a matter of fact, the US maintained its leadership position in certain 
specialized markets (for example gear cutting machines), but the demand for these 
highly expensive machines is very small and shrinking and certainly not sufficient to 
offset the poor market penetration for general purpose CNCs machine-tools. 8 
The introduction and application of CNCs has certainly been the most 
important technological change in the machine-tool industry in the last 30 years. 
After the mid-1970s, in fact, things started changing much more rapidly. As shown 
in Figure 4.2, since then both the production and the trade volume of machine-tools 
have grown at a much faster rate. In addition, the product life cycle has been much 
shorter and firms have been forced to redesign their products every five years, or 
even less, to keep up to date with the new advances in microelectronics and sensing 
devices.9 The redesign process is now mainly measured in months (CTI I, 1994). 
Machines have progressively been sold within flexible systems, which require a 
greater degree of compatibility and reliability and special after-sales assistance. In 
addition new markets have been invented (Sciberras and Payne, 1985) and 
competition is now more intense and globalised. In fact, the number and type of 
competitors has broadened to the newly industrialised countries (Taiwan, Spain, 
Korea), which produce not only low-priced conventional tools but also increasingly 
more sophisticated CNC products with the aid of technology licensed from Japan. 
The application of CNCs to machine-tools, therefore, did not represent an 
isolated radical technological innovation. It was, in fact, followed by a series of other 
innovations, mainly as a result of innovations in other sectors, such as the 
development of new materials or the semiconductor technology. As the 
representation in Figure 4.4 shows, these have helped to sustain novelty to a 
relatively high degree. 10 
8 See CTr I (1994). 
9 "According to one of the leading Japanese CNC lathe builders, a design made in 1974-75 had a 
lifetime of eight years; while a design introduced in 1978 was being phased out in early 1983 and the 
expected lifetime of a design put on the market in 1983 was around three years" (Jacobsson 1986, p. 
89 as reported by Carlsson 1989, p.179). 
10 Examples of the most recent innovations are: parallel kinematics, the use of lasers in material 
processing and linear direct drives (new highly dynamic drive elements with a simple structure for 
direct generation oflinear movements). 
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Figure 4.4 Representation of the change in the degree of novelty of the machine-tool sector 
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The introduction of CNCs has influenced also the level of appropriability in 
the sector increasing the importance played by various stakeholders in the innovation 
process. 
The technology involved in the machine-tool sector is in fact of the object-
oriented type. 11 It involves producing a fixed object like steel or automobiles. This 
kind of technology requires a high degree of accumulation of skills on the shop floor. 
In fact, since the invention of the first machine-tool, innovations in this sector were 
mainly the result of the activity of skilled machinists. Their inclusion was therefore 
essential for companies to innovate effectively. Indeed, for a long time this group of 
employees had strong bargaining power and enjoyed high levels of responsibility 
within the successful machine-tool firms of the 19th and early 20th century. For 
example, Lazonick (1990) reports that in Britain in the 19th century senior workers, 
usually known as the "aristocracy of labour" not only provided their own knowledge 
and skills to the building and operation of machinery but also recruited junior 
workers, whom they trained and supervised on the shop floor. During the 20th 
century in the US, by contrast, the few skilled workers were appointed to middle 
management and the application of Tayloristic methods of production progressively 
took (and kept) learning off the shop floor (Lazonick, 1990). 
The introduction of CNCs imposed the inclusion of a much larger group of 
employees. This was for two main reasons. First, because the adaptation of 
computers to machine-tools is a very complex operation and new skills requirements 
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have become crucial to combine mechanical (cutting and fonning) and electronic 
technologies (both hardware and software). Such operation requires "increased math 
and literacy, computer programming, electronic maintenance, statistical process 
control" (CTl, 1994). This, as argued also by Soskice (1999), means that employees 
have to invest early in their career in the acquisition of industry-technology and 
company specific skills, which commit them, at least partially, to a particular 
occupation and company. For this reason there has to be a fonn of inclusion that not 
only guarantees employment security but also a stable system of wage detennination 
and skill certification. 
Second, for shop floor employees to work and innovate effectively, they need 
to be organised into autonomous groups. These are costly for management to monitor 
and impossible to explicate contractually. Furthennore, as employees hold the 
problem-solving knowledge, it is seldom practical for managers to have unilateral 
control over decisions. A fonnal or infonnal consensus-based approach to decision 
making (inclusion) appears therefore to be the best strategy. 
In addition, as training on the job is no longer adequate and the employees 
need to accumulate specific skills before being employed, educational institutions 
become more powerful stakeholders in the innovation process of machine-tool 
builders. Finns need to build strong and stable relationships in order to influence 
teaching modules. This extends to organizing specific training activities cfr. the dual 
apprenticeships of Gennany, Austria and Switzerland or the vocational colleges in 
Sweden. Such schemes are relevant both to those who are to work on the shop floor, 
and to those who have engineering degrees. 
11 See Itami (1994) and Chapter 1. 
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Figure 4.5 External sources of technology for machine-tool firms 
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Customers are other crucial stakeholders in the innovation process as they 
express specific needs that are then translated into innovations by the machine-tool 
builders. 12 A study by Gordon and Krieger (1993) on 35 American machine-tool 
builders (See Figure 4.5) showed that customers are the most important sources of 
innovation, followed by competitors and trade fairs. Universities and research 
institutes on the contrary, seem to playa limited role. 
Similar results, on a much larger sample of firms were found by the CIS 
survey (See Table 4.4). In every European country that participated in the survey, 
customers were considered to play an essential role in the process of innovation of 
manufacturers of machinery and equipment, followed by the competitors and by 
trade fairs. Again, universities and government laboratories appear to be the least 
important sources of innovation in this sector. 
Close long-term inter-firm relationships with customers appear therefore to 
be essential, in order to facilitate communication and interaction, to share proprietary 
12 Also Porter (1979) refers to customers as one of the S competitive forces that determine industry 
competition and with their bargaining power could appropriate part of the returns of a finn's 
investments. 
123 
information with no risk, and to co-operate in the design of new machines. 
Moreover, given the high working capital requirements for producing machine-tools 
and the limited average scale of machine-tool builders, customers could also provide 
up-front deposits and in-process payments. 
Table 4.4 Sources of information for innovation. Ranking of the different sources of information 
according to their perceived importance (l=most important). Nace code 29: Manufacture of 
machinery and equipment N.E.C 
Italy Germany France Spain 
Within the enterprise 1 6 1 4 
Suppliers of materials and components 4 4 6 7 
Suppliers of equipment 6 7 5 5 
Customers 2 1 2 2 
Competitors in your line of business 5 3 7 1 
Consultancy services 8 12 12 8 
Universities/higher education 10 9 10 12 
Government laboratories 11 11 11 11 
Technical institutes 12 10 9 9 
Patent disclosures 9 8 8 10 
Professional conferences, meetings, 7 5 6 6 professional journals 
Fairs/exhibitions 3 2 3 3 
Source: CIS database (1999). 
As for the suppliers, Figure 4.5 and Table 4.4 suggest that their role in the 
innovation process of machine-tool builders is not of central importance. However, a 
distinction needs to be made between those who supply control systems and those 
who supply parts of machine-tools. The former have played a crucial role in the 
development of NCs and CNCs during the 1970s and 1980s and those firms that 
were able to establish close relationships with them enjoyed a strong competitive 
advantage. As argued by Sciberras and Payne (1985, p.40), "there is no evidence to 
suggest that either barriers to access to the new technology or prices at which the 
components were available were factors in the varying willingness or ability to adopt 
the new numerical controls in these countries. The most significant factors appear to 
be the attitudes or strategies of the NC suppliers and the relationships between the 
suppliers and the machine-tool industry in the different countries". In fact, American 
and European suppliers of control systems ignored the machine-tool firms' needs for 
cheaper and more flexible NCs. On the contrary, the Japanese (mainly the leader 
Fanuc) focused on the development of controls, which appeared to be "the most 
appropriate for flexibility and low cost, given the competitive concern of the general 
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purpose machine-tool industry" (Sciberras and Payne, 1985, pAl). With few 
exceptions, most American and European machine-tool builders had to develop their 
own in-house controls, dissipating in this way considerable resources and time. 
It is the suppliers of parts other than control units, who do not appear to play 
an essential role, as firms tend to subcontract only simple or non-strategic parts. 13 In 
a recent study by Delmestri (1998), who interviewed several machine-tool builders in 
Italy and Germany, it emerged that very few of them had confidence in the ability of 
suppliers to attain good quality standards and to maintain the required levels of 
secrecy.14 Those firms that outsource complex parts, also extensively apply inter-
firm long-term co-ordination mechanisms to mcrease mutual confidence. Such 
mechanisms are supplemented by: pricing policies independent of cyclical 
downturns; the integration of the suppliers in production planning; the sharing of 
CNC programmes and production know-how; the precise definition of contract 
terms, with basic guidelines and sometimes price per quantity; and finally the 
property rights. Those machine-tool builders who actually have close long-term 
relationships with their suppliers declared that they experience important reductions 
in their costs and an increase in their quality (Delmestri, 1998, p.656). 
Only in Japan, do suppliers seem to have played a very important role. 
Japanese machine-tool firms are mainly assemblers. They buy over 70% of their 
components from outside specialised firms (Sprow, 1985, pA8). In this way they are 
able to exploit enormous economies of scale, and to offer products at a much higher 
speed and lower cost than any other competitor in the world. Melman (1983, p.58) 
reported that a small Japanese firm employing only 100 workers was able to produce 
30 NC machines per month, when a firm of the same scale in the US or in Europe 
needed a year to produce the same number of machines. Moreover, the price offered 
by the Japanese was 40% lower than that asked by American producers for similar 
machines. Numerous key suppliers work interactively with the machine-tool builders 
in the development of new components. Makers often exchange and train the staff of 
suppliers, sometimes transferring certain technologies to suppliers to enhance their 
13 See the two case studies, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
14 For example a producer that was interviewed said: "We keep hydraulic pieces inside because we 
have developed a good know how. We also keep other pieces inside because it would take too long to 
explain to the suppliers how to do it: in the long run, they would reach the same level of know-how 
but specification are so many that it is impossible to communicate them (there are two hundred ways 
of drilling holes in the working head)", Delmestri (1998, p.657). 
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skills, increasing the quality of components while reducing their costs over time 
(CTI, II, 1994). 
The higher reliance on trade secrecy is due to the perception of low 
effectiveness of patents by machine-tool builders. As reported by Grosse (1999) and 
confirmed by the results of the CIS database (See Table 4.5) and by several experts 
of the sector interviewed by the author,15 patents are regarded as relatively 
ineffective and expensive as a form of protection of intellectual property. As a 
consequence, greater reliance is put on other instruments, such as, commonly, trade 
secrecy and complexity of product design. At root, this happens because most of the 
innovations that take place in the machine-tool sector are incremental and, as a 
consequence, are quite difficult to protect by patents. 16 
Table 4.5 Methods of maintaining or increasing the competitiveness of product or process 
innovation. Nace code 29: Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C 
Germany* Belgium Denmark 
Patents 4 4 4 
Registration of 5 5 5 design 
Secrecy 2 2 3 
Complexity of 3 3 2 product design 
Having a lead 1 1 1 
time advantage 
* Italy, France and Sparn dId not rnclude thIS quesTIon rn the questIOnnaire. 
Source: CIS database (1999). 
Ireland 
5 
4 
2 
3 
1 
Notwithstanding this perception, however, according to the recent study by 
Fleischer (1999), those firms that have relied more on patents as a form of protection 
have had much more successful results than those which have relied mainly on 
secrecy. This might be a sign of a recent transformation that needs to be borne in 
mind in studying the sector and the most suitable form of corporate governance. 
In the previous section it was mentioned that the introduction of CNCs caused 
a momentary increase in the degree of novelty of the machine-tool sector and 
according to the theoretical framework this suggests that new start up firms with 
nothing to unlearn should have had an advantage 17 (if sustained by external financers 
15 Mr Battaglia ofUCIMU, Mr Poloni ofDanieli and Mr Sacca from Stam. 
16 Based on the results of interviews with machine-tool builders and experts of the sector. 
17 See Chapter 1. 
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with a certain degree of industry-specific expertise). However, as the degree of 
appropriability appears to be rather low, especially so far as the role of the 
employees and their cumulated knowledge are concerned, it appears that new finns 
would lack all the close long-tenn relationships essential for success. A system of 
corporate governance characterised by a high degree of inclusion of the stakeholders 
therefore appears to be the most suitable in this sector. 
Visibility 
In this sector we need to distinguish between the visibility to those who are 
outside the finn and the visibility to those who work in the finn. The visibility to the 
fonner group is very low. In fact even though the distance in time 18 is rather short (3 
years) 19 if compared to chemicals and phannaceuticals (10 years or more iO there are 
several other factors that operate in the opposite direction. The percentage of 
investments in low visibility expenses such as design and engineering is rather high.21 
Secrecy is crucial during the process of innovation. Indeed it is so important that it 
may be advantageous to control or limit strategic relationships with the suppliers. 
Patents are on average not considered effective and in any case they can only be used 
after the innovation is completed. Expenses in development are much higher than in 
basic and applied research.22 Infonnal training and constant fonns of collaboration 
between the sales, production and research units, which are rather difficult expenses 
to account for, are essential to the process of innovation. It is therefore rather 
difficult for those who do not work actively within the finn "to judge whether the 
finn should be funded and to monitor progress" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.27). 
This is so unless they have developed afirm-specific perceptiveness, which is all the 
better if compounded with a good understanding of the industry, of its technology 
and of its general characteristics. 
18 The time "between the expenditure of money (and time and effort) on innovation and the point at 
which its value can be justified (or not) through sales, or profit/cash flow, resulting" (Tylecote 1999b, 
p.2). 
19 As reported by experts in the sector. 
20 As reported by Ramirez and Tylecote (1999). 
21 See Table 1.3, Chapter 1. 
22 "Visibility also depends on the way in which the innovation and the firm are organised: the more 
centralised, the more visible. Industries also vary in this respect. It is easier to centralise the process 
when it largely revolves around basic and applied research, than when it revolves around 
development" (Tylecote and Conesa, 1999, p.27). See Table 1.4, Chapter 1. 
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As for the visibility to the second group (i.e. those who work in the firm), it 
appears quite high. In fact, the rather small average scale of firms,23 due to the rather 
specialist products and the tendency not to rely on economies of scale24 ensures that 
distance in space and hierarchical distance are quite low. Plants scale does not 
exceed a few hundreds square meters. Given the low intensity of R&D,25 when a 
R&D unit exists, it is necessarily unique and rather small; foreign direct investment 
is not common; firms are frequently run by the owners/founders who have usually a 
very good understanding of the technicalities of the products and of the needs of the 
innovation process. Problems, however, could derive from the fact that for the 
process of innovation to be effective, managers need to delegate a large degree of 
responsibility to the employees. This, if not compounded with an "inclusion of the 
stakeholders" strategy, could obstruct monitoring and control. 
Table 4.6 Summary of the characteristics of the sector and of the requirements in terms of 
corporate governance 
Characteristics of the sector Requirements in terms of corporate governance 
Visibility: Low 
High degree of expenditure in low visibility High firm-specific perceptiveness of those who 
activities 
Scarce effectiveness of patents (high reliance on finance innovation 
secrecy in the production phase) 
Appropriability: Low 
Importance of close long-term relationships with 
customers and suppliers High inclusion of the stakeholders 
Importance of accumulation of skills on the shop 
floor and of industry-specific skills 
Novelty: medium with peaks mainly as a result Medium- high industry-specific expertise of 
of inventions in other sectors those who finance innovation 
Given the small dimension of machine-tool builders and the consequent 
difficulty of relying only on internal sources of finance, the external financers need 
to be characterised by a high degree of firm-specific perceptiveness. In addition, as 
the degree of novelty has been increasing (and it was definitely very high during the 
1970s and 1980s) a good degree of industry-specific expertise could increase the 
possibility of achieving the appropriate and most effective spending on innovation. 
23 See Section 4.l. 
24Japanese firms have been able to attain higher than the average economies of scale, but in 
comparison to other sectors the level of economies of scale achieved by machine-tool builders is 
rather low. 
25 See Section 4.1. 
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To summanse, a system of corporate governance characterised by a high 
degree of inclusion of the stakeholders,26 a high degree of firm-specific 
perceptiveness, and possibly, of industry-specific expertise of those who provide the 
funds for innovation, appears to be the most suitable for the machine-tool sector. 
On the basis of these considerations, in the next section we will compare the 
mam elements of the American and Japanese corporate governance systems, by 
particular reference to the machine-tool sector. On the basis of this analysis, which 
uses mainly the existing literature on the topic, we will try to explain why the US 
failed in transforming their invention, namely NCs, into a successful product for the 
mass market, thus allowing the Japanese machine-tool builders not only to become 
leaders in the sector but even to become main exporters to the US. 
4.5 The decline of the US and the upsurge of Japan: an attempted 
explanation 
In this section, using Tylecote's framework we will explain why the decline 
of the US machine-tool sector in the 1970s and 1980s was inevitable. It was 
essentially because the requirements imposed by the new technology, namely NCs 
and CNCs, in terms of corporate governance, were not at all fulfilled by the system 
of corporate governance characterising the country during that period. 
Appropriability 
The first main important difference between the US and Japan consisted in 
the type of strategy adopted to cope with the low degree of appropriability of the 
machine-tool sector. 
As mentioned before, there are three mam groups of actors who play an 
important role in the process of innovation of any machine-tool builder, namely the 
employees, the customers and the suppliers. Moreover, so far as the development and 
improvement of NCs and CNCs is concerned, employees needed to possess both 
26 If the perception of the effectiveness of patents changed, the inclusiveness of suppliers and 
customers could be reduced but the employees would still have to be included. 
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cumulated expenence on the shop floor and new skills that only the educational 
system could offer. Furthermore a good degree of collaboration between the latter 
and the machine-tool builders was important. 
The strategy adopted in the US was mainly a shareholders first strategy, the 
mam goal being to increase the value for the shareholders. The other important 
stakeholders in the process of innovation were not included but considered just as 
inputs in the production function. In Japan, instead, firms adopted an inclusion of the 
stakeholders strategy, having formed some sort of coalition with the other important 
actors in the innovation process. 
As for the employees, for several reasons, in the US they could not play the 
same strategic role in the innovation process as they did in Japan. In fact, as reported 
by the CTI study (1994) one of the problems in the US machine-tool sector lies in the 
scarce skills of its employees. This is for two main reasons. On the one hand "there is 
a relatively low supply of skills, at all levels, flowing from the US educational 
system into the machine-tool industry" (CTI I, 1994, pAS). This is due both to a 
widespread lack of basics in literacy, mathematics and other scientific topics, and to 
a scarcity of personnel inclined towards a specialisation in engineering and 
technology. On the other hand, several factors discouraged the U.S. machine-tool 
firms from investing more to advance the skills of their workforce. These factors 
included: the widespread practice of "extracting skills" off the shop floor in the US;27 
the cyclicity of the sector; the risk of poaching from larger firms; and the fact that 
providing training usually meant providing basic literacy and numerical skills. Skills, 
and, by implication, historical knowledge of the manufacturing process, became 
expendable; machine-tools, it was reasoned, could serve as substitutes for highly 
trained workers. And, if a skilled machinist was needed, it was cheaper simply to 
offer money to one from a neighbouring firm, than to invest in an in-house 
apprenticeship programme (Forrant and Flynn, 1999). Therefore, on the one hand the 
employees did not have any assurance that investing in specific skills would lead to 
long-term employment, and on the other, the machine-tool builders did not feel the 
need to adopt an inclusive strategy, as the employees did not have any specific skill 
27 See Lazonick (1990). This was through "task disintegration" (or Taylorism), with the possible 
intention of avoiding "hold up", but also with the possible consequence of labour disenchantment with 
the job quality. 
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that made them essential to the production and innovation processes. However, the 
American approach, which was central to the success of the previous paradigm of 
mass production,28 contrasted with the requirements of the system of flexible 
production based, among other things, on the activity of highly skilled workers. 
The situation in Japan was completely different. In fact, apart from employees 
having initial higher theoretical skills provided by the educational system,29 they 
were also subject to much broader in-company training. This was possible as it was 
easier for Japanese firms to face the cyclical nature of the sector and offer lifetime 
employment. This was both because of governmental incentives and because of the 
higher degree of outsourcing (Sprow, 1985). Poaching of employees was and is 
uncommon in Japan, and employees themselves have always greatly valued the 
loyalty shown to the firm for which they are working. As a consequence, they are 
also much more willing to invest in their own skills as they have the certainty that 
they will be not laid off at the first period of downturn. In addition, as opposed to the 
progressive specialisation of tasks and reduction of autonomy typical of the US, in 
Japan the employees have always been strongly encouraged to participate in all 
phases of the production process. "Keeping their workplace and machine in good 
order is a responsibility assigned to the operators themselves, along with maintaining 
output, helping fellow workers and assuring that every part produced meets or 
exceeds quality standards [ .. ] each worker is trained to correct the minor problems 
that often arise in the course of the day, to conduct regular preventive maintenance to 
monitor and adjust equipment, and to search continually for ways to eliminate 
potential disruptions and improve efficiency" (NMTBA as reported by Forrant and 
Flynn, 1999, p.184). "Scholars of Japanese manufacturing contend that much of the 
success enjoyed by firms is based on the full engagement of the hands and heads of 
front-line employees" (Forrant and Flynn 1999, p. 169). Another example of the 
important role assigned to employees' skills in Japan is offered by the CTr r (1994). 
"J apanese and German companies use their own factories as test beds for the latest 
tools, relying on workers to come up with new incremental improvements in 
products or the process of making them. This includes not only engineers (who are 
28 Ibid. 
29 In Japan and also in Germany, the general educational level of those who work in the machine-tool 
sector is much higher that in the US as manufacturing is held in high esteem and a much higher 
proportion of students qualifies in engineering and technology. See CTI II (1994). 
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scattered throughout their operations, not sequestered in the R&D department), but 
production workers as well. One leading distributor of both US and Japanese 
machine-tools said: 
"The Japanese will purchase the latest million-dollar flexible manufacturing cell and put an 
engineer on it for the first few weeks to ensure that it is operating properly and to search for any ways 
of improving its performance. A typical US firm will stick an operator on it whose only skill is 
knowing the difference between red and green buttons (to tum the machine on and off). Then they 
wonder why they don't get the expected return on their capital investment (RAND firm visit, 
1993).,,30 
The customers are another set of stakeholders who appear to have enjoyed a 
higher degree of inclusion in Japan than in the US. In the latter country, the 
relationship with the customers has been generally of an arm's length type, mainly 
with market transactions (a lot of emphasis was put on the price) and with a scarce or 
null participation of the customers to the innovation process, both in financial and 
technical terms. The only two customers with whom American machine-tool builders 
had a close long-term relationship were the defence and aerospace industries. 
However the symbiotic relationship with these public entities had the negative effect 
of keeping the focus of machine-tool builders on the high value added end of the 
market, very frequently with inefficient and ineffective methods ofproduction. 31 And 
it was precisely the scarce attention given to the needs of small metalworking firms 
that offered the main scope to the Japanese machine-tool builders with their flexible 
and low costs products of penetrating the American market. The Japanese, in fact, 
thanks to the high modularisation of their products, the high division of labour (see 
paragraph on the importance of suppliers) and the co-ordination provided by MITI 
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry), which allowed a widespread diffusion 
of knowledge among competing and non-competing firms, were able to deliver 
flexible, less expensive, standardized and simple machine-tools in a much faster way 
than the American counterparts were. In the development of the products, machine-
tool builders worked mainly together with their local customers, who very often 
belonged to the same group as in the case of Toyoda Machine Works, whose stakes 
30 CTI I, 1994, p. 49. 
31 The defence sector in particular has been responsible for not pushing the machine-tool builders to 
reduce the costs of production and shorten the delivery time. See the NRC report. 
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are in part owned by Toyota Motors, and Toshiba Machine controlled by Toshiba 
Corporation with a stake of 50.1 %. These customers, not only provided a secure 
market for the products, but also financial and technical assistance and a large 
number of innovative ideas. 
A close long-term relationship between suppliers and machine-tool builders is 
another distinguishing feature of the Japanese industry. In particular, as reported by 
several authors, the role played by the Japanese supplier Fanuc was central to the 
success of the machine-tool builders. Fanuc, in fact, began to collaborate with 
machine-tool firms in 1958, when together with Makino Milling Machine Company, 
it developed the first Japanese NC machine-tools. In the following decades, 
supported by MITl (Ministry of International Trade and Industry),32 Fanuc became 
the main supplier of controls and thanks to its large market share (over 80% by the 
end of the 1970s), and high standardisation, strategy was able to offer simple and 
reliable controls which proved to be essential to the low cost strategy of the Japanese 
producers. 33 As mentioned by Wieandt (1994), the existence of this dominant 
supplier further reduced the cost of production for machine-tool builders, as the 
interface adaptation costs were limited. The numerous American computer makers, 
on the contrary, regarded controls for machine-tools as a small product market, if 
compared to their other computer operations, and never developed a close 
relationship with the machine-tool builders or a sufficient market share to enJoy 
important economies of scale. According to Sciberras and Payne (1985) machine-
tool builders were treated as a second priority business and the attitude of the 
controller manufacturers was often of irritation and recrimination, rather than co-
operation when divergences of interests occurred. American and European machine-
tool producers often chose to develop their own numerical controllers or to resort to 
foreign suppliers. 
As for the other suppliers, it appears that the degree of reliance of Japanese 
firms on them was much higher than in other countries (currently it is 53% in Japan 
vs. 41 % in the US and Germany) so much so that Japanese firms are frequently 
32 MITI encouraged the machine-tool builders to buy from a single control producer. See Wieandt 
(1994, p.433). 
33 Fanuc had natural monopoly. The large economies of scale, and the consequent low cost (but high 
quality) of its controllers were at the base of the competitiveness of Japanese machine-tool builders. 
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referred to as assemblers rather than producers. There are no available data about the 
type of relationship between the American builders and their suppliers, but we are 
fairly sure of not being very far from reality in thinking that it was of an arm's length 
type and mainly market based, as it is typical of Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Visibility and Novelty 
As for the visibility and novelty issues, it was mentioned above that in order 
to achieve the "appropriate" and most effective spending on innovation, those who 
provide funds should have a high degree offirm-specific perceptiveness, which could 
be all the better if compounded with a medium-high degree of industry-specific 
expertise. 
Also with regard to these issues, the US and Japan exhibit several further 
differences. In fact, as mentioned before, during the 1970s and 1980s, several 
mergers and acquisitions took place in the US consisting mainly of the incorporation 
of machine-tool builders into large conglomerates. However, the acquirer typically 
had no industry-specific expertise, and did not use its shareholder power to acquire 
insider knowledge of the firm. Between 1977 and 1982, at least 64 between mergers, 
acquisitions, and purchases of corporate assets took place in the US machine-tool 
industry. This and other factors led to the elimination of about 200 establishments 
from 1343 in 1977 to approximately 1140 in 1982 (Carlsson, 1989, p.180). These 
conglomerates regarded their investments in machine-tools mainly as financial 
investments and the managers paid very little attention to what the technological 
requirements for success were. As argued by Carlsson, "although many US machine-
tool firms have recently been taken over by large, diversified firms (conglomerates) 
the acquisition of machine-tool firms appear to be motivated more by financial and 
diversification considerations than by vertical integration. Thus, it is not at all certain 
that being taken over by such firms makes greater financial resources available to the 
machine-tool firms. In fact, the truth may be rather the opposite, as a number of US 
firms have discovered: it is difficult for typically low-yielding machine-tool firms to 
compete for funds with firms in more 'glamorous' businesses" (Carlsson, 1989, 
p.186). Further "a lot of machine-tool companies will either be sold or closed 
because they are in the hands of conglomerates who traditionally are pretty cold-
hearted concerning their bottom line and their stock prices" (Sprow, 1985 as quoted 
by Carlsson, 1989, p.180). With reference to the same phenomenon, Sciberras and 
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Payne (1985) argued that "the machine-tool compames find themselves in 
competition with other divisions in the group for investment capital and therefore 
must show quick and large returns or be excluded from consideration for capital for 
new investment and for managerial rewards" (Sciberras and Payne, 1985, p.57). This 
seems to have played an essential role in hindering the degree of innovativeness of 
American machine-tool builders, as the research into, and development of, a new 
technology requires a long-term perspective, and the acceptance of higher short-run 
costs to obtain longer-term competitive benefits. 
Those firms that remained independent, due to their limited scale and scarce 
or null support from both financial institutions and the public sector, did not have 
sufficient funds to invest in innovation and many of them were forced to close down. 
The CTr study, in fact, confirmed that it was and still is, very difficult for small 
machine-tool producers in the US to attract external capital. This is mainly due to 
high processing and transaction costs, which normally represent a high proportion of 
the capital required. These firms, therefore, usually had/have to rely on retained 
earnings and capital from family and friends, capital that could/can hardly be used to 
exploit business opportunities and develop new products or processes. In addition, 
the same study revealed that, even if financial institutions or state or local 
governments with a good industry-specific expertise in the machine-tool sector, and 
specialised in the financing of small firms existed, small machine-tool builders found 
difficulties in finding them and building a long and stable relationship. "Some 
business have reported talking to 50 or 60 financial institutions before finding a good 
match; even then, high turnover rates among loan officers may jeopardise the 
relationship. Many small firms just cannot afford this much diversion of management 
attention" (CTr r, 1994, p. 55). 
In addition, American machine-tool builders in general, did not benefit from 
any sort of technological transfer from the public sector, as federal research activities 
were mainly directed towards specialized defence products, without any commercial 
utility (see for example the Man Tech program by the Department of Defense which 
was aimed at improving manufacturing processes among its suppliers). As for the 
universities, several factors, such as the higher interests in theoretical and science-
based activities, the limited practical experience of professors and students, and the 
conflict between the desire to publish articles by the researchers, and the need to 
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preserve secrecy in firms, collectively impede good understanding and effective co-
operation (CTI I, 1994, p. 39-40). 
Another important aspect that needs to be highlighted is that American firms 
in general tend not to co-operate with each other. This, according to the CTr report is 
due to several reasons such as antitrust regulations; unwillingness to share 
proprietary information; poor export culture, which makes firms compete for the 
same domestic customers; and the importance given to free markets and independent 
entrepreneurs. An antagonistic attitude towards competitors impeded the 
achievement of any sort of co-operative agreement for research and development, 
which could have been important, given the financial constraints suffered by small 
machine-tool builders. 
To summarise, for the US there is a need to distinguish between two main 
sets of firms, namely small and large firms. As for the small firms, their limited scale 
and therefore the short spatial and cultural distance and the direct involvement of the 
owners in the management of firms helped them to cope with the low visibility 
problems of the sector. However, the scarce firm-specific perceptiveness and 
industry-specific expertise of banks and other financial institutions; the limited 
approachability of the few institutions with some expertise on the sector; the scarce 
support for R&D coming from the public sector and from universities; the arm's 
length type of relationship with customers; and the lack of collaboration with other 
producers impeded the achievement of an adequate and effective spending on 
innovation and hindered the development of CNCs. As for the few large firms,34 
ideally they should have had many more opportunities to invest in innovation. This is 
both because of the higher willingness of banks and financial institutions to provide 
capital, and for their larger level of internally generated funds. However, as 
mentioned before, these firms (especially those within conglomerates) had to face a 
strong pressure for short-term results. This seriously limited the investment in 
research on new technologies that could have generated returns beyond the short-
term. 
34 In the US the 15 largest firms make up nearly 70% of the production. 
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The situation in Japan was completely different for several reasons. First, the 
average higher scale of machine-tool builders was (and is) not the result of mergers 
and acquisitions, but of a long process of internal growth. Second, many of the firms 
belonged to keiretsu35 , which, as opposed to the American conglomerates, provided 
export services, long-term financial support and often co-operative links with users. 
Third, Japanese managers appear not to have faced any type of short-term pressure. 
In fact, according to a NMTBA's analysis of 1981, Japanese managers had, among 
their main objectives, output volume and market share, as opposed to profit, and 
"worked doggedly towards long-term goals" (NMTBA, 1981, p.46) even sacrificing 
profits for several years if this could permit later success. Fourth, Japanese firms 
enj oyed strong support from the government through MITI (Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry).36 As reported by Wieandt (1994), among the various actions 
that MITI took were: the designation of product markets to specific firms to avoid 
duplication of efforts; the foundation of the Japanese Export Trade Organisation 
which spread market information among firms; the promotion of demand,37 granting 
long-term low costs government loans to firms in specific sectors for the purchase of 
new machinery; and the encouragement of machine-tool builders to standardise parts 
across a large number of machines, in order to reduce the costs of production. In 
addition, in contrast with the US, Japanese firms developed a strong network of inter-
firm relations, to share technological knowledge and to avoid duplication of efforts 
and waste of resources. Finally, as shown in Figure 4.6, both large and small firms 
could count on the support of financial institutions and public funding. Small firms 
(1 to 299 employees) were mainly supported by People Finance Corporations, Small 
and Medium Enterprise Finance Corporations, Credit Unions and Credit 
Associations. Medium and large enterprises (more 300 employees), instead, were 
particularly supported by City banks, Regional banks and Mutual banks. 
In summary, in Japan, machine-tool builders could benefit both from a large 
degree of firm-specific perceptiveness and from the industry-specific expertise of 
35 Keiretsu refers to several types of business relationships. For example, vertical keiretsu are 
integrative relationships between suppliers and principals or producers and users. Horizontal keiretsu, 
on the other hand, involve integration of less structurally linked companies, such as between 
producers and trading companies (CTI II, 1994, p.1). 
36 Friedman (1988) sustains the opposite argument that MITI's actions did not have any effective 
result. 
37 See for example Kikaikogyo Rinji Sochio-ho (Temporary Measures for the Development of the 
Machinery Industry Law, 1956). 
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those who were providing the capital for innovation. Further, they had the support of 
the government (MITI), which appeared to have a very good understanding of the 
needs of the sector. In addition, the high level of co-operation with competitors, 
customers and suppliers, profoundly reduced the costs of developing the new 
technology and transforming it into a marketable product. 
Figure 4.6 Outlays by financial institutions to small and large Japanese firms, 1966 
o Outlays to firms of 1-299 employees 
o Outlays to firms of 300+ employees 
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Source: Friedman (1988, p.168). 
To conclude, the main differences in the American and Japanese corporate 
governance systems appear to have been the following: the adoption of a 
shareholders first perspective combined with a short-term horizon in the US, as 
opposed to an inclusion of the stakeholders (customers, suppliers and employees) 
and a more long-term perspective in Japan; the lack of support from the public and 
financial sectors in the US, as opposed to the wide range of subsidies, loans and co-
ordinating activities offered by MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) 
and other financial institutions in Japan and an educational system oriented towards a 
pyramidal structure with a few highly specialised scientists and many non-skilled 
workers in the US, as opposed to the dual system of apprenticeship and vocational 
training in Japan. All these factors appear to have reduced during the 1970s and 
1980s, the ability of American machine-tool firms of introducing innovations. This 
allowed Japanese builders to become leaders in the sector. 
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5. Case studies 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter and in the following, two case studies will be presented. As 
explained in Chapter 2, these are illustrative case studies, carried out to gain more 
information about the topic, namely the influence of corporate governance on the 
process of innovation in the machine-tool sector. 
The first study concerns the typical firm in the machine-tool sector. It is a 
family owned business of 100 employees, rather successful and dynamic. The second 
"firm" is more accurately a group of firms, active in the minimills sector. It is a 
family owned business, with outsider shareholders. It has subsidiaries both in Italy 
and abroad, and a complex form. 
In both firms we carried out a series of interviews. In the first firm, Starn, due 
to its small scale, we carried out three interviews: with the President and owner of 
the firm, Mr. Sacca; with the production manager, Mr. Lizier; and with a member of 
the technical unit (See Figure 5.1). 
As for the Danieli Group (See Chapter 6) we carried on 5 interviews in the 
Headquarters, one in an Italian subsidiary, and 8 in the Swedish subsidiary.! 
The two firms are both very successful, and as it will be shown, both of them 
have been able to adopt a type of organisation that copes well with the low visibility, 
low appropriability and only moderate novelty of the technology utilised in the 
machine-tool and minimills sectors and with the imperfections of the Italian system 
of corporate governance. The firms were founded in the same period but while one 
focused on a particular niche and maintained a small dimension, the second has 
progressively grown, both internally and through a number of acquisitions, and now 
it covers all ranges of products in its sector. 
1 A summary of the questions is reported in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2. 
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Starn 
5.2 Introduction to Starn 
Starn is an Italian finn operating in the machine-tool sector. It is the leader in 
Europe in the production of roll fonning lines, and widely renowned for its 
capabilities in the working of coil, for the high quality of its cut-to-1ength lines and 
for the flexibility of all its systems. The finn, founded by lng. Luigi Sacca in 1963, is 
a family-owned business with no external shareholders. It does not belong to a group 
of finns and it does not have any subsidiary. Currently it has a headcount of 129 
persons. It occupies an area of 39,800 m2, of which 9,000 m2 are covered. The 
turnover in 1999 was of 48 billion lire2 (36 billion lire in 1998), and the production 
for foreign markets amounted to 94% (85% in 1998). For the level of turnover and 
for the number of employees (See Table 5.1), Starn can be considered as a medium-
large finn in this sector. ln fact, it ranks 50th in the list of the major producers of 
machine-tools in Italy (which are around 450). 
Table 5.1 Italian machine-tool industry: number of plants by sales groups and by employee 
groups, 1997 
Number of plants by sales groups (billion lira) 
<5 46.9% 
5:10 16.6% 
10:25 21.2% 
25:50 9.1% 
>50 6.2% 
Total 100% 
Number of plants by employee groups 
<50 68.8% 
50:100 15.4% 
>100 15.8% 
Total 100% 
Source: UClMU (1999). 
The finn is situated in Veneto, the region, which ranks third for number of 
machine-tool builders after Lombardia and Emilia Romagna, and also third, for 
number of employees, production and exports, after Lombardia and Piemonte. 
2 1 billion lira corresponds to about 330,000 pounds sterling. 
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Figure 5.1 The organisational chart of the firm 
Sales 
(6) 
Ing. Luigi Sacca 
and family (1 active member) 
Technical office 
(15) 
Production 
(6-8) 
Blue collars 
(100) 
Inputs 
(2) 
Administration 
(3) 
Figure 5.1 presents the organisational chart of the firm. lng. Luigi Sacca, is 
the founder and current President of the firm and acts also as a salesman. His 
daughter, who has a degree in Engineering and started working for the firm a few 
years ago, is part of the technical office and contributes to the decisional processes. 
Ing. Sacca has also a son, who is currently studying Economics and in the near future 
will most likely join the firm. 
In addition to lng. Sacca, there are 5 other salesmen in the firm. These people, 
as will be explained thoroughly in the following sections, play an essential role in the 
process of innovation. They act as a link between the firm and its customers, and 
usually provide the first idea for innovation. The technical office is composed of 15 
members and it is in charge of implementing the solutions proposed by the salesmen 
for the customers' production requirements. The firm does not have a permanent 
R&D laboratory. Only three people deal with the administrative aspects assisted by 
an external independent commercialista (i.e. fiscal advisor). The production and the 
input units together compose around 10 people, and the remaining employees are 
blue-collar workers. 
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5.3 The process of innovation 
Internal visibility 
In a fashion typical of Italian machine-tool builders,3 the machines produced 
by Starn have a very specialist nature, and are built in order "to achieve the best 
possible solution for the customers' requirements".4 It can be argued, for this reason, 
that almost every machine embodies some degree of innovation. In general, the first 
innovative input is provided by the client, when expressing a particular need. The 
salesmen (the President plus other five employees) usually have the necessary 
expertise to suggest an appropriate solution (See Figure 5.2, phase 1). 
Figure 5.2 The process of innovation 
Customer and salesman 
(4) 
Technica~prodllction 
(5) 
President, salesman and 
production manager 
(6) 
----.. 
Testing phase 
Its feasibility, the timing and costs, are evaluated together with the production 
manager (who is Mr. Lizier Isidoro). Then an offer to the customers is made (phase 
2). If the contract is signed, the production manager fixes the timing for each 
3 See Chapter 7. 
4 See promotional booklet of the firm. 
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activity,S from delivery to designing, through a backwards process (phase 3). The 
technical unit implements the idea, prepares the projects, and passes them on to 
production and to the suppliers (phase 4). Several meetings with the customers, who 
usually make constructive suggestions, take place during the process. The testing 
phase usually takes between 1 and 3 months (phase 6). Wilen the testing phase is 
concluded, the parts of the machine are sent to the customer's site to be put back 
together. As many as 2 or 3 employees at a time go to install all the parts, first the 
mechanics, followed by the electricians, the electronic technicians and finally by 
those who are experts in the software part. The maintenance is usually provided free 
of charge for one year, and beyond this it depends on the contract. The maintenance 
is carried out by the production unit. 
Naturally problems of evaluation arise if the new machine is very innovative 
and different from anything produced before. Innovation can be achieved in no more 
than 2 days if it just involves a simple modification of an existing machine. This may 
extend to 2/3 months for very complex operations. In case a wrong estimate is made, 
either some of the resources employed in other projects are re-assigned to the more 
innovative one, or the production of some parts of the machine are sub-supplied. 
Thanks to the limited size of the firm, and the continuous flows of information 
through face-to-face formal (and informal) meetings, and through the intranet 
system, there is real-time updating on the state of each order. When problems arise, 
they are immediately dealt with by the responsible salesman, the production manager 
and very often the President. The employees in general feel that the time allocated 
for the completion of each task is usually sufficient and when it is not, more time is 
readily obtained. This good understanding between the various sections and with the 
product manager (Mr. Lizier), is probably due to his long-term experience in the 
firm. This amounted to 37 years, having occupied almost any position in the 
production unit. 6 This resembles the kind of wide training that Japanese managers 
and employees get. In addition, as mentioned before, the activities of the owners are 
not limited to administrative tasks. Ing. Sacca and his daughter are directly involved 
in the activities of the firm. The former is a salesman and is kept constantly informed 
about the situation of each order. The latter works within the technical unit where the 
5 A production meeting is held once a month. It involves the production manager and the 6 salesmen. 
During the meeting the point of the situation in terms of workload (expressed in terms of hours of 
work) is made so that it is possible to make provisions in terms of delivery time. 
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implementation of the innovative ideas takes place (See Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). 
In this way they both have a thorough and complete vision of the situation. In 
addition, every salesman follows his order until it is delivered to the customer. 
The employees are encouraged to make comments and suggestions on how to 
improve the product. The ideas of everybody are considered and evaluated. There are 
not, however, forms of reward for those employees whose ideas are implemented, 
though there may be collective rewards for innovation. 
Given its quite limited scale (albeit larger than the average Italian machine-
tool builder), Starn does not have an in-house R&D unit. As mentioned before, every 
machine contains some innovative components. However, it is hardly ever the case 
that the firm produces innovative components on its own or provides solutions as a 
result of its own independent research activity. It is difficult to evaluate the level of 
R&D intensity. This is because there are no personnel dedicated to R&D. People 
who suggest innovative ideas or who contribute to their implementation, also 
perform other sorts of activities within the firm. They are identified as undertaking 
other activities rather than R&D. Making a comparison with the average intensity of 
R&D of the other firms in the sector (which is 1-2 %) is therefore problematical. 
However, the technological level reached by the firm appears to be quite high (as 
mentioned before they are leaders in the production of roll forming lines) thanks also 
to the activity of internal software programmers. As is the typical of Italian machine-
tool builders, the majority of the machines produced by Starn are CNCs. 
Interfimctional collaboration 
The degree of interfunctional collaboration between the technical and the 
production units appears to be quite limited. The employee from the technical unit7 
that was interviewed, argued that they try to prevent problems before they happen 
but he admitted that the production unit offers some important ideas on how to 
modify the machines. The modifications suggested by the employees in the 
production unit can take between half an hour to half a day to implement and they 
are mainly software modifications. The President admitted that there are problems of 
communication between the two units, which in some cases can cause unproductive 
delays. Greater ex ante communication would speed up the production process and 
6 Unfortunately for Starn he was due to retire three months after the interview took place. 
7 Those who belong to the technical unit have less than 30 years, they are 15 in number and 8 of them 
have worked for more than 10 years. Two of them are engineers and the others have only a diploma. 
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avoid the recurrent ex post requests for modifications of the projects coming from the 
shop floor (see Figure 5.2, phase 5). At the time of the interview, a new employee 
had just been hired to operate at the junction of the two units. This should stimulate 
collaboration and produce very positive results but only in a medium-long term 
period, when this new employee will achieve a sufficient level of understanding of 
the firm, of the written and unwritten rules and of the process of innovation. In fact, 
as it has been pointed out several times in the literature8 the production of new 
knowledge (i.e. innovation) is an interactive learning process, specific of every firm 
and based, among other things on a specific type of interpersonal relationship among 
those who are involved in the process itself. As a consequence, in order to give a 
positive and substantial contribution to the process of innovation, together with a 
good understanding of the sector and of the technicalities of the product, this person 
will have to invest in acquiring his own firm-specific knowledge. 
Sources of funding 
Apart from the problems connected to the scarce inter-functional 
collaboration between the production and technical departments, there do not seem to 
be particular obstacles in terms of internal flows of information, degree of firm-
specific perceptiveness of those who provide the funds for innovation, cultural, 
hierarchical and geographical distances. Therefore, if sufficient internal funds are 
available, there should not be any difficulties, due to low visibility, in reaching the 
appropriate and most effective level and type of spending on innovation. As for 
external sources of finance, Starn uses them only for the financing of day-to-day 
operations and not for the financing of long-term innovative projects. This is a 
personal choice of the President, who prefers to rely only on internal sources of 
finance. However, he admits, that the banking system does not have any 
understanding of the sector and in order to obtain long-term loans, the firm would 
have to provide full collateral. This is a very widespread problem among Italian 
firms, which very often lament the lack of support from the banking sector,9 
especially if they are of small scale. lo The situation of Starn is even more significant, 
considering that around 400 firms in this sector have a smaller scale and are therefore 
8 See for example Lazonick and O'Sullivan (1998). 
9 See Sciberras and Payne (1985) for other interviews in the machine-tool sector in Italy. 
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less likely to get the support of banks, if the entrepreneurs do not provide their house 
as collateral. 
Public funding 
This firm has applied for public funding (the Applied Research Fund)!! only 
twice. In the first case, it was successful, whereas in the second case the project 
presented was considered not to be sufficiently innovative. According to the 
President it is very difficult to obtain public funds. Not only is the information about 
such schemes generally inadequately publicised, but even when it is not, the number 
of documents that firms are required to complete is very large, and the procedure is 
time consuming. As a matter of fact, it is renowned!2 that Italian SMEs find many 
more difficulties in obtaining support from the public sector compared to larger firms 
(see Danieli case study). This is so, even if they enjoy specific and simplified 
burocratic procedures. Unfortunately SMEs typically do not have sufficient resources 
to employ a person just to monitor possible sources of finance, and to fill in all the 
application forms. 
Inclusion of the customers 
As mentioned before, Starn produces highly customised machine-tools. Close 
cooperation with the customers is therefore essential. As a matter of fact, Starn has 
364 customers, who tend to have a close long-term relationship with the firm. On the 
one hand, projects are specifically designed to satisfy the customers' needs. On the 
other hand, especially when the projects are particularly innovative, Starn's 
customers are required to finance part of the expenses through periodical instalments 
during the production process.!3 
Both firms enjoy an advantage from the close relationship. In fact, the client 
sees its own needs more effectively satisfied than if it had to buy a standardised 
product, as it can rely on a machine that could represent a competitive advantage in 
the market. At the same. time, given its limited dimension and the scarce support 
from the financial system, Starn would probably not be able to finance its own 
10 As explained in Section 3.2.3.1, Chapter 3, this problem is in part overcome by referring to multiple 
banks. However, this system does not seem to solve the strong fmancial constraints of Italian SMEs. 
11 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.7. 
12 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.7. 
13 For a similar case see Reid (1993, p.142). 
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operations as the machines produced are very specific and embody a high degree of 
technology (worth between 255 thousands and 4,1 million euro). Starn would 
probably have to produce something more standardised and cheaper for the mass 
market. However, the mass market is dominated by the Japanese machine-tool 
builders, who have achieved a level of economies of scale and of associated low 
costs that would be very difficult to achieve by a small, integrated firm. In fact, 
whereas Japanese machine-tool builders are mainly assemblers and every part of 
each machine is produced by very specialised suppliers, in Italy (and indeed in 
Western Europe), there is a much lower reliance on subcontracting. Firms tend to 
produce most of the strategic parts internally. According to a recent study on the 
machine-tool sector in Germany and Italy by Delmestri (1998, p. 639-665), this is 
caused by the fact that it is very difficult to co-operate with suppliers, to achieve a 
good understanding especially on the qualitative levels, and to be confident of their 
trustworthiness. 
Inclusion of the suppliers 
The type of relationship Starn has with its six major suppliers is certainly 
long-term, but it cannot be defmed as "close" as the sense of the term suggests. In 
fact, the suppliers are mainly asked to produce only the mechanical and most 
standardised parts, and always the sarne part, in order to reduce negative knowledge 
spillovers. In half of the cases, the engineering drawings are supplied by Starn. 
Suppliers seem never to have contributed in any way to the degree of irmovativeness 
of Starn's machines. All of the most strategic mechanical parts are produced 
internally. The CNCs Starn uses for its machines are standardised and supplied by a 
German and a French firm. The software that runs the CNCs is produced internally 
by expert programmers. In addition, also the process of "dressing" the machine, 
which consists of adding on the hydraulic, electrical and electronic parts, is done 
within the firm. These, together with the software programmes, are probably the 
most distinguishing features of a machine. We cannot therefore conclude that there is 
any degree of inclusion ofthe suppliers in the case of Starn. 
Inclusion of the employees 
Another group of stakeholders that, according to the hypotheses of the 
frarnework, should be included is that of the employees. The machine-tool sector, in 
147 
fact, as much as the other engineering sectors, is characterised by a low level of 
appropriability. It has an incremental type of innovation, which therefore requires a 
high degree of cumulative learning on the shop floor. As mentioned several times in 
Chapter 3, in Italy employees do not have any right of codetermination as they do for 
example, in Germany or Sweden. At the same time, given the limited scale of the 
average Italian firm, there is usually a quite close relationship between the 
entrepreneur and the employees, based on trust and a long-term, quasi-life time 
employment. The entrepreneur usually keeps under consideration the interests of his 
employees in the formulation of the company's strategy. In any case, it is very 
difficult, (though not impossible) for an employer to fire an employee without a 
proper reason. For these reasons, it was argued, in Italy employees can be defined as 
included. 
In Starn the situation appears to be very much as characterised above. In fact, 
Ing. Sacca and Ing. Sacca are typical Italian entrepreneurs. They keep day-to-day 
contacts with their employees, and are especially close to those who have been 
working for the firm for a long time. There is substantial concern for their conditions 
and needs (even though Ing. Sacca, given the low level of unemployment in the 
Veneto region (3-4%), would not feel remorseful for laying off some employees if 
there was the need to). In any case, dismissing the employees is not a strategy that 
has been adopted, even in periods of downturn. 
One of the imperfections of the Italian system, however, is that firms do not 
usually take advantage of the high degree of inclusion of the employees. In fact, the 
delegation of responsibility in Italy tends to be rather low. Firms do not always 
recognise the ability of employees to play an active part in the innovation process 
and capitalise on it. This is however, not to the case in Starn, where there appears to 
be a rather high delegation of responsibility to the lower levels of the organisation, 
and a strong encouragement to every employee to participate in the innovation 
process. 
However, given the envirollillent the firm is in, we were expecting to find 
more instruments of appropriation. In fact, according to the President there is a very 
scarce supply of specialised workforce, due to the inefficiency of the educational 
system. Starn therefore has to train most of the new employees that join the firm. 
Nevertheless, there do not seem to be in Starn specific forms of incentive (e.g. a 
system of rewards) for preventing people, especially blue collars, from leaving the 
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firm. This is quite surprising, considering that to Italian employees, working for a 
machine-tool builder is not a very highly regarded job, and that changing jobs in the 
Veneto region is rather easy. In addition, in the past Starn experienced serious 
problems with the unions. Several strikes had occurred and in a few occasions the 
employees occupied the factory. Associated with this, a key employee had left, 
carrying with him important engineering drawings. It is certainly true that those 
employees who have been working longer in the firm, have the higher firm-specific 
skills. They represent strategic resources. They are also those who have the highest 
responsibilities (such as Mr. Lizier) as well as and the closest and most loyal 
relationship with the owners, enjoying in this way a stronger form of inclusion. 
However, given the high importance of "cumulative learning on the shop floor" for 
innovation in this sector (and hence the necessity to keep a low level of turnover), 
Starn should probably invest even more in its relationship with the employees (e.g. 
individual rewards for suggestions, etc). 
Relationship with competitors 
Italian industry is very often cited for the importance of its industrial districts, 
and for the collaboration that occurs between competing firms in the development of 
new technologies. 14 It is certainly true that the concentration of machine-tool builders 
is higher in the Piemonte and Lombardia regions, where networks of firms appear to 
work quite effectively. However, we were expecting that something similar 
happened also in the Veneto region. Instead, at least so far as Starn is concerned, no 
forms of collaboration are in place with competitors, either for technological 
innovations, or for other activities, such as export. On the contrary, the President 
finds that the relationship with the competitors is very tense. Competition is mainly 
of the interfering type and there is very little room for co-operation. The President in 
the past tried to set up an agreement: first with a German competitor (for the 
acquisition of a German firm); and then, with an Italian one (for the acquisition of a 
supplier in trouble). In both cases the agreement did not take place. In particular, the 
reaction of the Italian competitor was very harsh. 
We were also expecting a more enthusiastic attitude towards UCIMU 
(Unione Italiana Costruttori di Machine Utensili), the Italian association of machine-
14 See Chapter 7 for an example within the machine-tool sector. See also Brusco (1982). 
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tool builders. On the contrary, it appears that, apart from important information 
concerning trade exhibitions, the firm does not perceive many more benefits coming 
from being part of the association. It is thought not to be worth the more than 40 
million liras paid per year. According to the President, the larger benefits are enjoyed 
by firms in Lombardia that are geographically closer to the main office of the 
association, suggesting nepotism and location-specific advantage. 
The degree of novelty 
As explained in the previous chapter, the level of novelty in the machine-tool 
sector has increased since the 1970s. This is so not only in technological terms (first 
with the introduction of numerically controlled machines, then of computer 
numerically controlled machines, and now of new and more sophisticated materials) 
but also so far as the structure of the market and competition are concerned. As a 
consequence, it has become more difficult for firms to compete. They need to keep 
up to date with the latest inventions in electronics, to defend the market share against 
a globalised competition, and to face the frequent and recurrent crises of demand in 
the sector. According to the hypotheses of the framework utilised in this thesis, when 
the degree of novelty is quite high, new firms, with the back-up of financial 
institutions with a high degree of industry-specific perceptiveness, are more likely to 
succeed than old and well established ones. If this were true, Italy would face (and 
should have faced during the 1970s and beginning 1980s) serious problems in this 
sector, given the low degree of industry-specific expertise of its financial institutions 
and the underdevelopment of its venture capital market. However, it was argued in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3, the introduction of CNCs and of the other innovations 
coming from electronics, not only needed the availability of new skills but also the 
support of the old "cumulated on the shop-floor" ones. As a matter of fact, within 
Starn, the introduction ofNCs and CNCs took place in a very gradual way. It did not 
represent a very radical break with the past, and problems of conservativeness did 
not occur. The demand for machine-tools, in fact, did not shift rapidly from normal 
machines to CNCs. The new needed skills were therefore progressively, but slowly, 
accumulated by the firm. In addition, it was argued by the President, as Starn mainly 
sells solutions to problems, and every produced machine is bespoke (i.e. different 
from the previous one), producing machines that work with numerical controls did 
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not represent something different from anything else done before. It was another 
example of finding a solution to a problem. 
Conclusion 
The study of the machine-tool sector presented in Chapter 4, allowed us to 
conclude that the technology used in this sector has a low degree of visibility, a 
medium level of novelty and a low degree of appropriability. In addition, from 
Chapter 3 we know that the Italian system of corporate governance has certain key 
features. These are: a high degree of firm-specific perceptiveness of the shareholders; 
a low degree of industry-specific expertise and of firm-specific perceptiveness of 
financial institutions (with the exception of banks within industrial districts and 
banks related in some way to large firms); and a high degree of inclusion of 
customers, suppliers and employees. The study of Starn appears to be in line with our 
findings but it has also highlighted some aspects that are particular to Starn. 
Specifically we refer to the role played by customers in the financing of innovation 
and the scarce level of inclusion of the suppliers. 
In fact, in the study of the Italian system of corporate governance we point 
out that medium-small firms outside the industrial districts, and not part of a group of 
firms, have difficulties in obtaining financing for innovative projects. This is true for 
either the banking system (unless they offer consistent warranties) or for public 
institutions. This case study of Starn has confirmed the existence of this problem. 
However, it has also revealed how SMEs, who are machine-tool builders, might 
overcome the limits of the Italian system of coping with activities characterised by 
low visibility. Here we are referring to their relying on the close long-term relations 
with the customers, who are required to make upfront payments for their highly 
customised machines. Other countries, such as the UK or the US, where firms mainly 
operate at arm's length, would not be able to cope with this kind of problem. 
As for the suppliers, we argued in Chapter 4 that they were important 
stakeholders in the innovation process of machine-tool builders. We still have the 
same opinion. But this case of Stam has shown that, despite the role suppliers could 
play in the innovation process, the need for secrecy is very important. This is so 
much so, that, up until now, no forms of inclusion have appeared to offer sufficient 
protection. This is quite surprising as, even if a supplier serves more than a machine-
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tool builder, there should be some forms of agreement that could ensure its 
trustworthiness. After all, Stam also has more than 300 customers, and, in many 
cases, machine-tools are at the basis of their competitive advantage. However, as it 
was explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1, many firms are starting to internalise the 
production of their own machines. This is caused by the tendency of machine 
builders to create spillovers by selling the machine produced in collaboration with 
one firm to that firm's competitors. We think that problems of secrecy are very 
severe, not only within the machine-tool sector, but also within the sectors of the 
machine tool builders' customers. Effective forms of inclusion have still not been 
found or thought of. For some firms, the most convenient form of inclusion is that of 
internalisation. Other firms, that for one reason or another cannot internalise the 
operations that need to be kept secret, are forced to rely on suppliers, who might or 
might not adopt a correct attitude. In any case, for these firms, the costs incurred for 
internalising the operations would probably be higher than those of the spillovers to 
the competitors. 
This does not mean, however, that more effective forms of inclusion cannot 
be found. Weare convinced that if more effort were put into finding specific forms 
of beneficial agreements, Italian firms would achieve a much higher degree of 
innovativeness. 
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6. The Danieli Group 
6.1 Introduction 
The Danieli Group is a group of medium scale that works in the minimills 
sector. It is the leader in the production of minimills for "long products". 1 The 
headquarters of the Group are situated in the North East of Italy. Subsidiaries are to 
be found in Italy, in various European countries and in the US. 
The choice of this Group as one of the two illustrative case studies was 
explained partly in Chapter 2 and further in Chapter 5. In the first few sections ofthis 
chapter, the main characteristics in terms of visibility, appropriabi/ity and novelty of 
the minimills sector will be described. It will be shown that these characteristics are 
very similar to those of the machine-tool sector. This is not surprising as, in general, 
most of the engineering sectors possess similar characteristics. Further the minimills, 
in a sense, can be described as gigantic machine tools. We proceed with the study of 
the Danieli Group and of two of its subsidiaries, by using a similar structure to that 
we used with the case study of Starn. 
6.2 The steel industry: two possible technologies 
The steel industry is composed of two types of producers, those who use the 
traditional method and those who use the minimills.2 In the first case (traditional 
method or full integrated method), iron and coke (the two elements that combined 
together give steel), after being processed to improve their quality, are combined in a 
blast furnace3 that adds oxygen and fuses the materials into pig iron4 (See Figure 
6.1). 
I Bars, rods, wire rods, light and heavy sections, rails. 
2 See Harvard Business School (1991). 
3 A blast furnace is a smelting furnace into which compressed hot air is driven. 
4 Crude iron from a smelting furnace. A different technology called direct-reduction iron process 
(DR!) allows purifying without melting iron ore into pellets of 90% to 95% purity. Another process is 
the HBR (hot briquette reduction). These advancements in technology reduced the use of blast 
furnaces. 
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Figure 6.1 Fully integrated process of steel production 
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Then, the steelmaking process heats the pig iron (sometimes together with 
scrap steel) in a second furnace (steel furnace) for further purification, which 
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removes excess carbon and impurities such as silicon or phosphorous using oxygen 
and other chemicals. Finally, the raw steel is shaped through castingS and rolling. 6 In 
the past, the molten steel was first poured or 'teemed' into a mould. Only after being 
held as inventory, in the form of ingots, it was passed on to the next step: the hot 
rolling mill. 
Figure 6.2 Diagram of a traditional, integrated steel mill 
UOLTEH STEEL 
Source: Harvard Business School (1991). 
5 The liquid iron is given a shape by pouring it into a mould. 
6 The metal is rolled into plates and bars. 
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This further processing involved a soaking furnace, which reheated the ingots 
and stands of rollers, which pressed the hot steel into its final shape, such as bars, 
rails or sheets. Since the invention of the continuous casting process in the 1960s, the 
molten steel does not need to be transformed into ingots and then reheated. Instead 
the slabs produced during the casting process are directly transferred, through rollers, 
to a shearing machine that transforms them into workable pieces. In general, every 
step of the production process to the final product, is carried out within the same 
plant. As the sector is highly capital intensive (in 1990 the initial investment was of 
the order of 1000 billion lira) 7, it utilises economies of scale as its primary 
competitive advantage. As a consequence, this method is characterised by 
considerable inflexibility. 8 
The second method (minimills), instead of using raw materials (iron and 
coke), operates on ferrous scrap coming, for example, from the car industry (See 
Figure 6.3). The scrap is melted down in electric furnaces, and the metal is then 
either cast into ingot moulds or (through the continuous casting), transformed into 
billets, blooms and slabs.9 The semi-products are then transformed into final products 
through rolling processes. 
The minimills technology became very widespread only in the second half of 
this century. Until the 1930s the traditional method was the only one available and, 
due to the high investments required, the steel makers were mainly public entities. 
However, after World War il, dramatic changes in the technology used in electric-
furnace steelmaking, such as advances in furnace electrodes, electrode holders and so 
on, encouraged the scrap-melting producing of carbon steel, which meant that small 
steel companies could be set up with a relatively small investment. During the 1960s, 
an initial investment of less than 10.5 billion lira10 allowed some 50-60 thousands 
tons of "long products" to be produced annually. The early versions of the minimills 
7 Approximately 324 million pounds. 
8 For a comprehensive study of the differences between the traditional method and the minimills one, 
see Hogan (1987). 
9 Billets are small metal bars. A bloom is a mass of puddle iron hammered or squeezed into a thick 
bar. A slab is semi-finished steel product that is later rolled into a finished product, such as a sheet. 
10 Approximately 3.5 million pounds sterling. 
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were initially very successful in the United States and Italy. Soon they spread to 
other parts of Europe, to Japan, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. 
Figure 6.3 Production of steel in a minimill 
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Source: Harvard Business School, (1991). 
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The main reasons for their success depended on their high productivity and 
low costs, which allowed selling "long products" at a much cheaper price than was 
possible with the fully integrated plants. Between 1960 and 1970, a period of rapid 
growth of world output of crude steel, the market share of electric-furnace producers 
grew from 1l.0 percent to 14.6 percent. l1 Before the end of the 1970, almost all the 
11 Ibid. 
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production of "long products" was left to the minimills. They progressively extended 
their product lines to include wires, smooth rounds, special-quality flats, and several 
other products. During the 1980s, especially due to recurrent crises in the steel 
market (that did not spare the minimills) and to the limited opportunities for a further 
growth in the "long products" markets, the users of minimills started pushing for 
further developments in technology. Their aim was to enter the "flat products,,12 
market, which, for a long time was the exclusive dominion of the integrated 
producers. These technological improvements took place in tenns of new processes 
of continuous casting. They allowed producers to continuously cast "thin" slabs, and 
therefore to reduce the minimum required scale of the plants. As a consequence the 
"flat products" market is now open also to the minimills, which are progressively 
increasing their market share and at the same time, becoming larger and more 
differentiated. It is still too early to say whether the minimills will have the same 
success in this sector as they did in the "long products" one, but they certainly 
represent dangerous competitors for the integrated producers. 
In the last 30 years, the steel sector has undergone at least three main crises. 
This has necessarily had consequences for plant-builders, especially as the main 
causes of the crises have been excessive productive capacity, and a stable demand. It 
has been estimated that during 1998 and 1999 the demand for steel plants underwent 
a reduction of 30%,13 notably because of the economic problems of the Far East and 
Russia. In the year 2000, however, the demand for steel plants was buoyant but in 
2001 another crisis started hitting the sector. 
In 1999 the European plant sector changed significantly. Fonnerly there were 
five almost equal competitors, namely the English-Norwegian Kvaemer, the Gennan 
Schloemantl, the Gennan Mannesman Demag, the Austrian V oest Alpine, and the 
Italian Danieli. The first two were put on the market during the year 1998 and were 
then bought respectively by Voest Alpine and Mannesman Demag. The Danieli 
Group, which just 10 years ago ranked more than twentieth on the market for 
minimills, is now among the three largest producers. Moreover, it is the leader in the 
"long products" sector. 
12 Flat products are any type of flat-rolled steel. 
13 See II Sole 24 ore, various years. 
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6.3 The characteristics of the sector in terms of novelty, visibility and 
appropriability 
6.3.1 The degree of novelty of technology and technological change 
In the last fifty years, the minimills technology has seen large technological 
advances: the first electric-arc furnace at the beginning of the century; the 
introduction of the UHP (Ultra high power, of American origin) and the continuous 
casting during the 1960s; the great improvements in productivity and quality of the 
products during the 1970s and 1980s; the increased possibility of differentiating the 
products and of producing special steels and progressive process automation (CNC). 
In the last few years, in particular, a new technology has been implemented for the 
production of "flat products", which has opened a new large market to the minimills 
steel makers. 
The latest innovation has been introduced by Danieli, which at the beginning 
of October 2000 inaugurated a new plant for the production of "long products" where 
the whole process from the metal to the final product can be realised with no 
interruptions. With this new technology, the production process takes 3 hours instead 
of the normal 40 days, with a reduction in the cost of 80 lira14 per each kg which, for 
an average steel plant, means 40 billion liral5 in one year. Danieli is also testing the 
same process for the "flat products" and it should be able to put it on the market by 
March 2001. 
Also the structure of the market has undergone important modifications. Even 
if there are high barriers to entry, which basically impede the entrance of new firms 
in the market, in the last few years various mergers and acquisitions have been taking 
place not only among the major competitors (as mentioned before) but also among 
the small ones, with an important rebalancing of power. The competition is therefore 
much stronger than before, and this forces the firms to find clients in distant and 
frequently unstable countries. Moreover, the frequent crises in the clients' market, 
mainly due to over-capacity, make it even more difficult to attempt any sort of 
forecast for the future. Investments become more risky and finding sources of 
finance more difficult. 
14 Approximately 2.6p. 
15 Approximately 13 million pounds. 
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The degree of novelty is therefore rather high. However, it is not certainly as 
high as, for example, in the biotech and in the pharmaceuticals sectors, where radical 
innovations are introduced much more frequently and in a much numerous number. 
6.3.2 The degree of visibility 
As explained in Chapter 2, the degree of visibility can be studied on the basis 
of four main variables, namely distance in space, distance in time, ease of evaluation 
and intensity of expenditure on innovation. 
Distance in space refers to the "distance between the people who have direct 
responsibility for and direct knowledge of the conduct of the processes of innovation 
and the people who have control over the provision of finance and ultimate power 
over the firm" (Tylecote, 1999, p.l). In the minimills sector firms tend to have quite 
a large scale with, therefore, several levels of authority. Moreover, the need for 
rationalisation and concentration has forced the majority of these firms to acquire 
subsidiaries abroad, with a further increase in the distance in space. 
Distance in time refers to the distance "between the expenditure of money 
(and time and effort) on innovation, and the point at which its value can be justified 
(or not) through sales/market share, or profits/cash flow, resulting" (ibid., p.l). 
According to an expert of the sector,16 the distance in time (from the first idea to the 
commercialisation phase) is on average 10 years (therefore quite high) with more 
time required for radical innovations and less for more simple and incremental ones. 
The evaluation of an innovation project is easier, the higher is the investment 
in fixed capital and the lower are other forms of expenditure, such as those for the 
marketing of the new product. Data about the distribution of spending for innovation 
in the minimills sector are not available but they are probably similar to the overall 
engineering sectors. On average these are characterised by a medium percentage of 
investment in high visibility activities such as fixed capital and R&D and lower in 
less visible activities such as production. At the same time, even though the 
importance of patents is increasing, the use of trade secrecy, especially during the 
innovation process, is still essentiaL 
16 Mr. Po1oni, the director of the Danieli R&D center. 
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F or the above reasons we can conclude that also in the minimills sector the 
degree of visibility is rather low. 
6.3.3 The degree of appropriability 
According to the managers interviewed in Danieli and in its subsidiary, 
Danieli Automation, in the minimills sector patents are an extremely effective means 
of property protection. At the same time, however, the process of innovation in the 
minimills sector requires a large element of cumulative learning on the shop floor 
especially by engineers, technicians and salesmen with their deep knowledge of the 
market. In addition, there is, on average, a fairly long lag (4-10 years) between the 
time when the first idea is born and the moment when it is possible to patent the 
innovation. During this long lapse of time, the use of secrecy is essential. Finally, 
what is offered to the client can either be a single machine or, more often, a turnkey 
plant composed of several parts that need to be put together into a functioning unit. 
In this latter case, close long-term inter-firm relationships with suppliers are 
essential. For these reasons, despite the effectiveness of patenting, it seems that an 
inclusion of the stakeholders strategy would be the best in this sector unless there 
were other efficient forms of appropriation. 
The characteristics of the minimills sector in terms of novelty, visibility and 
appropriability appear to be very similar to those of the machine-tool sector. We can 
therefore now proceed with the study ofthe Danieli Group. 
6.4 The Group 
6.4.1 The history of the Group 
Danieli is a group of firms. Its history dates back to 1914 when two brothers, 
Mario and Timo Danieli, founded the Angelini Steelworks in Brescia, Italy, one of 
the first firms to use the electric-arc furnace. In 1929, part of the firm was transferred 
to Buttrio where, in a more or less artisan structure, it produced tools for forging steel 
and small auxiliary rolling machines. During the 1950s, Luigi Danieli, the son of one 
of the founders, after graduating in engmeenng, started working for the family 
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business. At this stage the firm had 55 employees and was quite small. The strategy 
adopted was to service the needs of the Italian small and medium steel producers, 
which could not find cheap and automated plants either in Italy or abroad, which 
were suitable for their scale. The low costs and efficiency of Danieli machines soon 
became one of the main strengths of the firm. 
As early as 1964, Danieli produced the first turnkey plant abroad, in Eastern 
Germany. Its success continued to increase during the first half of the 1970s, thanks 
to the predominant importance given to R&D, which allowed it to improve the 
quality of the products and to realise important innovations. During the 1976-79 
period, as a consequence of one of the worst crises of the steel market, the firm 
underwent a very difficult phase. The dramatic fall in production and orders could 
have led to its complete crash if a major restructuring had not taken place. 
The 1982-86 period witnessed a complete rationalisation of production and a 
replacement of large parts of the management, which allowed the firm to overcome 
the crisis. In the meanwhile, the daughter of Ing. Luigi Danieli, Dott. Cecilia Danieli, 
had started working for the firm. Moreover, Mr. Giampietro Benedetti, the current 
general director and CEO, who had been working for the firm since 1961, had 
become the sales director. These two persons together led the firm out of the crisis. 
The turnover rose from 189 billion lira in 1980 to 813 billion lira in 1990, thanks to 
obtaining important orders from Ukraine and Byelorussia at the beginning of the 
1980s and from the States, the USSR, North Africa and the Far East in the second 
half of the 1980s. In addition, in 1982, the firm was listed on the stock exchange, the 
first and only firm in the whole Udine province to put part of its shares on the 
market. In 1991, Dott. Cecilia Danieli became President and Mr. Benedetti General 
director of the firm. At this stage the Group had already achieved an international 
status with several subsidiaries in Italy and abroad such as the Swedish 
Morgardshammar, specialised in high quality machinery and the Swedish Centro 
Maskin, specialised in the control of final products. 
In addition, during the 1990s, four important acquisitions consolidated the 
Group's international nature and optimised its capacity. The acquisitions of Wean 
Industries and United Engineering in the US improved the position of the Group in 
the "flat products" sector, which at the time was dominated by German, English and 
Japanese plant manufactures. Moreover, the French Rotelec and the Swedish Sund 
Birsta, acquired in the last few years, are both world wide leaders, the former in the 
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supply of electromagnetic stirrers and induction heating equipment, and the latter in 
the design and manufacture of tying machines and finishing equipment. 
In 1999 Danieli also entered the integrated plants market, through the joint 
venture made with Hoogovens Technical Services (Holland) for the production of 
blast furnaces and associated services. Moreover, in 1999, Danieli has also acquired 
the patents of the "Arex" direct reduction process, "an innovative technology that 
improves the efficiency of iron ore reduction. Through this acquisition, Danieli 
entered the gas direct-reduction market sector with a process aimed at offering plants 
with lower production costs and less severe depreciation costS.,,]7 In 2000 Danieli 
also acquired Danieli Corus (Holland), the Frojhling group (Germany) and Davy 
Distington (UK). 
The process of consolidation has produced a progressive growth of the sales 
revenues and of the net income, as shown by the trend lines in Figure 6.4. It has also 
allowed the Group to cope better with the cyclicality of the sector and the recurrent 
crisis, due mainly to excess of capacity in the steel sector. 
Figure 6.4 Danieli Group: Net income and Sales Revenue in billion lira18 
Net income Sales revenue 
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Source: Danieli's promotional booklet. 
Dott. Cecilia Danieli died in June 1999. As it will be explained thoroughly in 
the next few sections, this fact has forced a shift from a family run business to some 
sort of "manager controlled" business. In fact, Mr Benedetti (now unique active 
majority shareholder) has to rely much more than in the past on the collaboration of 
managers who are not owners. Such a transformation might have important 
implications for the process of innovation and the achievement of an appropriate and 
effective level of expenditure in innovation. 
17 See promotional booklet of the Group. 
18 One billion lira is approximately 330 thousand pounds. 
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6.4.2 The structure of the Group 
As mentioned before, Danieli is a group of firms. The current structure is the 
result of a long and progressive process of acquisition of different subsidiaries, in 
Italy and abroad, all specialised in specific phases of the productive process. The 
Holding owns the majority of the shares in all the subsidiaries, through a financial 
holding in Luxembourg. In addition, there are two other financial holdings, Danieli 
International SA (Luxembourg) and Danfin SpA, (Italy), which are responsible for 
the cash management and the treasury management of the entire Group, respectively. 
The Holding is specialised in the engineering of industrial plants and operates 
as a general contractor for turnkey projects, frequently co-ordinating a large number 
of subcontractors and making sure that the technological product units interface 
properly. Nowadays, the Group is amongst the three largest suppliers of equipment 
for the steel industry and it is the leader in the production of "long product" rolling 
mills for commercial and speciality steels with a market share of around 65%. In 
addition, thanks to the acquisition of Wean and United, the Group has now a market 
share of 30% in the "flat products" sector. The Group, as a whole, is capable of 
supplying, on a turnkey basis, complete production lines and individual machines or 
parts thereof. Its activity covers a whole range of products for the steel and non-
ferrous metal industries, such as steelmaking plants, hot and cold strip mills, strip 
processing lines, continuous casting, rolling mills and so on. In addition, Danieli are 
the leaders in the modernisation and expansion of existing plants. 
The Holding is the only firm to be quoted on the stock exchange. The 
majority of the shares (54.68%)19 are owned by the "family holding". An important 
German competitor owns, apparently only for financial reasons, 15.6% of the shares 
(since 1980), an Italian insurance company owns 2.364% and another company has 
2.211 %. The number of equity shares on the market sums up to 21 % and the 
company owns 2.123 % of its own shares. In terms of scale, the holding has a strong 
position within the Group, both in terms of sales and in terms of employees (54%). 
Currently, the Danieli Group employs more than 3000 people (3,105 on the 30th of 
June 2000). The average age of the employees is 37 years and the educational level is 
quite high (60% of the employees have taken A-levels and 25% have a degree). The 
19 The data refer to August 1999. 
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average seniority of service is 11 years, which is a bit lower than the Italian average 
(14). 
Danieli exports 98% of its output; 49.4 % goes to Africa and the Middle East, 
18.7% goes to the Americas, 9.8% goes to the Far East and 22.1 % remains in 
Europe. 
The treasury management of the Italian subsidiaries is realised by the Italian 
financial holding, which operates as a real in-house bank: and manages the internal 
and external financial operations of each subsidiary. 
The management of the liquidity of the Group is realised by the 
Luxemburgian investment holding, Danieli International SA. This holding was 
founded a few years ago in the form of "Holding of '29" and as a consequence it 
enjoys the fiscal advantages of such a juridical form: the incomes of these firms are 
not liable to taxes and they only have to pay some taxes proportional to their nominal 
capital. The liquidity of the firm is kept at a very high level to face the periodical 
downturns in the steel market and to avoid compromising the financial stability of 
the Group in case one of the clients is late in paying what it is due. The management 
of the investment portfolio (60% in dollars, 30% in German marks and 10% in ECU) 
is quite static and it is not subject to the continuous adjustments of an investment 
trust. 
6.4.3 The Holding: Danieli & C. SpA 
The organisational chart of the Holding is illustrated in Figure 6.5. There are 
four product units, one for the "long products", one for the "flat products", one for 
the steel works and one dedicated to automation. The four functions indicated by the 
arrows operate horizontally and service the four product units. 
Until June 1999, the management of the Holding and Italian subsidiaries was 
very centralised, the delegation of responsibility to lower levels in the organisation 
was strongly opposed by the General direction and only two people (Dott. Cecilia 
Danieli and Mr. Gianpietro Benedetti) took most of the decisions within the Group, 
both strategic and non-strategic. Recently, however, the death of Dott. Cecilia 
Danieli, the increasing scale of the Group and the market crisis have made it 
impossible to postpone the process of decentralisation and rationalisation. The 
situation is different for the Swedish and for the French subsidiaries which, even if 
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controlled periodically by the Holding, have quite a high degree of autonomy. (See 
section on Morgardshammar for further comments). 
Figure 6.5 Internal organisation of the Holding 
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6.4.3.1 The degree of appropriability and inclusion of the stakeholders 
The strategy adopted by Danieli is definitely an inclusion of the stakeholders 
Employees 
Danieli is a typical Italian firm regarding the relationship with its employees. 
Employees are included in the strategy of the firm and their dismissal is not an option 
that is usually considered. As mentioned in Chapter 3, entrepreneurs in Italy present 
a feeling of social responsibility towards the community in which they are in and 
Danieli is not any different. For example it is quite significant to remember that 
during the 1945-46 period lng. Luigi Danieli was vice prefect of Udine, and until 
1953 syndic of Buttrio the town where the Holding has its seat. This shows the 
strong connections that usually exist between Italian entrepreneurs and the 
community in which they live. A large part of the inhabitants of Buttrio either work 
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for Danieli or have relatives or friends who do so. In addition, the Group finances 
several of the community's activities, such as the local volleyball team, the 
restructuring of ancient buildings dear to the community, and so on. 
As a consequence of this symbiotic relationship with the local community, 
the strategy of the firm is to reach the full employment within the Italian factory, 
sometimes also at the expense of the foreign subsidiaries. An example of this is the 
current relationship with the American subsidiaries, Wean and United. In fact the 
Holding is using their logo to sell products that are produced in Italy and embody the 
technology invented in the States. For the majority shareholder the final result in 
terms of profits is the same. However, what is important is to keep the Italian factory 
working even if this might cause a reduction in the profits of the subsidiaries. An 
unwanted effect of this strategy is that the employees in the American factories could 
lose their enthusiasm and not be as efficient as in the past. This possibility was being 
investigated during August-September 1999 as the likely cause of the American 
subsidiaries' negative results. 
Notwithstanding the employees' inclusion, several measures are being 
adopted to avoid any sort of spillovers. For example, as secrecy is essential in the 
process of innovation, a very high division of tasks is employed in order to avoid any 
sort of spillovers to the outside world. Only very few trusty people have the overall 
knowledge of the innovative projects. 
Suppliers and customers 
The suppliers are vital to the process of innovation as most of the output of 
the Holding consists of turnkey plants composed of different parts which need to be 
harmonised in a single system. Close long-term relationships with the suppliers are 
therefore essential. For this reason, in order to avoid any sort of uncertainty, the 
Group has progressively absorbed most of the strategic suppliers. 
The process of integration of the Group has not only progressed upwards 
along the production chain but also downwards, towards the clients. The Group in 
fact, through the subsidiary ABS SpA, is also present on the steel market. This steel 
plant, set a few kilometres from the Holding employs around 500 employees and it is 
very important for three main reasons. First, it allows the Group to be directly 
involved in the market for which they are producing and to collect important 
information about its general needs and necessities. Secondly, it allows the Group to 
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test the new products so as to present them on the market only when there is a 
complete guarantee of their correct functioning. Thirdly, the working plants can be 
shown to new clients, which is much more convincing than complex engineering 
drawings. ABS is progressively becoming an essential part in the operations of the 
Group and in 2001 it accounted for one third of the whole turnover of the company. 
Other stakeholders 
In the past few years the Group had also shown a much more open attitude 
towards external research institutes and Italian and foreign universities for example 
through the funding of PhD students. It is not clear on which basis these forms of 
collaboration are carried out but they do not seem to be long-term relationships as 
each time they tackle different and specific programmes. 
To conclude, as a result of the difficulties in appropriation characterising the 
technology in the minimills sector, Danieli appears to have chosen the correct 
strategy, the inclusion of the stakeholders one. In addition, the close long-term 
relationships with the most strategic suppliers, instead of being based on formal or 
informal agreements, are based on ownership, a much stronger and long-lasting form 
of relationship. 
6.4.3.2 Visibility and firm-specific perceptiveness 
The minimills sector, as much as the machine-tool one, presents a very low 
degree of visibility. Therefore, in order to reach the most appropriate and effective 
spending on innovation, those who provide the capital for innovative projects in this 
sector are expected to be closely related to the firm, in a position where there is a 
sufficient flow of information about the innovative projects. They are also expected 
to have the skills and the knowledge to evaluate them. In this section we will study 
how the innovative projects are funded in the Danieli Group, the level of firm-
specific perceptiveness of those who provide the funds and the type and frequency of 
the flows of information within the Holding and between the Holding and the 
subsidiaries. 
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External sources of finance 
Funds used for investment projects can either be external or internal. External 
funds can either have the form of debt finance or be raised in the form of equity 
capital in the stock market. 
The Danieli Group does not usually make use of banks and other financial 
institutions in the financing of innovation. This is because the Group has always 
followed a strategy of self-sufficiency, trying to avoid any sort of interference from 
the outside. As it can be seen in Figure 6.6, since 1985, the liquidity level has been 
kept very high, much higher than the average of the other Italian firms. The 
opportunity costs of this strategy are certainly significant, as the capital could be 
invested in more profitable activities. However, the high costs connected to the 
production of every single plant and the subsequent difficulties, in case one of the 
clients did not payor was late for one of the instalments, make the choice of keeping 
such high levels of liquidity quite understandable from the point of view of financial 
safety. 
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As for the equity capital, even if in the last few years the efficiency and 
transparency of the Italian capital market have been enormously improved, it is still 
very difficult, especially for highly innovative firms, to obtain funds. As it was 
explained in Chapter 3, one way used by Italian firms to overcome these problems 
has been that of building up pyramids of firms. This mechanism allows firms both to 
increase the capital available at each level of the pyramid (equity capital) and to 
transfer funds from the less risky firms that do not suffer from financial constraints to 
169 
the more risky ones.20 Danieli, however, does not take advantage of all the 
opportunities offered by the group form. In fact, all the subsidiaries are 100% owned 
by the Holding. The main reason that led the general direction to adopt this form 
rather than an integrated one is not financial but strategic. The subsidiaries, before 
being bought, were all very successful in their own field and keeping their identity 
and logo (in addition to the Danieli one) was essential for their activity. At the same 
time, the subsidiaries, especially the Italian ones, are too small to be listed on the 
stock exchange and to be used as instruments for the collection of capital on the 
market. 21 The only firm to be listed on the stock exchange is the Holding. As 
mentioned before, 54.68% of the shares are owned by a financial holding Sind 
International, which is the "Family Holding" and until June 1999 was owned in equal 
parts by Dott. Cecilia Danieli and Mr. Gianpietro Benedetti. The remaining shares 
are in part owned by a German competitor, in part by an insurance company and 
another firm and in part by other minority shareholders. 
According to the President, the relationship with the outsider shareholders is 
very loose. The strategy of the firm is not influenced by the market price of its 
shares. Danieli' s managers do not perceive any sort of short-term pressure.22 
The majority shareholders 
The firm-specific perceptiveness and technical skills of the majority 
shareholders, on the other end, are very high. Until June 1999 there were two 
majority shareholders in the Group, Dott. Cecilia Danieli and Mr Gianpietro 
Benedetti. Dott. Danieli was the granddaughter of Timo Danieli, the founder of the 
firm back in 1929. She started working in the family business as financial and 
administrative manager in 1977, when she was 24 years old. In 1980 she was 
appointed Managing Director and in 1991, she was appointed Chairman of the 
Board. Even if she did not have a technical background, (she graduated in 
20 In fact, as shown by Zing ales (1994) funds raised on the market in the form of equity capital, are not 
usually used to make tangible investments but employed in financial activities (such as the financing 
of other firms in the group). 
21 The introduction of the New Market, might bring to the listing of one or more of the subsidiaries but 
this was never mentioned during the interviews. 
22 "Shareholders may put short-term pressures on management. To the extent that shareholders lack or 
do not understand information relevant to the longer-term performance of companies - e.g. on 
technological progress 'in the pipeline' they will respond excessively to current profit, dividend 
announcements, earnings per share, and similar easily available financial data based on historical 
performance or other short-term performance measures" (Demirag, 1996, p.128). This argument 
therefore does not apply to the case ofDanieli. 
170 
Economics) s,re had a good understanding of the technical issues involved in the 
processes of innovation thanks to her long experience within the firm. Mr. Benedetti, 
who first started as a designer for the firm, became Group Sales Director in 1977. In 
1980 he was given the added responsibility of managing the Engineering 
Departments and in 1991 he was appointed CEO of the Danieli Group. His 
understanding of the technical issues is therefore very deep and his strategic 
importance within the Group is quite clear given his past career. In fact, it is quite 
unusual in an Italian family business that 50% of the controlling shares are 
transferred to a non family member, unless this person plays a crucial role in the 
managing of the firm. These two people together managed the Group in the last 20 
years, taking most of the decisions, crucial and non-crucial and brought the firm to 
its current successful status. 
The involvement of the majority shareholders in the management of the firm 
is however insufficient to solve all the problems connected with the low level of 
visibility of the innovation activity. In fact, factors such as hierarchical distance, 
cultural distance and distance in space, can further reduce the level of visibility which 
is typical of an industry. Moreover, internal management control systems and reward 
systems can put short-term pressures on the management and impede the 
achievement of the appropriate level of investment in innovation. To address these 
issues, we will consider the process of innovation through all of its phases from the 
production of the first idea to the commercialisation of the final product. 
The process of innovation 
The first input for an innovative project within the Holding is usually 
provided by the salesmen as they have the best perception of the main needs of the 
steel producers and ofthe activities of the competitors. 
Sometimes, an innovative idea can also be born inside the firm, generally by 
the R&D employees. Also the employees of the product units can generate some 
innovative ideas. This, however, does not happen very often since, as admitted by the 
general manger of the "long products" unit, they do not have much time left to think 
about innovations. In general the radical innovations are made within the R&D unit 
(See Figure 6.7) whereas the production units mainly generate more incremental 
innovations. 
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Figure 6.7 The R&D unit 
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The R&D unit is currently composed by around JOO people, 40% o/which are technicians with A-levels and 60% 
have a degree. 
The scientific office starts with the study of the innovative project from 
scratch. Generally the R&D unit works together with specialised associations, Italian 
and foreign universities. When there is a general understanding of the issues arising 
from the innovative idea, the R&D director has a meeting with the product manager, 
a sales manager and sometimes with the majority shareholder and the vice-general 
manager to discuss the many aspects of the project, its feasibility, its timing and its 
profitability. In the same meeting, if the project is accepted, the tasks and the 
deadlines are decided for each person responsible. After the first prototype is realised 
the industrialisation phase starts. The latter comprises a long series of activities such 
as the marketing of the product and technical courses for the salesmen and design 
engineers. Finally the new machine is built under the supervision of the R&D 
employees. Some parts of the machine can also be realised by the R&D laboratory 
itself. The overall process usually takes between 4 to 10 years. 
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The R&D expenditures and the first set up of the new machine are totally 
financed by the firm or in collaboration with public institutes (IMI and MITI),23 
which usually provide 20% of the total cost. All the product units (long, flat, steel-
making or automation) are responsible for the financing of their own innovative 
projects. They are encouraged by the General direction to invest a fixed percentage 
(5%) of their sales in R&D and within that sum of money their autonomy is quite 
high. The R&D unit, therefore, operates as a contractor for each product unit and it is 
responsible to these for the success of the projects. The R&D unit is not a profit 
centre and its results are not evaluated on a profit basis. Within each project the 
employees are controlled on the basis of the degree of achievement of their goals 
such as the fulfilment of deadlines or the number of mistakes and so on. Every month 
the R&D unit is required to send a report to the product units on the state of the 
innovative projects. A similar report is also sent annually to the General direction, 
with a list of the current projects and their state (See Figure 6.8). 
Figure 6.8 Flows of information and funds 
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23 Within the R&D unit there is an office that is concerned with the obtainment of public funding and 
the preparation of the necessary documentation to patent an innovation. This office works both for the 
holding and for the subsidiaries. Around 20% of R&D expenditures are financed through public loans 
with low interest rates corning from 1MI, MITI and regional authorities (See also Section 3.2.7). The 
Group does not make any use of fmancing from the European Union as the information required is too 
specific and could be easily used by the competitors. In fact, whereas Italian public organisations ask 
mainly for the kind of technology that is being used (for ex. magnetic fields), the European Union 
requires all the calculations and the results. According to an expert interviewed in the R&D unit, the 
industry-specific expertise of those who work for Italian public organisations is very high and the 
Group does not usually have problems in obtaining fmancing when the project is valuable. 
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On the contrary, the product units and each subsidiary, are profit centres and 
once a year they are required to prepare a forecast budget for the general direction. 
The general direction, after making the necessary adjustments on the basis of all the 
forecast budgets, sends the budget back to the product units and the subsidiaries. In 
addition, every month the product units and the subsidiaries prepare a profit and loss 
balance sheet that reveals the level of the operative revenue. Their performance is 
evaluated on the basis of various indices: 
1. Minimum contribution to the overall structural costs of the firm; 
2. Minimum net value; 
3. State of each order (timing), number of orders acquired, number of orders 
completed; 
4. Economic evaluation of each order (efficiency indicator); 
5. Financial evaluation (payments by clients and expenditures): this IS very 
important as the there can be fluctuations of billions of lira; 
6. Structural costs; 
7. Qualitative parameters: for example quality of the engineering drawings (number 
of modifications etc.). 
Once a month the Board of Directors meets to discuss the profit and loss 
balance sheets. The Board consists of the general manager of the product unit that is 
being evaluated, the majority shareholder, the general managers of each function, the 
prime contractor and the sales middle managers. 
The previous considerations suggest that within the Holding, the distance in 
space is very low. The offices of those who "have direct responsibility for and direct 
knowledge of the conduct of the process of innovation, and the people who have 
control over the provision of finance and/or ultimate power over the firm" (Tylecote, 
1999, p.1) are less than 400 metres apart. The R&D unit has its seat in a building just 
across the street from the Headquarters. Moreover, the R&D activity is very 
centralised as the R&D unit performs innovative activities not only for the Holding 
but in large part also for the Italian subsidiaries and in small part for the foreign ones. 
Meetings among the people in charge of the various sections are held every month 
but informal conversations especially between the product units and the R&D unit 
take place much more frequently, weekly or even daily. The level of interfunctional 
174 
interaction between production and R&D can therefore be considered as high. This is 
very important in an industry like the minimills one where accumulation of 
knowledge on the shop floor is central to successful innovation. In addition, even if 
the R&D unit basically works for the product units, there is no hierarchical and 
cultural distance between the various managers. In fact, they all occupy the first level 
of the hierarchy (considering the majority shareholder as level zero) and the R&D 
manager until a few years ago was the "long products" manager. 
The visibility of the subsidiaries 
All the Italian subsidiaries work on different types of machines and processes. 
They all have their own market and usually sell part of their products to the Holding 
and part on the market. Most of the subsidiaries have their own R&D laboratory and 
carry on a part of their own processes of innovation. Also the subsidiaries, just like 
the product units, are supposed to attempt to spend an amount equal to 5% of their 
sales in R&D. They usually use internal funds. When there is a need for extra funds, 
the subsidiaries tum to the Holding, which will use the liquidity available on the 
internal capital market. In addition, as mentioned before, in the R&D unit of the 
Holding there is an office dedicated to the obtaining of financing for innovation 
under special conditions. Moreover, when the subsidiary produces an innovation for 
the Holding, the latter contributes 50% to the overall expenditures. 
The subsidiaries are quite autonomous in their innovation decisions but they 
have to follow specific indications given by the Holding, such as limiting the 
innovations to the steel sector and not producing anything that already exists. Every 
subsidiary is required to produce at least one innovation per year. Different 
innovations, however, require different lengths of time and the annual goal is not as 
strict if the subsidiary is carrying on very radical types of innovations. As usual, for 
every departure from the rule, it is possible to discuss the issue with the General 
direction, to explain the situation and to establish different goals. This is possible 
because the General direction understands the technical issues connected with the 
process of innovation and does not evaluate the subsidiaries only on the basis of 
financial indicators.24 The General director of the subsidiary we interviewed declared 
that the firm does not feel any sort of short-term pressure and that the goals that the 
24 Also the subsidiaries are required to present a forecast budget every year and a profit and losses 
balance sheet every month. 
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Direction imposes are not difficult to achieve. For example, in 1998 Danieli 
Automation introduced two innovations without achieving the percentage of 5% of 
sales in the R&D expenditure. 
The situation is different for the foreign subsidiaries not only due to the 
distance in space but also to the fact that several of them use a different technology. 
As a consequence the visibility of the processes of innovation of these firms to the 
Holding appears to be quite low, and there appears to be a serious danger of 
insufficient flow of information. The Holding receives the monthly report as from 
any other subsidiary and until now, the profit-goals have always been achieved. For 
this reason, the General direction has not felt the need to interfere in the management 
of the subsidiaries. However, it is possible that short-term pressures are put on the 
subsidiaries by the Holding, as the former is in a way acting as an outsider, even 
though with a very strong industry-specific expertise. 
6.4.3.3 The degree of novelty 
As it was mentioned in one of the first sections, the degree of novelty in this 
sector is medium and has had a tendency to increase. This is both because of the 
most recent developments in the technology and of the strong turbulence of the 
market. Firms need to be more innovative and effective than ever before and in many 
cases they need to start important processes of rationalisation. This is even truer for 
the Danieli Group, given the recent events. 
The conservativeness of the employees, who have been working for the firm 
for decades, might represent an obstacle and slow down any attempt of 
rationalisation. Their high level of inclusion, which is very important for 
appropriability reasons, might be counterproductive in a situation like this. The 
danger is slightly reduced by the fact that the rationalisation process embodies a high 
degree of delegation of the responsibilities and this will be mostly welcomed rather 
than hindered. At the same time, however, the increase also in the responsibilities of 
only one or few people might cause harmful effects if this is perceived as 
discrimination. The management will have to pay a great deal of attention to the 
rationalisation process in order to obtain the most effective result. 
The firm tends to finance its own R&D and not to rely on financial 
institutions, because of their scarce industry-specific expertise. At the same time, 
176 
however, public forms of financing, coming mainly from IMI, MITI and regional 
authorities, account for 20% of the total expenditure in R&D. 
6.5 One of the foreign subsidiaries: Morgardshammar 
6.5.1 The Company and its history 
Morgardshammar is a group of firms within the Danieli Group. Its history 
dates back to 1856 when the firm, which was previously producing iron, turned to 
the production of rolling mills for "long products". Thanks to the invention by Ernst 
von Zweigbergk of the first universal rolling mill for the production of flat iron with 
sharp edges and close tolerances, made during the 1870s, Morgardshammar soon 
became soon the leader in the Nordic countries, selling products both locally and 
abroad. During the 1950s, the firm consolidated its positions thanks to the 
introduction of patented products (roller guides, housing-less roll stands with 
cylindrical roller bearings and convertible stands), which represented a great 
improvement in the rolling mill technology as a whole. 
Since its set up and until 1975, the firm, which soon became a group of firms 
with subsidiaries abroad and a wide net of agents, was privately owned. The owners 
not only sat in the Board of Directors but were also active in the management of the 
firm. In 1975, the trading company Beijerinvest, which few years later merged with 
Volvo, bought Morgardshammar. In 1987, Volvo sold Morgardshammar to the 
Danieli Group, one of the main competitors of the firm. The fear that Danieli had 
bought the firm just to shut it down was widely felt among the employees but this 
was obviously not in Danieli's plans. After an important process of rationalisation 
and a few attempts to find a suitable strategy to manage the relationship (direct 
competition and geographical subdivision of the market), the two firms seem now to 
have found a solution. Currently Danieli produces rolling mills and 
Morgardshammar focuses mainly on the manufacturing and delivering of revamps of 
rolling mills, guides (40% of the market) and spare parts. 
Today Morgardshammar's shares are 100% owned by Danieli & C., Officine 
Meccaniche SpA through a financial holding in Luxembourg. In tum, 
Morgardshammar has five totally owned subsidiaries (factories or sales offices), in 
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India, Sweden, USA, Spain and Germany. There are 221 employees (199811999) in 
the parent company and 292 in the overall Group. This latter figure accounts for 
9.7% of the employees of the Danieli Group. In 1999, the net profits of the 
Morgardshammar Group amounted to 39,893 kSEK,25 which accounted for 15.9% of 
the net profits of the entire Danieli Group. More than half of the backlog of the 
Morgardshammar Group (394,000 kSEK) comes from Europe, a large part (around 
37%) from the States and a smaller part (around 12%) from the Far East. 
The study of Morgardshammar within this thesis is important for several 
reasons. Firstly, we can investigate the effects of factors such as geographical 
distance, cultural distance and decentralisation of R&D activities on the process of 
innovation. Secondly, we can analyse the relationship between the headquarters, the 
Italian subsidiaries and the foreign ones. Thirdly, as Morgardshammar has undergone 
three main changes of ownership in the last 25 years, we can investigate what effect 
on innovation owners with a different degree of firm-specific perceptiveness and 
industry-specific expertise have. Finally, as Morgardshammar is a Swedish firm, we 
can also analyse how the corporate governance of different countries influences the 
innovation process of two firms belonging to the same sector and group. 
6.5.2 The process of innovation 
In Morgardshammar also, the process of innovation usually starts as a result 
of the request of a customer who expresses a particular need. The firm, in fact, has 
focused its production on the revamping of old plants and on the production of 
guides and therefore mainly in the improvement of existing products. A close 
collaboration between the sales department and R&D is therefore essential. In 
Morgardshammar this is ensured by the so-called "product council", which 
comprises the head of the sales department, representatives of the production unit 
and R&D department, and also the CEO. This council is in charge of evaluating the 
feasibility of each project in technological terms and its expected future profitability. 
Within the council there is a direct and immediate transfer 'of information between 
the three areas aforementioned and the general direction. The presence of the CEO, 
in particular, ensures that once a project is approved within the council it will also be 
approved when the forecast budget is presented. The product council meets once a 
25 1 KSek=O.066 pound sterling. 
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month but as the finn is quite a limited in size and has a very well developed intranet 
system, when a problem arises it can be discussed almost in real time. 
Before starting work on any specific part of the project, the finn always 
checks whether those parts are already in production within the rest of the Group and 
in particular at the head quarters. In that case, thanks to the exploitable synergies of a 
group of finns, the finn can spare time and energy and buy those parts from the 
Group. 
6.5.2.1 Firm-specific perceptiveness and industry-specific expertise 
In the case of Morgardshammar, the financing of innovation usually involves 
both internal and external (mainly from banks) sources of funds. 
With regards to the internal sources, problems can arise at two levels. In fact, 
on the one hand there can be problems of internal visibility and, on the other, there 
could be problems in the relationship with the shareholders. 
As for the first issue, those who are in charge of approving the budget and the 
extraordinary expenditures could not receive precise and complete infonnation about 
the process of innovation. They might not also have the technical specific 
background for evaluating the project and for understanding its value. In the worst 
case, the projects are evaluated only on the basis of financial ratios, calculated 
monthly or quarterly. This practice usually causes serious problems of short-tenn 
pressures on those who are involved in the process of innovation and generally it 
impedes the achievement of the "appropriate" and most effective level of 
expenditure. 
In the case of Morgardshammar, these kinds of issues do not seem to be a 
problem. The CEO, Mr. Almhed, who is in charge of approving the budget and the 
extraordinary expenditures, has a technical background and, as mentioned before, is 
part of the product council, where all the decisions about the new projects are taken. 
In addition, the rather democratic atmosphere within the finn and the low importance 
given by Swedish people to time-consuming fonnalities, ensure that at each 
hierarchical level there is a relaxed and infonnal flow of infonnation, top-down and 
bottom-up. 
As for the relationship with the shareholders, when the visibility is low, they 
are required to have a high firm-specific perceptiveness or, at least, a high degree of 
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industry-specific expertise. The different owners of Morgardshammar have not 
always had such qualities and over the years the economic results of the firm 
illustrate this. 
Until 1975 Morgardshammar was a family owned business, with a portion of 
the owners directly involved in the management of the firm. Therefore, the degree of 
firm-specific perceptiveness and industry-specific expertise of the owners must have 
been very high and this certainly contributed to the high level of innovativeness of 
the firm during the 1940-75 period. In 1975, the firm was bought by Beijerinvest, a 
trading company with no expertise whatsoever of the sector. In that year the "black 
period" of the company started. Beijerinvest sold a large part of the physical capital 
of the firm and paid no attention to its low profitability and low efficiency. During 
this period the investments in innovation were very high but not very efficient and 
the firm frequently ended up with losses. The situation did not change when 
Beijerinvest became part of the multinational Volvo. In fact, not only did Volvo not 
have any expertise of the sector (the ownership of Morgardshammar was just an 
undesired result of the agreement with Beijerinvest) but also it did not even try to 
solve the problems that the firm was facing. This was probably due to the limited 
size of Morgardshammar in comparison to the overall scale of the Volvo Group. The 
firm at this point was definitely oversized and not at all efficient, with very high 
costs and consequent losses. 
In 1987 Volvo sold the firm to Danieli & C. SpA. Danieli, before buying 
Morgardshammar, required a radical reduction of the personnel from Volvo, which 
was basically halved in a very short period before the acquisition. Further important 
reductions occurred during the first half of the 1990s, and more limited ones in the 
last few years. The profitability of the Morgardshammar Group has progressively 
increased since 1987, with an improvement of50% in the net worth since 1994. 
Therefore, the acquisition by Danieli has proved to be essential to the survival 
and return to profitability of the Morgardshammar Group. In contrast to the previous 
owners, Danieli is different in its very high degree of industry-specific expertise 
(Danieli was a competitor of Morgardshammar) and in its high interest in the success 
of the Morgardshammar Group, as this is of strategic importance for its success too. 
The level of firm-specific perceptiveness was rather low initially but now it is 
increasing. In fact, even if Danieli knew Morgardshammar since the 1950s to be a 
dangerous competitor, producer of highly innovative products and of absolute 
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quality, the degree of mismanagement during the 12 years before the acquisition was 
quite clear from the balance sheets. As a consequence, it is quite reasonable that 
during the first few years Danieli controlled the firm very strictly. There were 
independent consultants spending a lot of time within the firm, checking on 
everything, and most of the decisions were taken by the headquarters. The situation 
changed progressively as Danieli became more familiar with the management of 
Morgardshammar, developing personal contacts and therefore a higher firm-specific 
perceptiveness. 
This process took quite a long time for several reasons. First, in the beginning 
Danieli was seen as suspect by Morgardshammar as there was fear that Danieli had 
bought it just to shut it down. Second, in the first 8 to 10 years, a few wrong 
strategies in the management of the relationship between the two firms (direct 
competition, subdivision of the markets in geographical areas) kept the levels of 
suspicion quite high. Third, there are several cultural differences that are difficult to 
overcome. For example in Sweden, the management of firms tends to be very 
democratic with a high delegation of responsibility and a continuous flow of 
information top-down and bottom-up. On the contrary, as mentioned before, within 
Danieli most of the decisions, even not relevant ones, were/are taken by the owners. 
This difference caused two main problems. On the one hand the management of 
Morgardshammar felt that the control was excessive and not justified. On the other 
hand they also felt that the communications with the headquarters were slowed 
down. 
At present, in describing the relationship with the subsidiaries, the 
headquarters claim that the foreign ones (including Morgardsharnmar) have almost 
total independence. They are mainly evaluated on the basis of their ability to 
generate profits and as long as they prove to be profitable there is not much 
interference in the management of the firm. The headquarters still require to be 
regularly updated, both through monthly budgets (which are thoroughly checked in 
terms of the reliability of the calculations) and through regular meetings (every two 
months) and phone calls. On the other hand, the management of Morgardsharnmar, 
recognizes that the degree of substantial control is now lower than before (even if the 
formal one is still quite high) and that the current situation resembles the typical 
democratic Swedish style of management much more so than in the past. 
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An interesting issue, however, came up during the interviews. The fact that 
Danieli has always adopted a strategy of low cost is renowned in the market and it is 
a strategy that is applied not only within Danieli & C. SpA, but also within the 
subsidiaries. For Morgardshammar this has meant among other things a strong 
reduction in the personnel and a tendency to minimize on everything. One direct 
consequence of such cuts has been that the product unit cannot give feedback to the 
R&D and design units at a very early stage of the process of innovation but only 
when the engineering drawings are completed. Occasionally the drawings have to be 
sent back because of mistakes, and this leads to inefficient delays. If the product unit 
had more resources to spend, some of such resources could be used to keep closer 
and more frequent contacts with the R&D and design units. In this way early 
mistakes could be identified and corrected in real time. Moreover, as the engineering 
sectors are characterised by a strong cumulative learning on the shop floor, those 
who are involved in the actual production could provide very useful information and 
suggestions at a much earlier stage. 
This issue was not considered a problem in the interviews with Danieli or 
with its Italian subsidiary. The reasons could be twofold. First, factors such as 
geographical distance, decentralisation of the R&D laboratories, and probably 
hierarchical distance might be reducing the visibility between the Holding and the 
subsidiary and impede the achievement of the "appropriate" spending in innovation 
in Sweden. On the other hand, there might be a difference in the perception of the 
importance of such feedbacks which could be due to cultural differences, to agency 
problems (it is well known that managers are always willing to enlarge their 
departments) or to the fact that the Swedish subsidiary is one step ahead of the 
Holding in the adoption of the integrative management approach. 
Other sources of funding come from the local bank with which 
Morgardshammar has been working for decades.26 As the firm has mainly focused its 
activities on the revamping of old plants, the funds are mostly provided for specific 
projects and not for research in general. In particular, the firm usually advances the 
capital needed (half with internal funds and half with bank loans) for any project and 
the clients pay in instalments only when the project is finished. In this respect a very 
26 In Sweden the relationship between banks and finns is much closer than in Italy and it resembles the Gennan 
type. 
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important role is played by the insurance company Sace, which offers rather strong 
guarantees to the bank for the repayment of the loans. Within the insurance company 
there is an employee who always follows the activity of the firm and therefore knows 
it very well. This, in a way, gives a competitive advantage to Morgardshammar over 
foreign competitors, especially the Italian ones. In fact, in Italy insurance companies 
hardly ever offer guarantees of this type as they lack any sort of industry-specific 
expertise necessary to evaluate the risk level of the projects. Quite often Danieli & c. 
SpA asks for help from Morgardshammar in order to get the same sort of guarantees 
from the Swedish Sace. The firm therefore does not appear to suffer any sort of 
financial constraint due to the low visibility of its activities, thanks to its long-term 
relationships with external financial entities. 
In contrast with Italy, however, Morgardshammar has serious difficulties in 
obtaining public funding for innovation, as the Swedish authorities tend to finance 
firms that do not have the necessary liquidity to realise processes of innovation. 
Morgardshammar has been very profitable in the last decade and this presents a 
serious obstacle for the obtainment of subsidies. In addition, Swedish authorities 
would require very precise information about the results of the project they have 
funded, which is in contrast to the secrecy requirements of the technology uti~ised in 
this sector. 
To conclude, apart from a certain level of short-term pressure imposed by the 
headquarters and by the lack of public funding in Morgardshammar, there does not 
seem to be any important factor that should impede the achievement of the most 
effective and appropriate level of spending on innovation. This is because those who 
provide the funds for investment projects have the possibility and capability of 
correctly monitoring the progress. In fact, the requirements in terms of firm-specific 
perceptiveness and industry-specific expertise imposed by the low visibility of the 
process of innovation typical in most of the engineering sectors seem to be held both 
by the owners and also by the bank and insurance company. 
6.5.2.2 "Inclusion of the stakeholders" or "Shareholders first" strategy? 
In Morgardshammar, the level of inclusion of the stakeholders is definitely 
.. 
high with regards to customers and employees, whereas it is basically non-existent 
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with regards to the suppliers. The role of the customers' needs as first inputs in most 
of the processes of innovation has already been mentioned before. A close 
collaboration with them is therefore essential for the firm and must be strongly 
persecuted. In the promotional booklet of Morgardshammar it is stated: 
"In accordance with the traditions of our company, we do not only 
supply equipment but also develop lasting relationships with our 
customers. A part from the fact that it is very satisfying to make friends 
with people of various nationalities, these relationships lay the foundation 
for the confidence a customer can place in a reliable supplier. The 
customer knows that he is always welcome to contact Morgardshammar for 
assistance in order to solve problems or to discuss further plans for his 
plant. Our experienced technicians are at his service. On our part, it is 
important that we have the possibility to follow-up the functioning of 
delivered equipment and to learn from the experience of the customer. This 
information is essential for our future development towards refined and 
even more efficient equipment." 
This extract offers a good idea of the attitude of the firm towards its clients 
and of the importance given to a close long-term relationship with them. The 
salesmen of Morgardshammar further strengthen such relationships. In fact, several 
of them have been working in this field since the 1960s and as a consequence they 
know their clients very well. Moreover, thanks to their wealth of experience, not only 
are they able to sell products but also to offer a service of problem solving. They first 
sell a technical solution and then decide about the price. In other words, the 
customers know that when asking for advice they will receive a professional answer. 
Many of Morgardshammar's competitors, on the contrary, employ very young 
salesmen who do not have long-term experience and base their activity on the 
availability of numerous brochures. This keeps the relationship on a very formal and 
distant level. In addition, the assistance given to the customer by Morgardshammar 
continues even after the warranty period has expired and in general at no extra 
charge. 
This attitude towards the customers is quite widespread in Sweden. As 
explained in the Appendix 4, there is a strong tradition in Sweden of "engineering 
inventiveness oriented towards problem solving in dialogue with qualified industrial 
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customers" (Adolfsson et aI, 1999, p.35). Firms tend to specialise in niches and to 
satisfy specific customers' needs. This appears even more obvious when taking into 
consideration companies such the ASEA and Ericsson, which cooperate very closely 
with the public authorities in order to find the best solutions to specific problems. 
The employees are another group of stakeholders that in Sweden present a 
very high level of inclusion. In fact, as much as in Germany, labour unions are very 
powerful and the employees have the right to have one of their representatives sitting 
on the Board of Directors. The same is true for Morgardshammar, where, however, 
the attitude of the general direction towards the employees is much more similar to 
the Anglo-Saxon than to the German or Italian ones. In fact, in Italy and Germany, 
managers (who are often owners) tend not to dismiss their employees both because 
they feel some sort of social responsibility towards the community in which the firm 
is inserted and because of the law on labour protection. In the Anglo-Saxon business 
world, on the contrary, managers frequently consider dismissing even large parts of 
the workforce if this would allow an increase in profits. Also in Morgardshammar, 
the general management would consider adopting this strategy if were considered 
profitable. At the same time, however, in contrast with the Anglo-Saxon case, in 
Sweden unions frequently try to oppose such decisions even though usually with a 
constructive attitude. 
Morgardshammar also adopts specific forms of incentive for those who work 
in the factory. The incentive scheme invites the employees who have an idea on how 
to improve a product or a process, to submit such ideas to an evaluating team. If the 
idea is found good and if it allows the firm to get some sort economic benefit, the 
employee will receive a percentage of that benefit. This mechanism seems to work 
quite well and in a span of time of 12 months or so, the firm usually grants between 
25 and 50 awards. 
Morgardshammar does not adopt a strategy of inclusion of the suppliers. In 
fact, even though the firm buys at least 60% of the components for its final product 
from external suppliers, the main strategic parts are produced internally in order to 
avoid problems of spillovers. This is because none of the suppliers produce 
exclusively for the firm and it would be very dangerous to produce strategic 
components outside the local workshop. As in the case of Starn, there does not seem 
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to be forms of inclusion that would represent a sufficient incentive for the suppliers 
to avoid the spillovers to the competitors ofMorgardshammar. 
Quite an important role in the process of innovation is played by universities 
and research centres. On many occasions Morgardshammar needs external help to 
solve specific technical problems and these public bodies appear to have the 
necessary expertise to deal with such problems. The relationship is however not a 
close long-term one and Morgardshammar pays for services when they are needed, 
not on a regular basis. 
6.6 Recent changes and conclusions 
In the last ten years the structure of the Danieli Group has changed 
considerably. It has grown larger, with a much higher number of employees and 
subsidiaries, both in Italy and abroad and a much wider spectrum of products offered. 
It is now a very complex and articulated business. At the same time, the market is 
also undergoing deep changes with a progressive concentration from five to three 
main producers and with the expectation of a further reduction to two in the next few 
27 years. 
As mentioned before, this is a market characterised by a low level of 
visibility, a low level of appropriability and a medium level of novelty. According to 
the framework, this means that those who provide the capital for innovation should 
have a high level of firm-specific perceptiveness and a medium level of industry-
specific expertise and that there should be an inclusion of the stakeholders, namely 
employees, suppliers and customers. Danieli appears to have satisfied most of such 
requirements. In fact, the Group has responded very well to the problems arising 
from a low degree of visibility of the sector and the low firm-specific perceptiveness 
and industry-specific expertise of Italian banks and financial institutions and the low 
efficiency of the capital markets. It has opted for a very high concentration of 
ownership and control in the hands of active shareholders with technical expertise. It 
has understood the importance of an efficient and frequent flow of information top-
down and bottom-up (within the Holding and with the Italian subsidiaries) fostering 
formal and informal meetings. In addition, it has managed to rely considerably on 
capital coming from government bodies with a high level of industry-specific 
27 Interview with Mr. Benedetti in Realta industria Ie (Sept. 1999). 
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expertise. Some resources are channelled to the interfunctional interaction among the 
Production, R&D and Sales units, which is essential given the high specialisation and 
complexity of the products. However, the interaction between the Production and 
R&D units appears to be limited to the higher hierarchical levels whereas feedbacks 
coming from the shop floor are not institutionally encouraged and usually do not 
occur. This is in line with the Fordist organisational approach that characterised the 
Holding, which tends minimise the influence of human variability upon the 
performance of the production system, and in general limits the opportunities for 
incremental product and process innovation. An integrative model seems to fit better 
with the high technology era the sector is now in. As mentioned before the Swedish 
subsidiari8 has already set up some sort of "suggestions box" which, even though 
still very far from a Japanese model, appeared to work very effectively. 
As for the relationship with the foreign subsidiary, problems of geographical 
and hierarchical distance and short-term pressures could further reduce the level of 
visibility characterising the sector. This relationship is perceived in a slightly 
different way by the General direction in Italy and by the employees in Sweden. In 
fact, on the one hand the General direction argues that the subsidiaries are mainly 
evaluated on the basis of financial indicators (which is quite dangerous as this could 
pose short-term pressures on the subsidiary and therefore limit the amount of funds 
spent on innovation) and are granted a large degree of autonomy. On the other hand, 
the Swedish subsidiary perceives that the degree of autonomy, which was very low 
in the first few years after the acquisition, is still lower than what is usual in Sweden, 
where the delegation of responsibilities is generally very high. This is a clear 
example of the cultural differences between Italy and Sweden. Drawing on 
Hofstede's (1991) work, Italy is characterised by a much larger tolerance of power 
distance29 (80) and of uncertainty avoidance3o (80) than Sweden (respectively 15 and 
32). 
28 Empirical evidence shows that consultative principles of management are progressively diffusing in 
Sweden (Allan N::es Gjerding, 1992). 
29 Power distance is "the extent to which less powerful members of institutions and organisations 
accept that power is distributed unequally". See Hofstede G. and Bond M. (1984, p.419). 
30 "Countries characterised by high uncertainty avoidance have a great deal of structuring of 
organisational activities, more written rules, less risk-taking by managers, lower labour turnover, and 
less ambitious employees. Low uncertainty avoidance societies have organisation settings with less 
structuring of activities, fewer written rules, more risk-taking by managers, higher labour turnover, 
and more ambitious employees. The organisation encourages personnel to use their own initiative and 
assume responsibility for their actions". See Hodgetts R.M. and Luthans F. (1997, p.103). 
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With regard to the low level of appropriability characterising the industry and 
the importance of cumulative learning on the shop floor, the Group has adopted an 
inclusion of the stakeholders strategy, with a great importance given to employees 
and close long-term relationships with customers. As for suppliers, already 
mentioned in the case of Starn, it appears that secrecy makes any form of inclusion, 
with the exception of acquisition, ineffective. 
At this stage, however, it is also necessary to pay attention to the current 
transformations that the Group is undergoing and to the effects that such changes 
could have. In fact, the progressive internationalisation of the Group, its expansion in 
scale, the widening of the product range offered and the death of Dott. Danieli, have 
made it impossible for Mr. Benedetti to keep managing and monitoring the Group as 
personally and thoroughly as before. As a consequence, in 1999 a deep process of 
rationalisation was started within the Group. This consisted on a progressive 
delegation of responsibility to newly appointed middle managers and a multiplication 
of the hierarchical levels. The distance in space has progressively increased along 
with the process of internationalisation. The hierarchical distance will progressively 
rise, the flows of information are likely to slow down and there will probably be 
much more reliance on financial indicators than in the past. This could be a real 
danger for the Group as it could resolve into a progressively lower level of visibility 
for the shareholder and into an insufficient level of expenditure in innovation. The 
rationalisation process was necessary but a particular attention was to be devoted to 
keeping a high level of internal visibility. 
One of the first effects of this new situation and of the expected reduction in 
the possibility of exercising a frequent and personal control over the employees has 
been the adoption of a new incentive plan. 
Until 1998 the reward system for the product units' employees consisted of a 
bonus based on the effort and achievements plus a rise in salary of a percentage as 
high as the level of inflation. This system has been transformed in 1999. Since then 
the salary of the first four levels (until the head clerk) have consisted of a fixed part 
plus a percentage of the profits of the firm, which are paid either in cash or in stock 
options. At the breakeven point the variable part is zero and it progressively 
increases with the profits of the firm. The 5th and 6th levels receive a fixed salary 
plus, when deserved, a special reward. The problem with this system is that most of 
the times profit is not synonymous with innovation. In fact, even though the General 
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Direction requires the product lines and the subsidiaries to spend a fixed percentage 
of their sales in R&D, there are many other expenditures deriving from a process of 
innovation that might undergo a consistent reduction in order to increase the short-
term profits, and that might undermine the process of innovation itself. In fact, if 
those who have the power (therefore the higher levels in the hierarchy) use their 
insider knowledge and pursue the long-term goals of the Group, there should not be 
problems. However, if they have a short-term perspective, even if they are insiders, 
they might prefer to reduce some expenditure necessary for innovation, in order to 
produce higher profits. 
To conclude, even though the technology employed in this sector presents a 
very low level of visibility, which would advise the firm being of limited scale, the 
high technology involved in the final plants, their size and characteristics have led to 
a progressive widening of the firms and concentration in the market. The majority 
shareholders in Danieli have tried for a long time to keep a very tight and direct 
control over the firm. However, the complexity of the business has now made it 
materially impossible, forcing a reengineering of the Group. Even if such delegation 
of responsibility might reduce the visibility for those who provide the funds for 
innovation, at the same time it will allow a faster decision-making process and 
maybe a progressive shift towards the integrative model. 
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7. Corporate governance and product innovation in the 
machine-tool sector in Italy 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we have presented the main characteristics of the machine-tool 
sector, the most important actors in the innovation process, and the main 
requirements in tenns offirm-specific perceptiveness, industry-specific expertise and 
inclusion of the stakeholders. We have also tried to explain, through Tylecote's 
(1999) framework, the decline of the US machine-tool sector and the upsurge of the 
Japanese one. In Chapter 5 and in Chapter 6 we have presented two illustrative case 
studies. These have helped us to gain a better understanding of the influence of 
Corporate Governance on product innovation. 
In this chapter, we will focus on the Italian machine-tool sector. We will 
present its history, its evolution and its current situation. We will make also a 
comparison between the requirements in tenns of corporate governance indicated by 
the framework for this sector and its current characteristics. To do this we will use 
several sources. Firstly we will report data collected and elaborated by UCIMU 
(Italian association of machine-tool builders, robot and automation). Secondly we 
will refer to the Mediocredito database for the years 1992-93-94, to the CIS database 
and to the results of the COPI survey. Finally, we will report the existing literature on 
the topic and the results of interviews with managers and experts in the sector. 
7.2 The machine-tool sector: the historical background 
As indicated in Figure 7.1, in 1998, Italy was the fourth international 
machine-tool producer (9.8%), after Japan (23%), Gennany (20.4%) and the US 
(12.4%), with an output valued at US $3,645 million and an increase of 5.8% over 
the production of 1997. 
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Figure 7.1 Top ten machine-tool manufacturing countries in 1998 (million US dollars) 
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Source: UCIMU (1998). 
Like Japan, Italy is a relatively newcomer among the top producers in this 
sector. In fact, even if it possesses a rather long tradition in the manufacturing of 
machine-tools, until a few decades ago it held only a very marginal position. As can 
be seen in Figure 7.2, until the beginning of the 1970s Italy's share of world 
machine-tool production was lower than 4%. 
Figure 7.2 Italy's share of world machine-tool production 
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According to CTr II (1994), the history of the Italian machine-tool sector can 
be divided into four main phases: an early stage (1960-70) of high growth; a second 
stage (1970-80) of the industry's intemationalisation; a period of crisis (1980-85), 
which involved the whole sector and a period of recovery (1985-91). We can now 
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add other two phases, namely the crisis that involved the whole sector between 1992 
and 1994, and the current recovery period. 
During the first phase, several exogenous factors favoured a rapid growth of 
the sector: firstly, at least until the middle of the 1960s, an exceptional growth in 
gross national product and private consumption, which boosted demand; secondly, 
the geographic proximity of machine-tool producers to those small and medium sized 
firms that played an essential role in Italy's industrialisation process; thirdly, the 
geographic proximity to the large producers such as Fiat, Alfa Romeo and Lancia in 
the Northwest and Zanussi (producer of electrical household appliances) in the 
Northeast; 1 fourthly, the process of substitution of labour2 with capital (mainly 
machine-tools), especially after the introduction in 1965 of the famous Sabatini Law 
(No. 1329), which granted subsidies and financial aid for the purchase of new 
machinery. 
In the following decade, the first oil shock led most industrialised countries to 
find more productive and efficient means of production and this increased the 
demand for high technology machine-tools. As a consequence, even though the 
internal growth rate of demand was not as large as in the previous phase/ Italian 
producers managed to increase their sales thanks to the exports growth. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, during this decade the world market share of Japanese 
producers progressively enlarged, mainly at the expense of the American one. Italian 
producers, instead, did not suffer much from the Japanese competition thanks to the 
high customisation of their products, which is still one of their main strengths. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the machine-tool sector is characterised by 
periodical crises and the 1980-85 period represented one of the worst crises of the 
last 50 years. Italy, however, was not hit as hard as its main competitors, mainly the 
US and Germany. 
I These large firms created a large network of suppliers of parts and components, natural users of 
machine-tools. 
2 Which was becoming progressively more expensive. 
3 Fixed investments both in small and large firms declined significantly after 1972, and the "apparent 
consumption" in real terms of machine-tools between 1972 and 1978 is negative. 
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According to CTI (1994) this was mainly due to three factors: the ability of 
Italian firms to increase their exports to those markets that grew more rapidly;4 the 
fact, already mentioned, that Italy was not much affected by Japanese competition; 
the fact that Italian machine-tool producers (as opposed to the American ones) were 
very quick to introduce the CNC technology. In 1976, when the introduction of 
CNCs had just started, the share of CNCs in total Italian machine-tool production 
was already 15.2%, a percentage as high as the Japanese one, nearly twice as high as 
the British, 50% higher than the German, and 25% higher than the French one. Since 
then, Italian producers have kept investing in this new technology and were 
surpassed only by their German and Japanese competitors. 
Even if Italy was not strongly hit by the 1980-85 period of crisis, it recovered 
at a much slower pace than its main competitors. According to CTr II (1994) this was 
the effect of a progressive "erosion of both price and non-price advantages" (p.78). 
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As shown in Table 7.1 in the second half of the 1980s, the price advantages 
of Italian machine-tool producers on average progressively diminished (with the 
exception of 1988). In addition, the competition of the Asian countries, mainly 
Taiwan, became progressively stronger especially due to the very low prices of their 
machines and the Italian imports from these countries increased progressively.s 
4 Italy expanded its export/production ratio from 49.1 percent in 1980 to 63.4 percent in 1985. See 
CTr II (1994). 
5 As reported by CTr II (1994), in 1991 the unit value (per kilogram) of Italy's imports from Taiwan 
was less than half the price ofItalian exports. See CTr II (1994). 
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As for the non-price advantages, at the beginning of the 1990s, new countries 
(mainly Asian countries) appeared on the scene as serious competitors. These 
countries, until the end of the 1980s, did not present a significant threat to Italian 
machine-tool builders due to their focus on standardised machines. However, thanks 
to the use of CNCs, new software and modular adds-on, they are now able to produce 
standardised and therefore cheap machines capable of offering very similar services 
to the highly customised ones. In addition, many countries have also started to 
compete on the same grounds as the Italian producers, "and are often able to erode 
market shares ofItalian manufacturers in this field" (CTr II, 1994, p.80). At the same 
time, according to the CTr study, Italian manufacturers did not respond to this new 
threat adequately and even they reduced their fixed capital investment activity. 
In the last few months of 1991 a new crisis started hitting the sector (see 
Figure 7.3). In 1992, for the first time in 10 years, the production of machine-tools in 
Italy decreased with respect to the previous year, by as much as 500 billion lira.6 
Export levels dropped by 5.2%. In less than four years around 14% of the firms had 
to close down and employment was reduced by 4,000 persons. The crisis ended only 
in 1994, year during which the index of orders increased by 30.7%. The sector is 
now following the upturn of the cycle. 
Figure 7.3 Production of machine-tools for the four world main producers (million of US 
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6 Approximately 170 million pounds. 
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7.3 Structure of the industry and corporate governance system 
As we have discussed in Chapter 4 for Japan and the US, we will now explore 
the system of corporate governance (in the wide sense) of the Italian machine-tool 
sector. We will compare our findings with the requirements indicated by the 
theoretical framework that we are utilising. To do this we will use the Mediocredito 
database, the CIS database, the results of the COPI survey, data provided by UCIMU 
(the Italian association of machine-tool builders) and recent literature on the topic. 
It is worth mentioning again that the technology utilised in the machine-tool 
sector is characterised by a rather low degree of visibility, a low degree of 
appropriability and a medium degree of novelty (with sporadic peaks due to the 
adoption by machine-tool producers of innovations coming from other sectors, 
mainly electronics). 7 According to the theoretical framework, a technology of this 
kind requires a high degree of firm-specific perceptiveness of those who provide the 
funds for innovation, and is better if compounded with a medium degree of industry-
specific expertise, and a high degree of inclusion of the stakeholders, which comprise 
mainly customers, suppliers and employees. 
7.3.1 Internal Visibility 
Several points need to be considered with respect to internal visibility. 
Geographic and hierarchical distances, distance in space, and the number of R&D 
laboratories are all factors that influence the flow of information, from where the 
innovation takes place, to the highest levels in the organisation where the decisions 
of investment are taken. 
Scale 
The 450 Italian machine-tool firms are, on average, small and medium in 
scale. In 1997, of the top 25 European firms, only one was Italian and only 6 Italian 
firms ranked among the top 50 (33 were German). As shown in Figure 7.4, 69% of 
the firms employed less than 50 persons, 15% had 50 to 100 employees and only 
16% of them had more than 100 employees. 
7 See Section 4.4. 
196 
Figure 7.4 Italian machine-tool industry: breakdown by employee groups. 1997 
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In turnover terms, almost half of the firms had less than 5 billion lira,s 37.8% 
of them fell in the 5 to 25 billion lira range and only 6.2% reached 50 billion lira. 
As a consequence of this, the distance in space should be, on average, quite 
limited, and the frequency of face-to-face meetings, which are some of the best 
means for facilitating the flow of information, should be quite high. The same is true 
for the hierarchical distance, as small-medium sized firms do not usually have many 
ranks of authority that could impede a smooth and fast transmission of information. 
Finally, the number of R&D labs in each firm is hardly ever higher than one. 
The Italian machine-tool sector also comprises some large firms and some 
firms that belong to groups of firms. These account for more than 50% of the total 
production of the sector. The visibility within these firms, if not appropriately dealt 
with, could be much lower. In fact, as we have seen in the case of the US (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.5), firms belonging to large organisations are often subject to 
short-term pressure and are often forced to cut expenses for innovation in order to 
increase profits. In fact, Sciberras and Payne (1985) found that an Italian firm 
belonging to an electronic engineering group "has been starved of necessary 
investment funds [ .. ] The lack of commitment by the parent has exacerbated its 
current poor competitive performance, which in tum discourages the parent from 
approving investment in new equipment needed for the machine-tool firm's future 
generations of products" (p.117). 
8 1 billion lira corresponds to approximately 330 thousand pounds sterling. 
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Structure of ownership 
As for the structure of ownership we will refer to the Mediocredito database.9 
Most of the finns in the sample are family-owned businesses with a strong 
concentration of ownership. On average, the first shareholder owns 59.0% of the 
shares, the second shareholder 25.0% and the third 16.0% (See Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2 Percentaae share of the first three shareholders 
First shareholder 59.0% 
Second shareholder 25.0% 
Third shareholder 16.0% 
Source: Mediocredlto database. 
In 11.4% of the cases finns are totally owned by a single shareholder 
(individual or finn) who also has direct control over the finn. When there is more 
than one shareholder, in most cases (63.9%) there are family links among all the 
shareholders, in 10.7% the family links are only among a few of them and in 25.4% 
of the cases there are not any family links (See Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3 Existence of family links among the first three shareholders (when there is more than 
one shareholder) 
Among all of them 63.9% 
Among few of them 10.7% 
No family links 25.4% 
Source: Mediocredlto database. 
In addition, in 73% of the cases the first and major shareholder is a private 
person living in Italy, in 11.4% of the cases another industrial finn, in 8.1 % of the 
cases it is a financial holding and in 4.1 % of the cases it is a bank or some other 
financial institution. Finally in 3.3% of the cases a foreign individual or finn is the 
major shareholder (See Table 7.4). 
9 For a description of the Mediocredito database see Chapter 2. 
198 
Table 7.4 Type of majority shareholder 
Private person living in Italy 73% 
Another industrial firm 11.4% 
Financial holding 8.1% 
Bank or other financial institution 4.1% 
Private individual living abroad 3.3% 
Source: Mediocredlto database. 
As much as 32.8% of the finns belong to group of finns, 60.5% of these are a 
subsidiary, 23.7% are in an intennediate position and 15.8% exist as holdings (See 
Figure 7.5). 
Figure 7.5 Distribution of firms among independent firms and groups of firms 
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Source: Mediocredito database. 
Such a high concentration of ownership and activism of the majority 
shareholders should account for a high firm-specific perceptiveness. It also suggests 
that these individuals are interested in the survival of the finn in the long-tenn, if 
need be at the expense of low short-run profits. 
In small-medium sized family businesses, the owners frequently perfonn 
important tasks, other than the administrative ones, and often act as salesmen. 
Salesmen, as explained in Chapter 5, are some of the most strategic sources of 
innovation in this sector, and are usually involved in new product development from 
the first idea to delivery to the customer. The owners, therefore, are usually 
completely aware of the appropriateness of any expenditure. Again, the presence of 
other industrial finns and financial institutions as majority shareholders could present 
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a problem. In fact, if these entities are highly diversified, those in charge of 
evaluating investment projects or the performance of profit centres might not have 
good industry expertise in the machine-tool sector and could try to evaluate the 
performance of the subsidiaries in a less effective manner, mainly on the basis of 
financial indicators. As shown in the case study of Danieli (Chapter 6), belonging to 
a large group such as Volvo was not sufficient for the success of Morgardshammar, 
as the Headquarters' understanding of the steel sector was too limited to correctly 
monitor the activity of the firm. Only with the advent of Danieli, which operates in 
the same sector, has the firm been able to regain its efficiency. 
7.3.2 Visibility towards the outside 
Given the above considerations, we can argue that if a firm has sufficient 
internal funds to finance the innovation process, there should not be problems in 
reaching the "appropriate" and most effective spending on innovation. The internal 
visibility of firms appears, in fact, to be very high. 
Table 7 5 Forms of financin<> innovation 1992 1994 
'6 -
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Risk capital 72 0 0 0 0 
Self-financing 72 0 100 74.68 38.75 
Medium-long-term loan 72 0 100 6.18 20.37 
Medium-long-term loan at a lower than 72 0 100 14.10 30.14 the market interest rate 
Public funds lent without security 72 0 50 2.26 8.08 
Fiscal deductions 72 0 100 1.39 11.79 
Other 72 0 80 1.39 9.69 
Source: MedlOcredlto database. 
However, when internal funds are not sufficient to finance innovative 
expenditures, Italian machine-tool builders could encounter a few problems. 
Italian entrepreneurs prefer not to sell the shares of their firms on the market 
to collect extra funds and therefore they need to rely on other sources (see Table 7.5). 
Bank loans account only for 6,18% of the overall financing. This is because banks 
and other financial institutions do not have the required level of firm-specific 
perceptiveness and industry-specific expertise to cope with the low visibility of this 
sector. As shown in Table 7.6, they appear to have a very low understanding of the 
machine-tool sector. On a 7 point Likert scale, the degree of understanding by banks 
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of the machine-tool was ranked at 2.3 with a very small standard deviation. As 
explained in Chapter 3, this is because, apart from local banks within industrial 
districts and Mediobanca, they have never had any incentives to invest in sector or 
firm-specific human capital, and, as a consequence, they have never played any role 
in the corporate governance ofItalian firms. 
T bl 76 D a e egree 0 un ers an mg 0 f d t d' fth e mac me- 00 sec or ly ta Ian an s h' t i b I r b k 
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
1 =nulI, 7=compiete 18 1 4 2.333 0.9075 
Source: COP I survey. 
In 1993 in an interview with "11 Sole24 ore", the Italian equivalent of the 
Financial Times, the President of UCIMU, Flavio Radice strongly criticised the 
banking system for not supporting Italian industrial firms. "They seem to have 
forgotten their real mission [ .. J In such a difficult situation firms are left alone. Many 
of them had to turn down orders because they did not have sufficient banking 
warranties. Our German and French competitors, on the contrary, can rely on lower 
interest rates and on a much more professional relationship between banks and firms. 
[ .. J The first goal is to convince the banking system to address their efforts towards 
the most strategic sectors in the country, the high-tech ones".10 
In the same interview, the director of the newspaper, Gianni Locatelli, 
claimed that the relationship between banks and firms will change only when the 
banks will try to seriously understand the problems of the firms. He said: "there is a 
need to grow again a number of good branch directors who, overcoming the 
burocratic approach, are able to build a constructive relationship with firms, 
especially the small ones".]] 
As shown also by the CIS data, in Italy the lack of appropriate sources of 
finance as one of the factors hampering innovation, is a much more serious problem 
than in any other European country, except for Spain (see Table 7.7). 
10 II Sale 24 are (30/06/1993). 
II In 1993 most of the firms in the sector were paying an interest rate of 16-17%. See II Sale 24 are 
(2/07/93). 
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Table 7.7 Ranking of the "lack of appropriate sources of finance" as a factor hampering 
innovation (1 =most important) 
Country Ranking 
Norway 6 
Portugal 3 
Netherlands 7 
Luxemburg 3 
Italy 2 
Ireland 3 
Spain 2 
Germany 3 
Denmark 4 
Belgium 5 
Source: summary table of CIS database. Own calculatIOns. 
In Chapter 3, we argued that only within industrial districts, do banks appear 
to have played an important role in the corporate governance of Italian firms. More 
than 50% of Italian machine-tool builders are located in the Lombardia region and 
this could suggest the existence of an industrial district. This, in tum, would mean 
that one or more banks should have the firm-specific perceptiveness or at least the 
industry-specific expertise to finance machine-tool firms in this sector. However, 
even if the number of machine-tool firms in Lombardia is very high, it is not possible 
to consider this area as an industrial district. 
A typical industrial district is the chair producing district of Friuli,12 for 
example. In not more that 100 square km, around 1000 firms coexist, producing 
some or all the parts of a chair, amounting to 40 % of the chairs produced in the 
whole world. A bank has its headquarters at the centre of the district, in a town of not 
more than 4000 inhabitants. Even though the firms in the district do not exclusively 
use this bank, it certainly has a very large number of these 1000 firms among its 
clients and shareholders. Very recently, the bank, together with some of the largest 
firms in the district, has set up a business for the provision of network services to the 
other firms in the district. The service will not only provide real-time flows of 
information between suppliers and industrial customers but it will also allow the 
12 The most eastern region in Italy. 
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bank to monitor the overall activity of the district, the relationship between finns and 
the operations of each single finn. 13 
We now turn to the machine-tool sector. In Italy, it has around 450 finns, 
most of which are concentrated in the North and in particular Lombardia, where one 
can find around 50% of total plants. But Lombardia is not like Friuli and even ifmost 
of the finns are located around Milan, they have a very large number of banks from 
which to choose. In addition, as revealed by the CTI analysis, "the areas with a high 
concentration of machine-tool suppliers and a high machine-tool adoption rate, are 
however characterised by (1) a low degree of sectoral specialisation, with machine-
tool suppliers coexisting with a large number of manufacturers from different sectors 
and of all sizes, often playing a key role as machine-tool users; (2) the presence of a 
few leading companies with a high international visibility, such as Comau, Dea, and 
Prima in the Turin area, and Mandelli and Marposs in Emilia; (3) a large majority of 
smaller manufacturers of machine-tools and accessories, acting either as 
subcontractors for larger manufacturers or as specialised suppliers of small and large 
users located within and outside the area; (4) no public intervention at a local level 
that is specific to the machine-tool industry, and a high geographic concentration (in 
Lombardia) of services provided by UCIMU.,,14 It is very unlikely, therefore that the 
degree offirm-specific perceptiveness and industry-specific expertise of banks in this 
area is as high as in a real industrial district. 
As for fonns of public financing of innovation, Table 7.5 shows that they 
account for only 17.75% of the total expenditure in R&D (medium-long tenn loans 
at a lower than the market interest rate, public funds lent without security and fiscal 
deductions). Alfredo Mariotti, General Director ofUCIMU, during an interview with 
11 Sole 24 OrelS confinned that public instruments for financing are not lacking. 
However, he claims, either finns do not know of them, or they are too difficult to 
understand. Between 1990 and 1995 only 43 finns out of a total of 450 used public 
fonns of financing for innovation and in 1995 only 13 were active in projects 
financed by the European Commission. 
13 From interviews with the main directors in the bame 
14 CTI II (1994). 
15 II Sole 24 Ore (7/3/1995). 
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According to the CIS database, among the vanous laws in favour of 
innovation, the Sabatini law, which provides financial support and credit incentives 
for the adoption of innovative machinery, appears to be the most used one (23.5%), 
followed by the Applied research fund (19.18%), and by law 317.9 (10.36%) in 
favour of R&D activities among small firms. The other forms of support of 
innovation (European funding, indirect financial funding, R&D services, technical-
scientific consultancy, public orders of R&D, public orders for the supply of 
products) are all considered unimportant, both by the average of Italian firms and by 
the machine-tool sector. 
There are no data available to explain the specific reasons that do make public 
instruments very ineffective. In fact the causes could be multiple, such as: a difficulty 
in getting information about the available forms of financing; a lack of resources 
within SMEs to assist in filling the required documents; a long time spent by the 
public administration in evaluating the application forms; a high number of 
applications rejected either due to strict limits, or to actual scarce innovativeness of 
the projects, or to scarce industry-specific expertise of those who evaluate the 
projects. 
The above considerations allow us to draw some important conclusions about 
the Italian machine-tool sector. On the one hand, it appears that internal visibility is 
on average very high. Therefore, if there are internal funds available, firms should be 
able to reach the appropriate and most effective spending on innovation. On the other 
hand, when internal sources of finance are not sufficient, machine-tool firms appear 
to have some difficulties in obtaining the necessary funds. In fact, banks and other 
financial institutions do not have the necessary firm-specific perceptiveness and 
industry-specific expertise to correctly evaluate the innovative investment projects. 
Also, applying for and obtaining public sources of finance appears to be rather 
difficult, especially for SMEs. 
As there are no good short-term prospects of obtaining strong support from 
the banking system and from the public sector, UCIMU has launched a campaign to 
convince Italian SMEs to merge or become part of groups. According to UCIMU's 
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experts,16 Italian machine-tool producers need to increase their scale, as in the 
globalised market only a larger scale allows firms to meet the required marketing 
expenses and to finance important innovative projects. 
We do not agree with UCIMU as we think that firms should maintain their 
small and flexible scale. 17 To overcome the lack of financial resources they need to 
learn to operate together, not only for marketing activities,18 but also for R&D, at 
least at the very early stage of research when there are no problems of competition. 
In addition, it is important that firms collaborate to ensure the compatibility of the 
various parts they produce,19 as nowadays customers demand more integrated 
systems, rather than single machines. 
A successful example, which should be followed by many others, is that of 
LAMBDA,2o a complete line for the production of pots. This scheme was realised 
thanks to co-operation of 14 firms, each of which provided its own technology. 
Within one year from the production of LAMBDA, the consortium of firms received 
four other orders for the production of similar lines. 
However, according to the Mediocredito database, only 5% of the firms 
between 1992 and 1994 carried out R&D activities with other firms. The agreements 
took place among firms with 51 to 250 employees and with more than 500 
employees. Among the first group, the percentage financed was around 50% whereas 
in the second group it was much lower (15%). As confirmed by the President of 
Starn, firms in the machine-tool sector are not used to cooperating with their 
competitors. 
A critical activity in favouring the setting up of inter-firm agreements could 
be played by UCIMU. The association currently comprises 70% of the firms in the 
16 This idea has been put forward by UCIMU since 1993 in an interview with 11 Sole 24 ore 
(24/08/93). See also: II Sole 24 Ore (3/07/98), II Sole 24 Ore (23/07/98), 11 Sole 24 Ore (18/12/98). 
More recently, it has been confinned by Dott. Battaglia, director of the economic studies of UCIMU, 
during a personal interview in December 1999. In 1998 UCIMU had also produced a law project that 
would favour mergers among small-medium firms. For a different opinion see II Sole 24 Ore 
(22/08/95). 
17 For an exhaustive discussion of this point see Section 7.4. 
18 In 1992, ten firms set up a consortium (Ita) for the penetration in the North American market. 
Besides the headquarters, there are now several distributors covering the whole territory. The goal is 
to reach 20 associates. The structure is financed both by the associated firms and by the government 
through the law that finances consortia of firms aimed at penetrating foreign markets. See Tecnologie 
meccaniche (1996d). 
19 See 11 Sole 25 Ore (22/8/1995). These kind of agreements among firms are strongly favoured by the 
EC. 
10 See 11 Sole 24 Ore (211911993). 
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machine-tool sector, being in this way the natural point of focus and coordination 
among them. The association was formed in 1945 "to defend members' interests by 
encouraging greater and more widespread business enterprise through services that 
are constantly revised to meet the needs of firms in the industry,,?l UCIMU is 
articulated in several subsidiaries to provide specialist support in all areas of 
business: EFIM, the unit that organises trade exhibitions in Lombardia; Fondazione 
UCIMU, an institution for the realisation of sectoral-specific analyses; CEU SpA, a 
company that organises trade exhibitions in Italy and abroad and Probest Service 
SpA, which offers several types of services, from training courses for new 
employees, to courses for the re-training and re-qualification of old employees, 
mainly in the firms' premises. The engineering section offers services in support of 
innovation, such as feasibility analyses; engineering activities (basic design, layout 
of the shop floor of the client etc); supervision on the assembly; setting up of a new 
machine or plant; selection of the customer's personnel and technical/managerial 
training for the use of new machines. Finally, Probest offers advice and operational 
support to better deal with all the matters concerning the sale and purchase of capital 
goods and project financing applied to technological innovation. Unfortunately it 
appears that only the firms situated in Lombardia get considerable benefits from 
UCIMU, whereas the other firms, even those belonging to the association, do not 
receive much in exchange for the high fee they are paying.22 
7.3.3 Appropriability and inclusion of the stakeholders 
As explained in Chapter 4, the degree of appropriability in this sector is 
rather low and as a consequence the inclusion of the main stakeholders, mainly 
customers, suppliers (especially those who produce CNCs) and employees, is very 
important. 
On average it appears that firms in the machine-tool sector tend be more 
prone to use an inclusion of the stakeholders strategy as opposed to a shareholders 
first strategy. Table 7.8 shows that on average, those firms that participated in the 
COPl survey try to balance the interests of the shareholders with those of the other 
21 See: www.UCIMU.it. 
22 See Starn case study (Chapter 5). 
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stakeholders. Notwithstanding the shift towards the outsider position, the importance 
given to the stakeholders appears to have increased in the last few years. The results 
are however not statistically significant. 
Table 7.8 Is your main priority to maximise shareholders' value, if necessary at the expense of 
the interests of other stakeholders? 
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Now 15 1 7 3.53 2.19 
5 years ago 16 1 7 3.75 2.13 
1 = We always InSISt on balanCIng the Interests of the shareholders wIth those of other stakeholders. 
7= We give complete priority to shareholders' interests. 
Source: copr survey. 
As evident in Table 7.9, the Italian machine-tool producers usually have a 
very strong relationship with the first group of stakeholders, namely the customers. 
T bl 79 T a e ype 0 fl· h· . h h re atlOns lp WIt t e customers 
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Long-term=l Short-term=7 18 1 3 1.8 0.7859 
Tight=l Loose=7 18 1 4 2.055 0.9376 
Source: COPl survey. 
Italian machine-tool builders, in fact, mainly produce highly customised 
products and as a consequence they need to operate closely with their customers. It is 
not a coincidence that most of the Italian customers of machine-tools are in the North 
of Italy where most of the builders are also situated. At the same time, in exchange 
for highly customized products, built to satisfy their specific requirements, customers 
are usually willing to make payments up-front. These are very important, as small 
machine-tool builders could not afford to finance the production of such expensive 
machinery on their own. In the last few years, in particular, the standards set by the 
customers have become progressively higher, requiring not only high levels of 
automation,but also a large degree of flexibility and easy re-configuration. For these 
reasons, machine-tool producers have now a new role, not only being suppliers of a 
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specific machine, but also ideal partners for the re-engmeenng of the means of 
2' production. ~ 
The degree of vertical disintegration in Italy is very high, with large reliance 
being placed on very specialized suppliers. The machine-tool builders, in fact, rather 
than making non-proprietary components such as tool-changers or electrical cabinets, 
buy these from the suppliers who specialize in them. Serving several builders enables 
the suppliers to make components in economical lot quantities, which lowers the unit 
cost to the builders. As a result, the builders have more resources to devote to 
application solutions within each company's market niche.24 
Table 7.10 Type of relationship with the suppliers (not of CNC) 
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Long-term=1 Short-term=7 18 1 5 2.833 0.9376 
Tight=1 Loose=7 18 2 6 3.8 1.27 
Source: copr survey. 
The relationship with the suppliers (not of CNCs) appears to be long-term 
but suppliers do not seem to be strongly included (see Table 7.10). In fact, for 
reasons of secrecy, most of the products bought by the machine-tool builders from 
the suppliers are standard ones or produced on the basis of drawings provided by the 
machine-tool builders themselves. In this latter case, the supplier only has knowledge 
of a small part of the whole proj ect, which is of no use to the competitors. Machine-
tool builders do not appear to finance projects of innovation from their suppliers or to 
work together with the supplier for the development of an innovation. 
As for the suppliers of CNCs, things have changed considerably in the last 
decade or so. In fact, up until the early 1990s, most Italian machine-tool 
manufacturers tended to purchase CNC technology on the market. They favoured 
internationally manufactured devices (Siemens or FANUC, as a rule). Only a few of 
them, such as Mandelli, Jobs and Dea, produced their own CNCs both for internal 
consumption and for the market. 25 
Since 1993, the Italian production of CNCs (only devices) has considerably 
increased, so much so that in 1997 more than 50% of the whole internal demand was 
23 See II Sole 24 Ore (3/1 0/98). 
24 http://mmsonline.com/reports/ 
25 Mandelli, Elsag and Fidia produced also the related software. See CTr II (1994). 
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satisfied by internal consumption. 26 In addition, the growing complexity of electronic 
devices and the need to personalize the product, force CNC producers to collaborate 
with their main customers (machine-tool builders) and to sell their products directly 
without relying on agents (see Figure 7.6). 
Figure 7.6 Sales channels on the market of CNCs (1997) 
16% 6% 
78% 
Source: Tecnologie meccaniche (1998a). 
o Direct sales 
13 Agents 
o Retailer 
The relationship with the suppliers of CNCs appears to be closer than that 
with the other suppliers (see Table 7.11). Differences in mean are statistically 
significant at the 99% level. 
Table 7.11 Type of relationship with the suppliers (CNC) 
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Long-term=l Short-term=7 18 1 3 1.5 0.61 
Tight=l Loose=7 18 1 2 1.44 0.51 
Source: COP I survey. 
Currently the major exporters to Italy of CNCs are Germany (40%) and 
Luxemburg (37%). This is probably due to the geographic proximity, which favors 
close relationships among firms. The United States and Japan play now a very 
limited role, together exporting less than 5% of the total Italian imports ofCNCs. 
As for the employees, we mentioned in Chapter 3 and in the two case studies 
(Chapter 5 and 6) that in Italy they appear to be strongly included. This feeling of 
inclusion derives mainly from the legislation on job protection and even more from 
16 See Tecnologie meccaniche (1998a). 
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the common type of relationship between employees and employers based on trust 
and reciprocal commitment. Table 7.12 reports the results in the COPI survey for the 
following question: "If it seemed to the top management that the firm could gain in 
profit over the next three years by a strategy which involved dismissing a substantial 
number of employees, which of the following considerations would weigh against 
this, and how strongly?" The directors that participated to the COPI survey gave to 
the options "Problems of conscience: inner feeling of responsibility to the 
employees" and "Social position in the local community would make it difficult", 
some of the highest marks, even higher than to "Effectively blocked by our legal 
obligations to the workforce". 
Table 7.12 If it seemed to the top management that the firm could gain in profit over the next 
three years by a strategy which involved dismissing a substantial number of employees, which of 
thfll· ·d f Id·h ·tth· dh t I? e 0 owmg consl era IOns wou welgJ agams IS, an ow s rongn . 
1 = would not have any influence, 7= would have N Min. Max. Mean Std. deviation 
a major inf1uence 
Problems of conscience: inner feeling of 16 1 7 5.31 1.81 
responsibility to the employees 
Social position in the local community would make 16 1 7 4.06 1.806 it difficult 
Would throwaway skills which are likely to be 
valuable and thus in the long-run might be self- 16 2 7 5.7 1.4 
defeating 
Would damage the co-operative relationship 
between employees and management and in the 16 1 7 4.2 l.8 
long-run be self-defeating 
The union would react by a damaging strike or 16 1 6 3.9 1.8 
other industrial action 
The workers would obstruct it by using their 15 1 7 3.0 1.7 powers under co-determination 
Effectively blocked by our legal obligations to the 16 1 6 2.75 1.61 
workforce 
Financial interests of shareholders 15 1 6 2.8 1.7 
Credibility towards providers of debt 14 1 6 3.07 1.9 (banks) 
Source: COPI survey. 
Knowing that they will hardly ever lose their jobs and that their interests are 
kept in consideration regarding the formulation of the firm's strategy, Italian 
employees should have all the incentives to participate to the innovation process, 
accumulating industry and firm-specific skills and contributing to the cumulative 
learning. The process of skills accumulation is in fact not at risk as suggested for the 
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case of the US by Blair (1995).27 The real situation is, however, rather different from 
what it seems. Firstly, as opposed to Germany for example, a blue collar worker in a 
machine-tool firm is not especially held in high esteem within the community. 
Secondly, the lack of any agreement or any form of communication between firms 
and educational institutions turns into a lack of personnel with those specific skills 
that are needed more by the machine-tool builders (see Table 7.13). Students need to 
be trained on the job. However, this is not always possible, as the type of skills that 
the employees are required to have in this sector are now rather high-tech and not 
many SMEs have sufficient resources to invest in this type of training. Some support 
is offered by UCIMU. However, if Italy was to develop some type of vocational 
training similar to the German one, machine-tool builders could rely on a much more 
skilled employment base. 
Table 7.13 What is the role played by the educational system in preparing the students to work 
in the machine-tool sector? 
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
NUll=l Essential=7 20 1 4 2.25 1.01 
Source: copr survey. 
Thirdly, even if there is a high degree of inclusion, the delegation of 
responsibilities to the lower levels in the organisation has up until now been rather 
low. This is mainly due to the presence of the owners among the management team 
as they usually want to keep everything under their control. This means that firms are 
not taking full advantage of the innovative potential of their employees. In fact, as it 
was explained in Chapter 4, the cumulative learning acquired on the shop floor is an 
essential source of innovation in this sector and if employees are not granted some 
freedom of action to use their competence and skills, they will not be able to 
contribute to the innovation process. 
Only recently, firms seem to have realised the great potential of the existing 
inclusion. For example, UCIMU, in collaboration with some of the associate firms, is 
organising a promotional operation to explain to young students what it really means 
to work for a machine-tool firm. The operation is called "Factory for Man,,28 and 
since its launch it interested 15,000 young people. The main theme is that UCIMU 
27 See Chapter 1. 
28 See UCIMU' s web page. 
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and the associated firms are some of the mam interpreters of the process of 
empowerment of the employees. In the new scenario, each worker will have more 
autonomy, responsibility, and space for creativity and imagination, giving back the 
role of protagonist within the firm to the employees (managers or blue collars). 
To summarize and conclude, Italian machine-tool builders seem to have 
included those stakeholders that playa major role in the innovation process. The 
situation with the employees is rather critical in the sense that even if included, up 
until now they have not had much space to contribute to the process of innovation, 
having little responsibility and not being used to work in groups. In addition, there is 
a strong need of some kind of support from the educational system, if machine-tool 
builders are to keep their products at the technological frontier. 
7.3.4 Novelty 
The degree of novelty is medium in the machine-tool sector, with few but 
high peaks, mainly due to inventions in electronics. New start-up firms in this sector 
do not have an advantage over established firms, as the accumulated knowledge is 
important and close long-term agreements with suppliers and customers, so essential 
in this sector, require time to be set up. The inclusion of the employees could cause 
some problems of conservatism when important changes need to be made but this 
does not seem to have caused problems at the time of the introduction of CNCs. The 
President of Starn said that even if the introduction of CNCs represented a critical 
turning point it happened gradually, starting only with one or two machines the first 
year. The employees did not have serious problems in adapting to the new 
technology and the support of UCIMU in re-training those who needed to be re-
trained, played an important role. 
Table 7.14 With respect to (1) Change in processes, (2) Product Innovation, how would you 
did· I ? describe the attitu e of manua pro uctlOn emp. oyees. 
l=Deliberately obstruct change N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 7=Thoroughly cooperative attitude 
Change in process 20 2 7 4.15 1.2 
Product innovation 20 4 7 5.4 1.04 
Source: COPI survey. 
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Furthermore, as employees are quite sure that they are not going to lose their 
jobs, they usually do not try to obstruct change, both of product innovations and of 
process innovations (see Table 7.14). 
7.4 Groups of firms, independent firms and innovation 
The consultants of UCIMU (Italian Machine-tool Builders association) claim 
that Italian machine-tool producers should merge or form groups of firms in order to 
increase their scale and the level of investment in innovation. This is because, they 
argue, Italian firms are too small to channel sufficient resources to R&D (and 
marketing and after-sales service) and this would cause a loss of competitiveness in 
this current high technology era. On the contrary, large firms and in particular groups 
of firms would be able to allocate the "appropriate" spending in innovation, and, in 
any case to reach a much higher level of R&D spending. 
The theoretical foundations of this claim can be found in the literature about 
capital market imperfections and financial constraints. As argued by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), in a situation of perfect capital markets, the financial structure of a 
firm should not influence the number and size of its investments. The latter, on the 
contrary, should be driven only by expected future profitability. Internal and external 
sources of finance would be perfect substitutes for each other and belonging or not to 
a group would not influence the availability of funds. Since 1958 the assumption of 
perfect capital markets has been challenged many times, both in theoretical and 
empirical terms, mainly on the grounds that there are clear imperfections in capital 
markets such as managerial agency problems, transaction costs and asymmetric 
information. 
Due to information asymmetries, high-technology firms usually face higher 
financial constraints than low-technology firms. This is because, on the one hand, 
they have to sell their equities at a discount (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and on the 
other, banks tend to ration their credit. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In fact, as 
emphasised by Stephan (1996) and Dasgupta and David (1994), firms carrying out 
science-based activities present a higher degree of uncertainty and information 
asymmetry regarding the value of their projects. This is because the evaluation of 
investments in innovative activities and in particular of R&D expenditures requires 
specific competencies that outsider investors do not often have. In addition, in many 
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industries, patents are not a useful method of appropriating the returns to 
expenditures for innovation and as a consequence, finns in these industries prefer to 
keep a high level of secrecy about their projects. 
Several studies on the presence of capital constraints29 have shown that firms 
belonging to groups of firms appear to be less financially constrained than 
independent ones. The reasons for this phenomenon appear to be the following. 
First, finns belonging to groups have easier access to external financial resources, as 
banks and other financial institutions are aware of the fact that in case of distress they 
will be able to rely on the resources of the group. Second, capital acquired on the 
market by low risk finns belonging to the group can be reallocated to high-
technology finns. In this case we can argue that there is a double hurdle in the 
financing process. In fact, banks and other financial institutions obtain funds on the 
market from savers. However, they do not have the necessary competencies to make 
an economic evaluation of the innovative proj ects. Hence they would ration credit or 
ask for a discount on the shares of high-technology firms. On the other hand, those 
who work within the group, being insiders, are more capable of making a correct 
evaluation of the projects. Therefore, they can reallocate funds from a firm with easy 
access to the external market to another finn perceived as very risky by the market. 
Third, through the internal capital market, the extra liquidity of one or more firms 
can be reallocated to another firm with temporary liquidity problems. Finally, the 
holding generally has a higher market power than each subsidiary and can obtain 
funds at a lower price. 
The lower financial constraints faced by finns belonging to groups of finns 
suggest that these finns have more capital to invest in R&D and other innovative 
activities and as a consequence should be able to be more innovative. This 
conclusion is the same as that of the consultants ofUCIMU. 
There are, however, several arguments against this line of reasoning. First, the 
studies that deal with financial constraints30 do not distinguish between low-visibility 
and high-visibility sectors and refer to investments in fixed capita13l (a highly visible 
expenditure) and not on more general expenditures for innovation. Moreover, as 
29 See Schiatarelli and Sembenelli (1996) for Italy, Cho (1995) for Korea, Elston and Albach (1995) 
for Germany and Schaller (1993) for Canada. 
30 See for example Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (1996). 
31 They basically show that within firms belonging to groups, the level of investment in fixed capital 
does not change with the cash flow. 
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previous works have shown,32 cash flow accounts for less than 10% of the variance 
in R&D intensity. Furthennore, a linear relationship between R&D and innovation 
has been proven not to exist. 33 Therefore, even though finns belonging to groups of 
finns present fewer financial difficulties in carrying out R&D expenditures, they do 
not necessarily present a higher probability of innovating. 
It must also be borne in mind that the machine-tool sector is characterised by 
low visibility. This means the following. On the one hand groups of finns could solve 
the problems due to the low firm-specific perceptiveness of the outsider financers, as 
mentioned before. On the other hand, belonging to a group could engender internal 
problems of the same type. This is because, in general, the various profit centres of a 
large finn or of a group, be they divisions, product lines or finns of a group, compete 
for scarce resources. It is usually rather difficult for those who are in control, even if 
they are insiders, to be perfectly infonned of the potentials of each investment 
project and of the correctness of the expenditures. If the control is carried out 
primarily through financial indicators, (and there is both considerable hierarchical 
and geographical dispersion) the "appropriate" and most effective spending on 
innovation might not be attained, even if there are funds available within the finn or 
the group. This is even more likely if the group is highly diversified and the 
production of machine-tools is not part of its core activities. 
It is therefore very difficult to anticipate whether belonging to a group of 
finns or to a large company would automatically mean that more resources would be 
spent on product innovation, as UCTh1U is suggesting.34 In addition, availability of 
funds, even if very important, is not the only factor influencing the innovativeness of 
a finn. 
As it will be shown in Section 7.6, the data seem to support our VIew. 
Belonging to a group, or having a large scale, does not appear to positively influence 
the ability to innovate. It must also be added, that SMEs appear to resist the recurring 
crises in the sector much better than large finns or groups (see Tecnologie 
Meccaniche, 1996). In addition, at the early moment of the introduction of CNCs, 
Italian finns were among the first finns to introduce them, thanks to the lower fixed 
32 See Cohen and Levin (1989). 
33 See Rosenberg (1994). 
34As a matter of fact, the few attempts to create large groups in Italy were not very successful. 
Exemplar is the case of Mandelli, which thanks to an expansive strategy had reached the 10th position 
in the European rank but due to the high indebtedness had to start a radical restructuring process. 
215 
costs that they had sustained for the production of conventional machines. The 
flexibility of small firms is one of their main strengths. Even if this sector does not 
present high levels of novelty, the application to machine-tools of innovations 
occurring in other sectors (mainly electronics) can offer great competitive advantage 
to those firms that are able to exploit these opportunities faster than the others (see 
Japan against the US for the case of CNCs). 
7.S The sample of firms, descriptive statistics and simple inference 
In this section, using the Mediocredito database, we will test some of the 
hypotheses that we have formulated in the previous sections. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the Mediocredito database contains data about 5,415 manufacturing firms 
for the 1989-1994 period. Out of this universe of firms, a firm is included in the 
analysis if it belongs to the machine-tool sector (all the firms belonging to the subsets 
322.1 and 322.2 of the classification Ateco 1981) and if we have complete data for 
all the variables included in the econometric specification. The final balanced 
database is composed of 122 firms. A Probit model was used to estimate the 
probability that a firm innovates. Dependent, independent variables and descriptive 
statistics are presented below. 
INNO 
The dependent variable, INN 0 , is a binary variable indicating whether the 
firm produced any product innovation in the 1992-1994 period. As shown in Figure 
7.7, during this period, 23.6% of the firms did not produce any sort of innovation, 
15.4% only product innovation, 22.8% only process innovation, 38.2% both of them. 
Both those firms that produced only product innovation and those that produced 
product and process innovation were included in INNO=1. Those firms that 
produced only process innovation or neither product nor process were included in 
INNO=O. 
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Figure 7.7 Types of innovation in the machine-tool sector 
22,8 
Source: Mediocredito database. 
SCALE 
o No innovation 
E!iI Only product innovation 
o Only process innovation 
o Both process and 
product innovation 
The first independent variable included in the analysis is the scale of the finn 
and it is calculated as the naturallogarithrn of the number of employees in 1992.35 
Table 7.15 Scale 
Variable Min. Max. Std. Deviation 
Loo-em 1.04 3.34 0.4097 
Source: own calculation on Mediocredito database. 
This variable will have a positive sign if, as suggested by UCIMU, scale plays 
an essential role in favouring innovation. Instead, it will have a negative sign if 
problems of internal visibility and scarce flexibility playa much more important role. 
GROUP 
Among the 122 finns, 40 of them belong to a group and 82 are independent 
finns. The variable takes value 1 if the finn belongs to a group and value 0 if it is 
independent.36 As it is shown in Table 7.l6, on average the percentage of finns that 
belong to a group of firms and have carried out product innovation is slightly lower 
(52.6%) than that of independent finns (54.1 %), especially when considering firms 
35 The choice of this variable is intended to keep some sort of comparability with Evangelista (1997). 
In the paper, using the CIS database the author shows that the probability of innovating is positively 
linked to the scale of a fIrm (measured in log) and to its belonging to a group of fIrms. No distinction 
among sectors is made. 
36A fIrm is considered as part of a group if it is controlled, directly or indirectly by another company 
or if it controls, directly or indirectly another company. 
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with less than 250 employees. Differences between the proportions are however not 
statistically significant (a z-test analysis was employed). 
T bI 716 Pdt' f a e ro ue mnova IOn m groups an d' d m epen d fi ent lrms 
Classes of PRODUCT INNOVATION PRODUCT INNOVATION 
employees Firms belonoino to a group Firms not belonoing to a oroup 
NO YES NO YES 
11-20 -- -- 60% 40% 
21-50 71.4% 28.6% 53.4% 46.6% 
51-250 41.7% 58.3% 34.3% 65.7% 
251-500 20% 80% 50% 50% 
>500 100% -- -- --
Total 47.4% 52.6% 45.9% 54.1% 
Source: own calculatIOns on MedlOcredlto database. 
As Table 7.17 shows, firms belonging to groups of firms are on average 
larger than the independent ones (as measured by employment and sales). 
Table 717 S t f f h' t I d ummary s a IS les: mac me- 00 pro ueers 37 
Group R&Dn>o 
Mean 
Sales92 ** Yes No 
Employment92 ** Yes No 
R&D92/Salesn Yes 3.26 
No 3.18 
* 
Yes 3.2 R&D92/K~)1 No 5.1 
** Differences in means slgmficant at the 1 % level 
* Differences in means significant at the 5% level. 
Source: own calculations on Mediocredito database. 
St.D 
4.6 
3.29 
7.6 
0.4 
All firms 
Mean St.D 
28536.40 18900.16 
12692.50 15131.05 
122.80 78.78 
61.39 55.49 
3.02 4.5 
2.7 3.2 
1.90 6.07 
0.222 0.7574 
The R&D intensity relative to sales is higher, but not significantly higher, in 
groups than in independent firms, when all firms are included in the analysis and also 
in the smaller subset. The intensity relative to total assets is instead significantly 
higher in groups than in independent firms when all firms are considered, and 
significantly higher in independent firms when only firms that carried on R&D in 
1992 are included. 
The fact that independent firms that carry on R&D invest on average more 
relative to assets (statistically significant) than firms belonging to groups, is probably 
37 The results for the other years are similar. 
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in part due to the fact that in groups, the holding usually carries on R&D for the 
subsidiaries as well. 
T bl 718 D a e f f h Hid· . R&D egree 0 autonomy rom t e 0 mgm actIVIties 
Classes of R&D carried on R&D carried on in part by the R&D carried on totally by the 
employees Holding firm and in part by the Holding totally by the firm 
11-20 -- -- --
21-50 20% 0 80% 
51-250 20.8% 12.5% 66.7% 
251-500 0 60% 40% 
>500 0 0 100% 
Total 16.667% 16.666% 66.667% 
Source: own calculatIOns on MedlOcredlto database. 
As it can be seen in Table 7.18, for at least 20% of the firms with less than 
250 employees and subsidiaries of a group of firms, all the R&D activity is carried 
on by the Holding. This could explain the fact that the R&D intensity of firms up to 
50 employees and belonging to groups is much lower than that of independent firms. 
As in each subset there are less than 30 firms, we cannot draw any conclusion about 
the difference in proportions. 
Table 7.19 R&D intensityin 1992 (R&D expenditure /salesl 
Classes of employees Total Firms belonging to Independent firms groups 
11-20 3.9 -- 3.9 
21-50 4.07 3.5 4.21 
51-250 2.89 3.4 2.5 
251-500 2.41 2.06 l.3 
>500 3.02 3.02 --
Total 3.21 3.26 3.l8 
Source: own calculatIOns on MedlOcredlto database. Only finns that have carned out R&D In 1992 are 
included. 
As shown in Table 7.19, both among independent firms and groups, the 
largest firms have the smallest R&D intensity (apart from the unique firm with more 
that 500 employees), which is probably due to the fact that small firms encounter 
some minimum limits of investment under which it becomes not effective to carry on 
any sort of R&D activity. If we consider only those firms that belong to groups and 
that carry on all the R&D activities on their own, we can see that small subsidiaries 
(11-50 employees) have a lower R&D intensity than independent firms (see Table 
7.20). In all the other cases the intensity is much higher within groups than for 
independent firms and, in general, it is higher in the holding, followed by the 
intermediate firms and finally by the subsidiaries. Again the number of firms in each 
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subset is lower than 30, therefore we cannot draw any conclusion about the 
differences in means. 
Table 7.20 R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/sales) in 1992 
R&D intensity of R&D intensity of firms R&D intensity of 
Classes of firms that carryon that carryon their firms that carry Independent their R&D in R&D in groups of on their R&D in 
employees groups of firms and firms and are in an groups of firms firms 
are subsidiaries intermediate position and are holdings 
11-20 -- -- -- 3.9 
21-50 2.38 -- -- 4.21 
51-250 1.62 3.58 7.8 1.5 
251-500 2.51 2.97 -- 1.3 
>500 1.67 -- --
Total 2.55 2.84 7.8 3.18 
Source: ovm calculatIOns on MedIOcredIto database. Only firms wIth R&D92>O were mcluded. 
As we mentioned above, it is very difficult to make assumptions about the 
role played by groups of firms on innovation in the machine-tool sector as several 
factors operate in opposite directions (i.e. finance against visibility). If the 
importance of the support provided by a group of firms is much stronger than a11 the 
factors that negatively influence the degree of visibility, the variable wi11 have a 
positive sign, negative otherwise. 
EXTERNALF 
This variable is equal to 1 if the firm received any form of external financing 
(bank loans, public funding, European funding) for its innovative activities, ° 
otherwise. We expect a positive sign, since, as mentioned before, machine-tool firms 
are very sma11 and financing R&D and other innovative activities with internal funds 
is very often not possible. As it is shown in Figure 7.S, nearly SO% of the firms did 
not receive any form of external financing. 
Figure 7.8 Use of external financing for innovation 
No Yes 
Source: ovm calculations on Mediocredito database. 
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RDINTENSITY92 
The R&D intensity in 1992 is calculated as the total R&D expenditure in 
1992 divided by the level of sales in the same period. In 1992 as many as 55 firms 
did not carry on any sort of R&D activity. The descriptive statistics for this variable 
can be found in Table 7.19. As mentioned before, several studies have tried to prove 
the positive influence of R&D on innovation and very few have had positive results. 
TYPE OF SHAREHOLDERS 
The third and fourth variables included in the analysis answer to a corporate 
governance type of question and refer to one of the characteristics of the two largest 
shareholders. The variables (Typea and Typeb) assume value 1 if the shareholder is 
an individual and 0 if it is an individual resident abroad, another firm, bank or 
financial institution. The value 0 in variable Typeb comprises also the case when 
there is not a second shareholder (i.e. the first shareholder has an absolute ownership 
over the firm). This subdivision is meant to highlight the cases where the internal 
visibility is higher, such as when the majority shareholder is an individual, and where 
it is more likely to be lower, such as when there are one or more hierarchical levels 
or a geographical distance between the firm and the shareholders. However, we must 
admit that this subdivision might cover cases where there is a financial holding 
owning the shares of the firm and an individual owning the shares of the holding and 
having direct control over the firm. In this particular case, the visibility will be high 
but the shareholder will be indicated as a zero type. The lack of other information 
does not allow us to be more precise. 
As for the sign, we expect at least one of the two variables to have a positive 
sign because the presence of an insider (individual shareholder with a large stake) 
should help reducing the visibility problems. If both the variables have a negative 
sign, this means that being part of a larger organisation (group or multinational) has 
many more advantages (financial or in terms of industrial synergies with the other 
members) than disadvantages. 
The variable First Shareholder differs from the variable Group. In fact, the 
firm could have an individual as first shareholder and still be part of a group as 
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headquarters. As it is shown in Table 7.21, the first and the second (when they exist) 
shareholders are for the vast majority private individuals. 
Table 7.21 Shareholders' type 
N 1 0 
First shareholder 122 73% 27% 
Second shareholder 122 76.2% 23.8% 
Source: O\VIl. calculatIOns on Medlocredlto database 
CONTROL 
This variable assumes value 1 if there is only one shareholder with direct 
control over the firm, where for direct control it is meant an active participation in 
the decision making. The variable includes both the cases when there is only one 
shareholder and those when there is more than one shareholder but only one has 
direct control over the firm. There are not cases where none of the shareholders have 
direct control, or in other words there are not cases of managerial control. There are 
several situations where there are three or more large shareholders but only one of 
them has direct control and the others do not have a concrete interest in the activity 
of the firm. This is often the case in the presence of a family business where the 
shares are distributed among the members of the family for tax reasons. When the 
shareholder with direct control is another firm, it is meant that in effect there is not 
influence of other shareholders in the decision-making and that the mother firm sets 
the strategy for the daughter. As it is shown in Figure 7.9, the number of cases with 
absolute control is rather low. 
We expect the sign of this variable to be positive because the presence of 
numerous parties in control might undermine the stability of the firm's strategy, and 
hinder the close long-term relationships with employees, customers and suppliers, 
which are so important in the innovation process. In fact, when there is more than 
one shareholder with control over the firm, and, for example, none of them with an 
absolute majority stake, changing coalitions among the shareholders could cause 
drastic shifts in the strategy of a firm. This could make it difficult to obtain the co-
operation of other stakeholders. 
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Figure 7.9 Type of control 
Absolute control Other 
Source: own calculations on Mediocredito database. 
FAM 
This variable takes the value 1 if there are family links between any of the 
first four shareholders, 0 otherwise. In line with the existence of an absolute control, 
the presence of family links ensures some sort of continuity in the strategy of the 
firm. In fact, even when there is more than one shareholder with control over the 
firm, the fact that they belong to the same family gives some sort of guarantee to the 
crucial stakeholders that the attitude towards them and the strategy of the firm in 
general will not change suddenly. We expect therefore a positive SIgn from this 
variable. 
T b 722 D a Ie escnptIve statistIcs f FAM dAGREEMENT or an I 
Frequency Percent 
FAM 
1 44 36.1 
0 78 63.9 
AGREEMENT 1 20 16.4 0 102 83.6 
Source: own calculations on Mediocredito database. 
SHAREA 
This variable corresponds to the percentage share of the majority shareholder. 
We expect this variable to be negative as a lower concentration of ownership, 
without losing control, could increase the availability of capital. As it can be seen in 
Table 7.23, on average the majority shareholder has an absolute control over the firm 
with more than half of the shares (59.385%). None of the majority shareholders owns 
less than 10% of the stakes. The average stake of the second shareholder is much 
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lower (22.5%) and that of the third even lower (8.9%). The dispersion of ownership 
is very low and on average the first two shareholders own together more than 80% of 
the shares. 
Other measures of dispersion and concentration of ownership did not provide 
statistically significant results and were excluded from the econometric specification. 
Tab Ie 7.23 Descriptive statIstIcs 
Percentage shares N Min. Max. Mean St.D 
First shareholder 122 10 100 59.385 n.012 
Second shareholder 122 0 62.5 22.486 15.924 
Third shareholder 122 0 33.4 8.902 9.96? 
lOO-sharesl-shares2 122 0 90 18.129 19.25 
Source: own calculation on Mediocredito database. 
AGREEMENT 
This variable takes value 1 if none of the shareholders has the absolute 
majority of shares but control is guaranteed by an agreement among some or all of 
the shareholders and there are not family links among them. We do not know what to 
expect for the sign of this variable. In fact, if the agreement is considered as stable as 
a family link the variable might have a positive sign. If not, it will have a negative 
sign. See Table 7.22, for descriptive statistics of this variable. 
7.6 Empirical results: econometric analysis 
The econometric analysis estimated the impact of firms' characteristics, 
structure of ownership and control on the probability of innovating of a firm. 
Estimation is by maximum likelihood and was performed using Eviews software. 
EViews uses quadratic hill-climbing to obtain parameter estimates. This algorithm 
uses the matrix of analytic second derivatives of the log likelihood in forming 
iteration updates and in computing the estimated covariance matrix of the 
coefficients. Convergence usually occurs in four iterations, which suggests "peaked" 
likelihood function. 
Table 7.24 reports the coefficient estimates, asymptotic standard errors, z-
statistics, corresponding p-values and marginal effects. 
The overall fit of the model is satisfactory as measured by the Mc Fadden R-
squared of 0.203109, which is rather high given the fact that the model is cross 
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sectional. Using a cutoff of 0.5 the model produces 68.85% of correct predictions. 
The LR test of the joint null hypothesis that all slope coefficients except the constant 
are zero produces a test statistic of 34.24, which exceeds the X20.01(10) critical value 
of 23.21. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected and it is appropriate to proceed 
with the discussion of the estimated coefficients and marginal effects. 
Table 7.24 Probit for full sample. 
Dependent Variable: INNO 
Method: ML - Binary Probit 
Sample: 1 122 
Included observations: 122 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
C· . d· dd . ovanance matrIx compute usmg secon envatives 
Variable Coefficient 
C -0.387266 
LOGEM92 0.249840 
GROUP 0.Ql0178 
EXTERNALF 0.611633 
RDINTESITY92 0.076183 
TYPEA -1.096995 
TYPEB 1.108951 
CONTROL 0.925257 
FAM 0.823655 
SHAREA -0.014675 
AGREEMENT -0.265183 
Mean dependent var 0.532787 
S.E. of regression 0.456710 
Sum squared resid 23.15285 
Log likelihood -67.17912 
Restr. log likelihood -84.30147 
LR statistic (10 dt) 34.24471 
Probability(LR stat) 0.000168 
Obs with Dep=O 57 
Obs with Dep=1 65 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
Std. Error z-Statistic 
1.192827 -0.324662 
0.388267 0.643474 
0.430447 0.023646 
0.365025 1.675589 
0.042913 1.775267 
0.500924 -2.189941 
0.432668 2.563052 
0.363384 2.546224 
0.408538 2.016103 
0.007289 -2.013503 
0.461572 -0.574522 
S.D. dependent var 
A vg. log likelihood 
McFadden R-squared 
Totalobs 
Prob. Marginal 
effects38 
0.7454 -0.100970 
0.5199 0.651393 
0.9811 0.002653 
0.0938* 0.159467 
0.0759* 0.019862 
0.0285** -0.286013 
0.0104** 0.289130 
0.0109** 0.241236 
0.0438** 0.214746 
0.0441 ** -0.003826 
0.5656 -0.069140 
0.500981 
-0.550648 
0.203109 
122 
A firm was more likely to innovate if it obtained external sources of finance; 
it had a positive and high R&D expenditure relative to sales; the control was 
concentrated in the hands of one single person or firm; the majority shareholder was 
not an individual; the second shareholder existed and was an individual; there were 
family links among some or all of the majority shareholders and the lower was the 
38 Eviews does not calculate marginal effects automatically and they had to be calculated manually 
following the procedure explained in Greene (1993). We evaluated the marginal effects at every 
observation and used the sample average of the individual marginal effects. 
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stake of the majority shareholder. All variables except LOGEM, GROUP, and 
AGREEMENT were statistically significant. TYPEA, TYPEB, CONTROL, F AM, 
SHAREA at the 5% level and EXTERNALF and RDINTENSITY at the 10% level. 
All the variables had the expected signs. 
As it can be seen in Table 7.24, the variables LOGEM92 and GROUP have a 
positive sign (which would support the arguments of UCIMU) but they are not 
statistically significant, which means that we cannot conclude anything about the role 
played by these factors on the probability of innovating within a firm. This seems to 
support the idea that the difficulties which large organizations usually face in coping 
with a low degree of visibility, indicated by several sources and by the Danieli case 
study, tend to offset the advantages of using internal capital markets and other sorts 
of synergies. 
As for the other variables, they all appear to support the findings of the case 
studies and of the COPl survey. Insider shareholders (TYPEB), who a have high 
degree of firm-specific perceptiveness, appear to cope well with the low visibility 
characterizing the sector, and, therefore, to favor innovation. When the stability of 
control is ensured by the presence of a single majority shareholder (CONTROL) or 
of a coalition of members of the same family (F AM), the probability of innovating is 
higher. This is probably due to a perception that the stability of control guarantees 
that the agreements with various stakeholders will not be broken in the long-term, 
which, as explained before, is essential for innovation in this sector. 
The case study of Starn, the results of the COPl survey and several other 
sources show that Italian machine-tool producers do not receive much support from 
banks or other financial institutions, as the latter appear not to have the appropriate 
degree offirm-specific perceptiveness or industry-specific expertise. For this reason, 
Italian machine-tool firms are frequently forced to rely only on their internal sources 
of finance, which are not always sufficient. Many of the results of the econometric 
analysis are in line with these findings. In fact, when the first majority shareholder is 
not an individual (TYPEA) (and the second shareholder is an individual in order to 
avoid problems due to the low visibility, see Section 7.4) there is a higher probability 
of innovating. This is probably because in this way the firm can rely on the support 
of the other firm, bank or financial institution which controls it. Moreover, also 
receiving external sources of finance (EXTERNALF) is positive for innovation, 
which supports the argument that the internal ones are not always sufficient to 
226 
finance R&D activities and more general expenditures in innovation. Finally, the 
probability of innovating is higher when the share of the majority shareholder 
(SHAREA) is lower. In fact, a low concentration of ownership allows the injection of 
external capital and reduces risk. 
The Mediocredito database employed in the econometric analysis does not 
address all the elements of the COPI framework, as the data were collected for a 
different purpose. However, the data triangulation appears to have worked 
effectively. In fact, the results of the econometric analysis support and to some extent 
complete the findings of the two case studies and of the COPI survey. In particular, it 
is noteworthy that among the variables that playa statistically significant role on the 
probability of innovating, the corporate governance ones (TYPEA, TYPEB, 
CONTROL and F AM) have the higher marginal effects. 
Table 7.25 Probit for reduced sample 
Dependent Variable: INNO 
Method: ML - Binary Pro bit 
Sample: 1 2 446 5362 6467 6971 73 108 112 113 
Included observations: 100 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
C' . d' dd . ovanance matrIx compute USlllCl' secon envatlves 
Variable Coefficient 
C -0.505467 
LOGEM92 0.196229 
GROUP -0.065065 
EXTERNALF 0.666674 
RSINTES92 0.109949 
TYPEA -1.587156 
TYPEB 1.312649 
CONTROL 1.448412 
FAM 1.845648 
SHAREA -0.019560 
AGREEMENT 0.160358 
Mean dependent 0.540000 
var 
S.E. of regression 0.422093 
Sum squared resid 15.85645 
Log likelihood -46.52477 
Restr. log likelihood -68.99438 
LR statistic (10 df) 44.93922 
Probability(LR stat) 2.23E-06 
Obs with Dep=O 46 
Obs with Dep=l 54 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1 % level. 
Std. Error z-Statistic 
1.383970 -0.365230 
0.459970 0.426612 
0.505663 -0.128673 
0.486460 1.370459 
0.052715 2.085740 
0.638589 -2.485409 
0.515274 2.547476 
0.461231 3.140317 
0.561321 3.288044 
0.008672 -2.255578 
0.542430 0.295629 
S.D. dependent var 
A vg. log likelihood 
McFadden R-squared 
Totalobs 100 
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Prob. Marginal 
effects 
0.7149 -0.273591 
0.6697 0.106212 
0.8976 -0.035217 
0.1705 0.360846 
0.0370** 0.059511 
0.0129** -0.859070 
0.0109** 0.710489 
0.0017*** 0.783973 
0.0010*** 0.998982 
0.0241** -0.010587 
0.7675 0.086796 
0.500908 
-0.465248 
0.325673 
As it can be seen in Table 7.25, even when 22 of the firms are taken out of the 
sample,39 the results are still robust. All the significant variables maintain the same 
sign and all of the variables that were significant before, apart from EXTERNALF, 
are still statistically significant or even more significant. The variables that were not 
significant before are still not statistically significant. The LR statistic exceeds the 
X20.01 (10) critical value of 23.21 thus rejecting the null hypothesis that all of the 
coefficients, except for the constant, have value zero. The McFadden R-squared goes 
up to 0.3256 and the percentage of correct predictions increases from 68.85% to 
71.13%. Convergence is still achieved in 4 iterations. 
39 The fInns were chosen randomly as Eviews, as opposed to other programs such as Shazam for 
example, does not offer an in-built option. 
228 
Conclusion 
In this thesis we have studied the relationship between corporate governance 
and product innovation with a particular reference to the Italian machine-tool sector. 
The thesis is inspired by a new theoretical framework that claims that the existing 
systems of corporate governance differ in their capacity to cope with three types of 
factors characterising innovation, namely visibility, appropriability and novelty, 
which vary among sectors. No system appears to be the one best way and each 
system presents advantages and disadvantages according to the industrial sector 
under consideration. 
As shown in Chapter 1, the study of the relationship between corporate 
governance and product innovation is a new avenue of research. The debate on 
corporate governance typically never refers to issues concerning innovation. 
Similarly studies on innovation typically never consider corporate governance as one 
of the possible influencing factors. Not even within the National Systems of 
Innovation approach, has any author ever considered corporate governance as one of 
the central components of innovation systems. 
Before proceeding with the study of the machine-tool sector, it was necessary 
to analyse the Italian system of corporate governance from the point of view of the 
chosen framework. In Chapter 3, we illustrate the main elements characterising the 
Italian system and we conclude that it can be ranked, unambiguously, among the 
insider systems. Moreover, using the terminology of the framework, the Italian 
system of corporate governance appears to be characterised by a high degree of firm-
specific perceptiveness and medium-low industry-specific expertise of those who 
actually finance innovation, and a rather high inclusion of the stakeholders. These 
characteristics, according to the framework, give Italian firms a competitive 
advantage in sectors characterised by a low degree of visibility, a medium-low degree 
of novelty and a low degree of appropriability, such as prevails for example in most 
of the engineering sectors. On the other hand, Italy is not expected to be successful in 
sectors characterised by a high degree of novelty, such as the chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and electronics sectors. Firms will in fact lack appropriate forms of 
financing and will have difficulties in following the latest developments in the 
market due to the close long-term relationships with customers, suppliers and 
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employees. The data concerning the Italian industrial specialisation for the years 
1987 -1991 appear to support this theory, in the sense that Italy appears to be more 
specialised in the engineering sectors rather than in other sectors characterised by 
high novelty. 
In Chapter 3 we also discuss the latest developments of the Italian system, 
referring to the growth of the stock exchange, the institution of the Piccolo Mercato, 
the progresses of the venture capital market and the Draghi refonn. The evidence 
seems to suggest that the Italian system of corporate governance is moving towards 
the outsider end of the continuum. This process has certainly been very positive for 
Italy. However, if it has occurred without a complete awareness of its consequences, 
Italy could find itself "stuck in the middle" (Porter, 1985). In fact, as explained in 
Chapter 3, with the shift towards the outsider end of the continuum, there could be 
important consequences that could reduce the advantages that Italy has now in 
sectors characterised by low visibility, low appropriability and low novelty. For 
example, if the presence of insider shareholders was to be reduced and banks and 
other financial institutions did not assume a long-tenn perspective; and if the role 
played by the important stakeholders started to be neglected and finns adopted a 
strategy for the maximisation of the shareholders' value (as suggested by the Code of 
Conduct), then the strengths of Italy in such sectors could vanish. On the other hand, 
Italy's strengths in sectors characterised by high visibility, high appropriability and 
high novelty are still rather underdeveloped in comparison with the outsider 
countries. In fact, the Italian private equity and venture capital markets are 
developing but still very small in comparison with the American one. Further, 
legislation on job protection would impede finns from pursuing the latest 
developments in the market, encouraging them in the direction of dismantling 
subsidiaries, and laying off large sections of the work force if needed. As the 
framework suggests, there is not a one best way of corporate governance, and each 
systems possesses strengths and weaknesses according to the sectors in 
consideration. 
In Chapter 4 we use the existing literature on the machine-tool industry to 
draw conclusions about the degree of visibility, appropriability and novelty of 
innovations. The importance of secrecy, the limited effectiveness of patenting, the 
large share of expenditures in low visible activities, such as development and 
marketing, suggest that the degree of visibility is rather low. Moreover, the limited 
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effectiveness of patenting, the centrality of customers in the innovation process and 
the great importance of the employees' cumulative learning on the shop floor 
indicate that the degree of appropriability is also rather low. Finally, the continuous 
adoption by machine-tool builders of innovations produced in other sectors (mainly 
electronics) and the recurrent crises in the market, suggest that firms in this industry 
face a medium degree of novelty. In Chapter 4 we also try to give an explanation of 
the upsurge of Japan in the machine tool sector during the 1970s and 1980s and of 
the contemporaneous decline of the United States. Using existing literature on the 
topic we show that during the 1970-1990 period the Japanese system of corporate 
governance appears to have had all the characteristics that, according to the 
framework, are necessary to cope with the low visibility, low appropriability and 
medium novelty of the machine-tool sector. The Japanese system is in fact an insider 
system characterised by a high degree of firm specific perceptiveness of those who 
finance innovation (insider shareholders, in-house banks), a rather high degree of 
inclusion of the stakeholders (close long-term relationships with customers and 
suppliers, quasi-lifetime employment, good educational system and active 
participation of the employees in the innovation process) and a medium-high 
industry specific expertise both of financial institutions and of public agencies. On 
the contrary, the American corporate governance system, being an outsider type of 
system, has difficulties in coping with the requirements of the machine-tool sector. 
Firms have dispersed outsider ownership, they keep arms' length relationships with 
customers and suppliers and have progressively substituted highly skilled workers 
with machines, losing in this way one of the main sources of incremental innovation. 
The educational system fails to educate highly skilled workers. Managers are mainly 
evaluated on the basis of short-term financial indicators and usually suffer short-term 
pressures, which reduce the expenditures on innovation below what is optimal. 
Small, family business firms do not receive any form of financial support, either 
from financial institutions or from the state. 
After analysing the machine tool sector in general, we proceeded to focus on 
the situation in Italy. The available literature was not sufficient to make an 
appropriate study. Therefore, before proceeding with the analysis of the 
Mediocredito database and the development of the questionnaire we decided to carry 
out two exploratory case studies to collect more information. They are presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The case studies allowed us to interpret in a more correct way the 
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information available in the literature and m the database and to formulate 
appropriate questions for the survey. 
In Chapter 7 we analyse the machine tool sector in Italy in terms of the 
framework. Italy is at the moment the fourth producer in the world of machine-tools. 
Italian firms are on average small and are mainly family businesses. This accounts 
for a high degree of firm-specific perceptiveness of those who finance innovation. 
Managers are not subject to short-term pressure coming from outsider shareholders 
as most of the shareholders usually work within the firms. The inclusion of 
customers, some of the suppliers, and most of the employees allows them to 
overcome the problems of low appropriability characterizing the sector. The activity 
of UCIMU (Italian association of machine-tool builders) is of great support in coping 
with some of the problems that usually affect small firms, helping them to export, to 
find forms of finance, to carry on some R&D and to test the prototypes. Everything 
appears to operate in the correct way. 
However, there is also the other side of the COlD. In fact, the progressive 
globalization of the market, the increased competition, the higher level of technology 
embodied in the machines, the high quality requirements and the progressive 
substitution of single machines with FMS (Flexible Manufacturing Systems) make it 
progressively more difficult for SMEs to keep their market share. Internal funds are 
no longer sufficient to finance the higher investments required for R&D, for 
marketing activities and for the circulating capital (producing a single machine was 
already difficult to afford for a small firm, producing complete FMS is basically 
impossible). The problems that have always been lamented by Italian machine-tool 
builders (the lack of support from the banking system and the fact that public funds 
are difficult to obtain) are becoming now even more pressing. So much so, that in the 
past decade Italian machine-tool builders have started lobbying the government to 
obtain special legislation in favor of mergers and acquisitions. However, according to 
our econometric study, larger firms, that usually take the form of groups of firms, do 
not appear to have a higher degree of innovativeness than smaller independent ones. 
The involvement of a shareholder in the management of a firm appears to be very 
important for the innovativeness of a firm. This is because, we argued, the visibility 
problems are so stringent that only those who are directly involved in the activity of a 
firm can actually verify that the funds invested in development activities or in 
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developing and maintaining close relationship with customers, are not just being 
wasted. 
It must not be forgotten that this policy was tried, and it failed, both in Britain 
and Germany, and the process of consolidation which occurred in the US during the 
1980s did not give positive results. Small firms have proved to cope much better than 
the larger ones, not only with the periodical crises characterizing the sector but also 
with the occasional peaks in novelty (see the introduction of CNCs in 1970s). 
Therefore, a wave of mergers and acquisitions (which is anyway very unlikely as 
Italian entrepreneurs are rather unwilling to sell their family business) could not be 
the best solution to the problems of Italian small and medium firms in the machine-
tool sector. 
Currently, UCIMU is also suggesting that Italian machine tool builders 
should get listed on the Piccolo Mercato. This could be a good source of funding. 
Our econometric results show that a lower concentration of property favours 
innovation. However, on the one hand it appears that Italian entrepreneurs are not 
very willing to sell parts of their companies to outsider shareholders. On the other 
hand, Italian savers are just now starting to buy shares on the stock exchange in large 
numbers and it is difficult to make any statement about their attitude. For example, 
American companies did not benefit from the listing on the stock exchange, since, as 
opposed to German and Japanese firms, they could not rely on providers of finance 
with a long-term view. Short-term pressures were some of the most important factors 
hindering innovation in American firms during the 1970s and 1980s. Our case study 
of Danieli (Chapter 6) did not help us to make judgements about the typical Italian 
investor, as the firm does not pay attention to the price of its own shares. This 
strategy for collecting money should therefore be analysed with more accuracy 
before it is taken up by a large number of firms. 
We also found that concentration of control and the presence of a family link 
among the four majority shareholders have a positive influence on the innovativeness 
of a firm. The listing on the stock exchange should be done keeping these results in 
mind. 
There are other means of solving the problems of Italian machine-tool 
builders. Firstly, there is the need to develop strong and close relationships with a 
few financial institutions with a specific expertise in the sector. UCIMU could foster 
those relationships, for example, offering training courses to the employees of the 
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financial institutions to develop a good understanding of the sector. Secondly, the 
application procedures for public funding should be further simplified so that also the 
smallest finns could apply. IfUCIMU is already offering consultancy services in this 
sense, such services should be further improved and, possibly, an office should be 
opened also in the eastern regions to allow all the finns to easily take advantage of 
these services. Third, there is a need to set up more numerous strategic alliances 
among competing finns for joint development and commercialisation of new 
products. Finns, with the support of UCIMU, have already been moving in this 
direction, but there is still a lot that can be done. Machine-tool builders need to 
realise that by focusing on a global market, they have a much larger pool of potential 
customers, and no longer need to consider their neighbours as competitors. 
Another set of policies is with regard to the relationship with the educational 
system and the employees. It is necessary to develop strong relationships with 
secondary schools and universities to prepare future employees for the workplace. In 
fact, the latest developments in technology not only require a much more skilled 
workforce, but also require that these people know how to work in autonomous 
groups. The educational system should both work on the technical skills of the 
students and on their capacity for taking decisions and assuming responsibilities. In 
fact, as mentioned before, finns are progressively delegating responsibilities to the 
lower levels in the organisation, as this is the only way to take advantage of the high 
inclusion of the employees and of their knowledge accumulated on the shop floor. 
The employees, therefore, need to know how to take on those responsibilities. In this 
way, jobs in this sector would become much more gratifying. They would probably 
assume a much higher status in society and more youngsters would want to start a 
career in this field. 
Another set of agreements should be set up with universities for joint projects 
of R&D activities. The support of UCIMU, together with that of universities, could 
profoundly increase the technical potential of Italian machine-tool builders. 
Especially now that the Italian university system is being transfonned with the 
introduction of master's degrees, it will be progressively easier to find students in 
search of important projects to work on, and with the proper infrastructure to carry 
them out. 
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To conclude we think that this thesis offers interesting insights on the 
influence played by corporate governance on product innovation in general and in 
the machine-tool sector in particular. The analysis of the topic from different angles 
and with different, but complementary, methods has certainly made the study more 
interesting. The exploratory case studies allowed us to increase our knowledge of the 
issues under consideration and to ask more appropriate questions in the 
questionnaire. The copr survey facilitated the gathering of further information and 
enabled us to draw some conclusions on the influence of corporate governance on 
product innovation. The Mediocredito database allowed us to test some of the 
hypotheses of the framework and to investigate a number of issues that are currently 
of great interest for machine tools firms (i.e. the role of groups of firms and of firm's 
scale on innovation). It is also possible, however, to identify a few weaknesses and 
to suggest several ways to further improve and complete the analysis. 
First, the framework is rather complicated for somebody who is approaching 
it for the first time. This, together with the excessive length of the questionnaire, has 
certainly been one of the causes of the low response rate to the survey. A much 
simpler and more straightforward framework could have produced a much higher 
response rate. This would have allowed us to perform an econometric analysis and to 
draw more robust conclusions on the basis of data collected specifically with this 
purpose. Second, it is rather difficult to quantify the degree of visibility, 
appropriability or novelty and the degree of firm-specific perceptiveness and 
industry-specific expertise and to make comparisons between sectors and between 
systems of corporate governance. To avoid this problem we could have attempted to 
build synthetic indices for each of the variables, which would have been more 
effective for the comparisons. 
Another problem is linked to the use of the Mediocredito database. In fact, 
even if the Mediocredito is a very serious institution, we cannot be completely 
confident of the quality and soundness of the data as we did not participate in their 
collection. However, this is one of the richest sources of information about Italian 
firms, their innovativeness and their corporate governance system. We decided 
therefore, that it was worthwhile using it. 
The study could be completed with comparisons between different sectors 
and different countries. In particular it would be interesting to compare different 
sectors within the same country, for example machine tools and chemicals, to verify 
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whether the same corporate governance system copes well in one sector and not in 
the other, as the framework suggests. Moreover, it would be interesting to study how 
different corporate governance systems differ in the way they cope with the same 
technology. For example, we could compare the Italian and the British corporate 
governance systems with reference to the machine-tools sector. This we will do, as 
soon as the data collected by the other teams in the copr project will be ready to be 
analysed. Significant results pertaining to these comparisons will give further support 
to the arguments contained in this thesis. 
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Appendix 1. The Mediocredito questionnaire 
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MEDIOCREDITO CENTRALE 
SECTION I - GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Y car of founding of the firm 
2. Type of activity 
2.1. Iseetor of activity ~~-I 
2.2. IprinciPal products ~~-1 
2.3. Tumover: 
1992: 1 11993: C~--J 1994: C---
2.3.1 Percentage of tumover from products that have not changed in the last three years: 
1992: 1 11993: C--- J 1994: [ -- J 
3. Current juridical form 
D Ditta individuale 
D Societa di persone 
D Societa di capitali 
D Societa cooperativa 
D Altra forma giuridica 
4. Mergers and acquisitions 
4.1. Has the firm performed operations of mergers and acquisitions during the 1992-1994 
period? 
Yes No 
5. 
4.2. lIas the firm performed operations of de-merger during the period 1992-1994') 
Y~ No 
Control of the linn 
5.1. List in order of percentage of equity shares the characteristics of those who 0\\11 andlor 
control directly the finn 
Direct control is performed by those who, usually by voting in the assembly, "pose a 
determinant influence on the decisions relative to the medium-long term goals orthe tlrlll, to 
the strategies to reach them, to the economic and financial development and to the 
investments", for example nominating the company organs. 
The shareholder 
Shareholders Type of Percentage of has direct is part of a 
shareholder shares 
control over the voting 
finn agreement 
Shareholder a c:::J I %1 1 yesl ~ 1 Yesl EJ 
Shareholder b c:::J %J 1 Yesl ~ 1 Yesl ~ 
Shareholder c c:::J %,1 1 Yesl [g 1 Yes 1 EJ 
Other c:::J %>1 1 Yesl [g 1 Yesl EJ 
Total %1 
Indicate with: 
I) Individual non-resident in Italy 
2) Individual resident in Italy 
3) Italian firm, private or public (industrial) 
4) Holding not performing industrial activity 
51 Banks and other financial institutions 
5.2. In case of direct control shared among more than one individual, is there a family link 
among them? 
D no D only among few of them D yes, among all of them 
~ ____________________________________________________ ~1238LI ________________________________________________________ _ 
6. Groups of I1nns 
6.I.Is the firm part of a group of firms? 
Yes 
6.2.The firm is: 
D Holding 
D In an intermediate position 
D Only subsidiary 
No 
6.3. How many firms (national and foreign) are there in the group? 
6.4. In what year was the group established? 1 L _____ .J 
6.5. What are, according to the firm, the advantages of the group fonn? 
~o 
:E 
E 
;:l 
;U 
<!) 
2 
:s 
.3 
[-- J 
Better control costs sharing and organizational coordination 
Diversification 
Addition of correlated activities 
Control of suppliers 
Control of distributors 
Fiscal discounts 
Easiness in collecting equity capital 
Risk reduction 
Involvement of family members 
Other ______________ _ 
6.6. Number of employees in the group [ nn 1 
7. 
6.7. What is the degree of autonomy of the flrmlium the Headquarters for each of the 
following functions 
Function 
Administration 
Finance 
Marketing 
R&D 
Is the linn part of a "consorzio" 
Yes 
7.1. 
7.2. 
7.3. 
7.4. 
No 
D Consorzio for loans 
D Consorzio export 
o Consorzio R&D 
D Other forms 
Degree of autonomy 
o 
o 
o 
o 
I =Entirely performed by the Headquarters 
2=The firm has a certain level of autonomy 
3=The firm is totally independent 
SECTION II - PERSONNEL 
8. Employed in 1992-1994 
8.1 Entrepreneur and family 
8.2 Top managers 
8.3 Middle management 
8.4 Clerks 
8.5 Manual workers 
8.6 Total 
8.6.1 Part time workers 
3\,12.92 31.12.93 31.\2.94 Monthly 
average 1994 
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8.7 Education of the employees 
8.7.1 Compulsory school 
8.7.2 High school 
8.7.3 Graduate degree 
Number at 31.12.94 
9. Has the firm hired anybody in the period 1992-1994? 
Yes No 
9.1 If Yes, how many? 1992 9.1.1 How many with a degree? 
1993 
1994 
10. How many employees have carried out R&D activity 
10.1 1992 c= .. 10.2 1993 ,-C __ -, 10.4 
11. How many employees: 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1994 C 
11.1 Were hired with a training contract 
11.2 Participated to training public or private courses 
11992 1 1993+ 1994- 1 
SECTION 111- THE INVESTMENT ACTIVITY AND R&D 
R&D 
12. III the 1992-1994 period the finn has carried out: 
~ Product innovation Process innovation Product and process innovation Neither product nor process innovation 
13. In the 1992-1994 period, has the firm carried out any type of R&D activity? 
Yes No 
13.1 R&D expenditure 
1992 I I 1993 C I 1994 IL-__ -----' 
13.2 What was in the 1992-1994 period the contribution of: 
13.2.1 In-house R&D labs 
13.2.2 Extemal R&D labs 
% 
% 
Total I 100% 
13.3 What percentage of R&D was devoted to: 
13.3.1 Improvement of existing processes 
13.3.2 Improvement of existing products 
13.3.3 New product 
13.3.4 New processes 
13.3.5 Other 
Total 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
100% 
13.4 How did you finance your R&D expenditures in the 1992-1994 period? 
13.4.1 Equity capital 
13.4.2 Self-financing 
13.4.3 Medium long-term loans at a market rate 
13.4.4 Medium long-term loans at a lower than the market rate 
13.4.5 European and national public funding 
13.4.6 Fiscal discounts 
13.4.7 Other 
Total 
% 
% 
(Yo 
(Yo 
(Yo 
UI 
IU 
% 
100% 
13.5 In the period 1992-1994, had the finn catTied out any R&D activity with other firms? 
Yes No 
~----------------------------------------~12401~1 -------------------------------------------
13.5.1 If Yes, please indicate the percentage of R&D can'ied out with other firms and their country 
of origin. 
I~· -;:] 13.5.2 USA 
EU 
Extra-EU 
Investmcnts 
14 Has the firm carricd out any invcstmcnt in fixed capital such as plants, machinery and 
equipment in the period 1992-1994? 
Yes No 
14.1 Investment in fixed capital: 
1992 C--- 1993 [ 
~---
1994 C ~ 
14.2 What percentage of the investments was devote to? 
14.2.1 Substitution of plants with equivalent plants 
14.2.2 Substitution of plants with innovative news 
14.2.3 Introduction of new plants equivalent to the existing ones 
14.2.4 Introduction of new innovative plants 
14.2.5 Other 
Total 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
100% 
14.3 With what goals did you make the investments in fixed capital in the period 1992-1994'1 
..c 
OJ) 
:t 
E 
::l ;;:; 
:¥ ~ ,3 
Improvement in quality of existing products 
Increase in production of existing products 
Production of new products 
Lower impact on the environment 
Lower use of raw materials 
Lower use of employment 
Other _______________ _ 
15 
14.4 What was in the IlJ92-1994 period the degree of use of the firm's plants') 
1992 L 'X, I 1993 [n .~ 1994 1- %1 
14.5 How did you finance your investments in lixed capital in the 1992-1994 period') 
14.5.1 Equity capital 
14.5.2 Self-financing 
14.5.3 Medium long-term loans at a market rate 
14.5.4 Medium long-term loans at a lower than the market rate 
14.5.5 European and national public funding 
14.5.6 Leasing 
14.5.7 Fiscal discounts 
14.5.8 Other 
Total 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
~) 
100% 
14.6 In 1994 did the firm ask for and not obtain bank loans to finance the investments in fixed 
capital? 
Yes No 
14.7 In 1994 the firm would have accepted to pay a higher interests to obtain bank loans to 
fInance investments in Ilxed capita}? 
Yes No 
SECTION IV - INTERNATIONALISATION 
Has the Ilnn exported part or all of its products in 1994? 
Yes No 
15.1 If Yes, what percentage of the total turnover derives li'om exported products? [3 
L-------------------------------------------------------------~'241 ~I --------------------------------______________________________ ~ 
Distribution of exports according to: 
15.2 Geographical areas 
UE 
Central and Eastem Europe 
Ex USSR 
Other European countries 
Africa 
US and Canada 
Central and South America 
Middle East and other Asia 
Japan 
Australia and Oceania 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
15.3 Length of the of extension of paymcnt 
None/one month 
Between I and 3 months 
Between I 3 and 12 months 
Between I and 2 years 
Between 2 and 5 years 
More than 5 years 
Total 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
100% 
Total 100% 
16 In the 1992-1994 period, did the firm: 
16.1 buy patents or licenses abroad? 
16.2 transfer patents or licenses abroad? 
16.3 sign agreements for production with 
firms abroad? 
16.4 sign agreements for marketing and 
sales with foreign firms? 
16.5 do FDIs 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
16.5.1 If Yes, please indicate the year and the amount invested 
EU 
Non-EU 
In the period 1992-1994, did the firm: 
16.6 carry out operations of commercial 
penetration in foreign countries? 
16.6.1 Representative offices 
16.6.2 Sales points 
16.6.3 After-sales assistance points 
16.6.4 Promotional campaigns 
16.6.5 Market research 
1992 1993 1994 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
-- I 
No 
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16.7 receive any form of assistance 
abroad from Italian ageneiesry 
16.7.1 ICE 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in thc EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes, in the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
Yes outside the EU 
17 
18 
16.7.2 Embassies 
16.7.3 Camere di commercio 
16.7.4 Banks 
16.7.5 Regions 
16.7.6 Other 
SECTION V - OGRANISA TION AND AGREEMENTS 
How can your turnover be distributed among the various typcs of customers? 
17.1 Direct sale through own commercial structures 
17.2 Direct sales to shops through own commercial structures 
17.3 Direct sales to other firms 
17.4 Direct sales to the public administration 
17.5 Sale to wholesalers 
17.6 Production for other firms 
17.7 Other clients 
Total 
%. 
% 
% . 
% 
% • 
% 
% • 
100% 
What part of thc turnover of 1994 derived from products produced on order'! 
'---'-'-'-'''-__ ...:%''''"' of total turnover 
19 Percentage of the production of 1994 deriving from sub-supply agreements. 
_____ 'X_o-'Ioftotal turnover 
No 
20 Main competitors of the firm 
-So 
:i 
E 
:l 
:0 
" ::E 
:s 
.3 
Same province of the firm 
Same Region 
Other Italian regions 
EU 
Other industrialized countries 
Developing countries 
21 In the period 1992-1994, did the finn: 
21.1 buy patents or licenses from Italian firms? 
21.2 transfer patents or licenses to Italian firms? 
21.3 sign agreements for production with Italian finns? 
21.4 sign agreements for marketing and sales Italian firms? 
SECTION VI- FINANCE 
Risk capital 
22 lias the firm made use of participative loans since 1992'? 
Yes No 
§, 
:i 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
E 
:l 
:0 
" ::E 
:s 
.3 
Small firm 
Medium firms 
Large firms 
Multinationals 
No 
No 
No 
No 
22.1 Is the firm planning to use participative loans in the next three years? 
Yes 22.2 Reasons: 
No 22.3 Reasons: 
Financing for investments 
Firm restructuring 
Other 
The firm does not need risk capital 
The firm prefers other forms of fin. 
23 Have banl{!;, merchant banks or other financial institntions purchased shares of the firm 
since 1992 '! 
Yes No 
23.1 If Yes, in what percentage of the capitaP %1 
23.2 Is the firm planning to transfer capital shares to banks, merchant banks or other financial 
institution in the next three years? 
Yes 
Probably 
No 
24 Incentives 
23.3 Reasons: 
23.4 Reasons: 
Fiscal reductions 
Financing for investments 
Finn restructuring 
Other 
The firm does not need risk capital 
The lirm prefers other forms of 
financing 
24.1 In the period 1992-1994 did the linn receive financial incentives? 
Yes No 
24.2 If Yes, please indicate which type of incentives the firm received. 
A) Internal activities 
24.2.1 Law in favor ofSMEs 
24.2.l.l. L. 1329/65 
24.2.1.2. L.317/91 
24.2.1.3 Other laws in favor of SMEs 
24.2.2 L46/82 
24.2.3 L.64/86 
24.2.4 L. 1142/86 
..c 
bO 
:i 
E 
:l 
:0 
" ::E 
:s 
.3 
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24.2.5 L. 240/81 
24.2.6 L. 657/77 
24.2.7 Other 
8) External activity 
24.2.8 L227/77 
24.2.9 L. 49/87, art.5 
24.2.10 L. 394.81 
24.2.11 L.49/87, art. 7 
24.2.12 L. 100/90 
24.2.13 L. 304/90 
24.2.140thcr 
Financial Management 
25 Does the firm carry out iu a coutinuous and systematic way the financial management? 
Yes No 
25.1 If Yes, this is done through: 
Internal structures 
In tCl111ediaries 
25.2 The financial serviccs through intermediaries deal with: 
i'n 
::c 
E 
::l 
'5 
Q) 
::2 
;s 
.3 
Trcasury management in lire and foreign currency 
Administration 
Fidejussion 
Export finance 
Swaps, Future 
Project finance 
Other _______________ ~ 
25.3 Is the firm planning to devclop its linancial function? 
Yes No 
25.4 If Yes, this is going to be done through: 
Intemal structures 
Intermediaries 
- National 
- Foreign 
COllllJlercial debts and credits 
26 Please indicate the total number of suppliers in 1994 ---I 
26.1 Please indicate the % of suppliers from which the finn has purchased goods and services 
with commercial debts in 1994. 
a) Firms within the same group %/ 
b) Other Italian firms %1 
c) Other foreign tlnns %1 
26.2 What is the total amount of commercial debts the tirmmade in 1994? 
, a) Firms within the same group 
b) Other Italian tlrms 
c) Other foreign tlrms 
26.3 What is the average length of the commercial debts made in 1994? 
I a) Firms within the same group days 
, b) Other Italian firms days 
r c) Other foreign t1rms days 
26.4 In what percentage the suppliers that in 1994 granted an extension in the payment, offered 
a discount for payment in advance? 
a) Firms within the same group 1 %-, 
b) Other Italian firms 1 %l 
c) Other foreign firms 1 %l 
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26.5 What is the average monthly discount for payments in advance? 
a) Firms within the same group % monthly 
b) Other Italian t1rms % monthly 
c) Other foreign t1nlls '-____ O/~_mon th ly 
26.6 In 1994 what % of the commercial debts was paid by the firm after the agreed deadline and 
what was the average delay? 
%l a) Firms within the same group 
b) Other ltalian t1rms 
c) Other foreign t1rms 
days I 
%1 daysj 
%1 days 
26.7 During 1994 what percentage of the commercial debt, which was paid after the deadline, 
involved the payment of a penalty? 
F ~1 % a) Firms within the same group b) Other ltalian t1rms c) Other foreign t1rms 
26.8 How long after the deadline have the suppliers required the payment of the penalty? 
a) Firms within the same group days 
b) Other Italian t1rms days 
c) Other foreign t1rms days 
27 What is the total amount of commercial credits granted in 1994'? 
~ a) Firms within the same group b) Other Italian t1rms c) Other foreign firms 
27.1 What is the average discount granted for payments in advance? 
a) Firms within the same group % I 
b) Other Italian firms % 
c) Other foreign firms % 
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Section 1 
DEFINITIONS 
Product innovation: The introduction of a good or service which (for the firm) is new or substantially 
improved. 
Process innovation: The introduction of a new means of production which (for the firm) is new or 
substantially improved. 
**Please allSlVer 01111' to the questiolls that applv to I'our {irm** 
1. Nameof 
2, Sector of activity. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Position of person filling in the questionnaire ............................... . 
How long have you been in this position? ..................................... . 
How long have you been in the company? ................................................ . 
6. Number of employees 
7. Gross Turnover of the company 
1997 ........................... 1998 ............................... 1999 ..... . 
8. AI-e there majority shareholders who work actively and full time (or nearly) in the 
management of the finn? 
i. [ .. ] Yes [ .. ] No 
ii. If Yes, please answer only to questions n.8.1., 8.2., 8.3., 8.4., 9, 11,12, 14, 15, 19,21,22, 
23, 23a 0 23b, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 highlighted with two asterisks ** 
iii. If No, please go to question n.9 and then answer to all the questions, if applicable. 
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8.3.** List in order of percentage of equity the characteristics of those who have the 
highest number of shares in the I1rn} 
Subjects Type of 
shareholder 
Shareholder a 
Shareholder b 
Shareholder c 
Shareholder d 
Type of shareholder: 
I) Foreign individual or tirm 
2) Resident individual 
3) Private national linn cUiTying on 
industrial activity 
4) Public national linn cUiTying on 
industrial activity 
Percentage 
of shares 
5) Private or public lirm non-carrying on 
industrial activity 
6) National banks or other tinancial 
institutions 
7) Foreign banks or othcr t1nancial 
institutions 
Does he/she Does he/she 
have the direct have a vote 
control over the agreement with 
firm? other 
shareholders? 
yes no yes no 
yes no yes no 
yes no yes no 
yes no yes no 
8.b.**Is there a family relationship among those who actively control (havc shares and 
work) the linn? 
a) yes among all 
b) no 
c) only among a few of them 
8.c.**What kind of activity do the iiI'S! four shareholders (if individuals) perform in 
the firm? (ie, management, administration, sales, production, nnance, etc) 
c d--------------------------------------
8.d. **Can you foresee the entrance of new shareholders (not belonging to the family) 
in the next 5 years?, 
Yes [ .. ] 
No [ .. ] Please explain 
9. ** What priority was given to each of the following stakeholders in the company's 
corporate stl'ategy five years ago and what priority is your company giving to each of its 
stakeholder groups in its current corporate strategy? 
Stakeholdel' groups Time frame No High 
priority priority 
Shareholders Five years ago I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Labour unions Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Employees Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Customers Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dealers and distributors Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Society at large Fi ve years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Government & Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
governmental agencies 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Preferred suppliers Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Other (non-pre felTed) Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 Suppliers 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ecological pressure groups Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Providers of debt capital Five years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
At this moment 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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10. On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent are the non-executive directors on the board 
representatives of specific shareholders: 
None 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
All 
7 
11. ** Are any of the non-executive directors on the board, I'cpresentatives of some stakeholder 
such as banks, suppliers, customcrs, govcrnment, employees. 
No [ .. ] Yes Banks [ .. ] 
Suppliers [ .. ] 
Customers [.] 
Govcl11ment [ .. j 
Employees [ .. ] 
Other [ .. J 
Please speciEy 
12. ** How often docs the board of directors/supervisory board mec!'! 
13. How many timcs a year docs your company management hold a meeting, formal or 
informal, with your largest sharcholders or their representatives? [Do IIOt illclllde board meetillgs, 
evell those ill which directors represe/llillg specific shareholders are preselltJ 
a. Less than once a year 
b. Once a year 
c. Twice or three times a year 
d. Four or more times a year 
[ .. ] 
[.] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
14. ** How many times a year does yonI' company management hold a meeting, formal or 
informal, with the following stakeholders? 
Less than once 
a year 
Once a year 
Twice or three 
times a year 
Four or more 
times a year 
Banks Suppliers Customers Government Unions 
15. ** How often do others in your company, besides the chief executive and finance director, 
participate in the meetings with shareholders? 
a.R&D 
director 
b. Leading 
scientists 
and 
technologists 
of the firm 
c. Other, 
please 
specify 
Never 
participates 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
6 
6 
6 
Participates 
in all 
7 
7 
7 
16. To what extent do the (a) largest shareholders and (b) average shareholders of your 
company have an in-depth understanding of the general situation and the key technologies of the 
industry'? 
Has/had no 
understanding 
a. The general situation: prol1tability, capacity utilisation and market trends 
I. Largest 
shareholder now 
Largest 
shareholder 5 
2. 
years ago 
3. Average 
shareholder now 
4. Average 
shareholder 5 
years ago 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
b. The nature of the key technologies and the way they arc developing 
l. Largest shareholder 2 3 4 5 
now 
2. Largest shareholder 2 3 4 5 5 years ago 
3. Average 2 3 4 5 
shareholder now 
4. Average 
shareholder 5 years 2 3 4 5 
ago 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Have/had full 
understanding 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
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17. On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent do the largest shareholders and average shareholders of your company have an in-depth understanding of the following matters, and to what 
extent did they understand these matters live years ago 
Have/had no understanding Have/had fllllllnderstanding 
a. The company's financial and competitive position, and corporate strategy 
I. Largest shareholder now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Largest shareholder 5 years ago I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Average shareholder now 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Average shareholder 5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. The company's short-term technology strategy, including products due for launch within the next two years 
I. Largest shareholder now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Largest shareholder 5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Average shareholder now 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Average shareholder 5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The company's longer-term technology strategy, including products more than two years from launch 
I. Largest shareholder now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Largest shareholder 5 years ago I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Average shareholder now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Average shareholder 5 years ago I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. The quality and competence of the current top management team 
I. Largest shareholder now 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Largest shareholder 5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Average shareholder now 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Average shareholder 5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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18. Does 'Insider-Dealing' [or otherllegislation represent a real obstacle in explaining to 
shareholders the work on innovation taking place in your company? 
Represents Represents 
no real 
obstacle at obstacle 
all 
l.Largest I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
shareholder 
2. Average 2 3 4 5 6 7 
shareholder 
19. ** Is your main priority to maximise shareholder value, if nccessary at the expense of the 
intercsts of other stakeholders? 
We always insist We give 
on balancing the cOlllplete 
interests of priority to 
shareholders with shareholders' 
those of other interests 
stakeholders 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
20. How far does the need for secrecy represent a real obstacle in explaining to shareholders the 
work on product innovation taking place in your company? 
Represents no 
obstacle at all 
2 3 4 5 6 
Represents a 
real obstacle 
7 
21. ** To what extent are the main shareholders of your linn active in the following areas, and 
how was the situation in these respects 5 years ago'! 
Show no 
interest 
a. Influencing general strategy (incl. major mergers and acquisitions) 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 
5 years ago I 2 3 4 5 6 
h. Influencing the remuneration system of top management 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 
5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 
c. Influencing the selection of top management 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 
5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 
Routinely insists on full 
explanation ami expects 
the last word on the 
matter 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
22. ** How far would you agree that the following statement is true for your IIrm: "The nature 
of the relationship with shareholders leads to less resources going to prodnct innovation than 
would be optimal for long-tenn shareholder value'? " 
Strongly Strongly 
disagree agree 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
23. ** In the last three years, has your company carried out a major restructuring operation 
which involved dismissing a substantial number of employees'? 
[ .. I Yes 
[ .. ] No "'" ~II"" 
Please answer question 23a 
Please answer question nb 
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23a. ** In carrying out the restructuring operation, what was the influence of the following 
considerations on the str'ategy yon followed at that time? 
23b.** If it seemed to the top management that the firm could gain in profit over the next three 
years by a strategy which involved dismissing a substantial nnmbel' of employees, which of the 
following considerations would weigh against this, and how strongly? 
Did/would Did/would 
not have any have a 
influence major 
inllnence 
Problems of conscience: inner 
feeling ofresponsibility to the 2 3 4 5 6 7 
employees 
Social position in the local 
community would make it 2 3 4 5 6 7 
difficult 
Would throwaway skills 
which are likely to be valuable 2 3 4 5 6 7 
and thus in the long run might 
be self-defeating 
Would damage the co-
operative relationship between 
employees and management 2 3 4 5 6 7 
and in the long run be self 
defeating 
The union would react by a 
damaging strike or other 2 3 4 5 6 7 
industrial action 
The workers would obstruct it 
by using their powers under 2 3 4 5 6 7 
co-determination 
Effectively blocked by our 
legal obligations to the 2 3 4 5 6 7 
workforce 
Financial interests of 2 3 
shareholders 
4 5 6 7 
Credibility towards providers 2 3 
of debt (banks) 4 5 6 7 
24.** What percentage of your expenditure 101' innovation was financed lIsing the following 
sources'? 
l. Equity capital (... ..) 
2. Self financing ( ....... ) 
3. Medium or long-term bank loan ( ......... ) 
4. Finaincing with a lower than the market interest rate ( ......... ) 
5. National programmes of support ( ......... ) 
6. European programmes of support ( .......... ) 
7. Regional programmes of support ( ............ ) 
8. Fiscal reductions ( ......... ) 
9. Customers ( ....... ) 
10. Other ( ... 
25.**Ifyonr finn does not utilize bank loans to finance innovation expenditnres, please explain 
why: 
I. We do not need extemal sources of finance 
2. The interest rate is too high 
3. We should have provided excessive collateral 
4. 
26.**ln a scale 1 to 7, what is in your opinion the understanding of banks of you I' market and of 
the technology employed in you products'? 
None 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
'cry high 
7 
27.**111 a scale 1 to 7, holV do you define your relationship with the suppliers (not of CNC),? 
Close Loose 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
,ong-term 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
hort-term 
7 
28. ** In a scale 1 to 7, how do you deHne your relationship with the suppliers of eN C? 
Close Loose 
1 2 3 456 7 
"ong-tenn 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
,hort-term 
7 
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29.** In a scale 1 to 7, how do you define YOllr relationship with the cllstomers? 
Close 
I 
.ong-term 
I 
2 3 
2 3 
4 5 6 
4 5 6 
Loose 
7 
,llOrt-term 
7 
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Section 2 
DEFINITIONS 
I'roduct innovation: The introduction of a good or service which (for the finn) is new or substantially 
improved. 
Process innovation: The introduction of a new means of production which (for the firm) is new or 
substantially improved. 
**Please allswer olliv the questiolls that appll' to "our firm ** 
1. Name of 
2. Sector of activity ................................. . 
3. 
4. 
Position of person filling in the questionnaire .................................................... . 
How long have you been in this position? ............................................................ . 
5. How long have you been in the company? ................................................... .. 
6. Approximate number of employees working on Research and Development more than 50";', 
of their time ................................... . 
7. R&D expenditure 
1997 ................................ 1998 ................................ 1999 ................. .. 
8. On a scale of 1 to 7, indicate the importance of different typcs of expenditnre 011 product 
il/llovatiol/ in previous 12 months 
A major element 
None of product 
innovation 
expcnditure 
a) Research 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b) Dev. & 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Design 
c) Marketing & 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sales 
d) Training 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e) Fixed capital 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. On a scale of 1 to 7, indicate to what cxtent is the rcsearch and devclopment work for your 
prodllct innovations donc in-housc'? (Joint ventures should be put in the middle of the scalc.) 
All the R&D 
work for product 
innovation is 
done ontside the 
firm 
2 3 4 5 6 
We rely 
entirely on 
in-house 
activities on 
in-house 
activities 
7 
10. How many R&D units or laboratories docs your company havc? Iryou only have onc please 
go to question 
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11. On a scale of 1 to 7 mark the present and ideal level of interaction among the different R&D 
units of your company. 
None Very 
High 
Present level 2 3 4 5 6 7 
of interaction 
Ideal level of 2 3 4 5 6 7 interaction 
12. On a scale of 1 to 7 what is the degree of interaction between the following different 
functions in I'elation to product innovation; and what should it ideally be in such a business 
as yours? (please tick 'Not Applicable' if your firm is not structured in this way) 
Not None Very 
applicable high 
1. Between Marketing e R&S 
Present level [ ... ] 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ideal level 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Between Production & R&S 
Present level [ ... ] 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ideal level 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Between Research & Development (if separate) 
Present level [ ... ] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ideal level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Among different product divisions 
Present level [ ... ] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ideal level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Among different geographical divisions 
Present level [ ... ] I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ideal level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. On a scale of 1 to 7 what is the degree of interaction with the following in relation to 
product innovation; and what should it ideally be in such a business as yours? (For 
customers we are not concerned with retailers, wholesalers or households; where these are 
the only important customers please tick Not Applicable.) 
Not None Vcry 
applicable high 
1. Finn and its customers 
Present level [ .. ] 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ideal level 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Firm and its suppliers 
Present level [ .. ] 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ideal level 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Firm and its competitors 
Present level [ .. ] 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ideal level 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If at b) (relationship with the suppliers) you answered 1,2 or 3, this is because: 
a) Secrecy is too important and therefore we only buy very simple parts from our suppliers. 
b) We lind difficulties in trusting them. 
c) They do not do research. 
d) 
On average, how much time docs it take to bring a product innovation to market - from initial 
conception to launch'? 
Incremental change in existing product 
Clearly new 
14. Considering the long-term interests of shareholders, how far would you agree with the 
following statement: "Not enough time and money is put into product innovation"'? 
Thoroughly 
disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Thoroughly 
agree 
7 
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IS.a. Ifyoul' answcr to question 16 is 5, 6 or 7, is this beCllllsc: 
a. These projects wil! not pay back soon enough [ .. J 
b. The targeUhurdle rate of return is set too high [ .. J 
c. There is not enough funding/staff for exploratory 1V0rk [ .. J 
d. There is not enough funding for R&D overall 
e. There is not enough funding put into launching new [ .. J 
products and building up their market share [ .. J 
f. There are a number of different divisions or profit centres 
which 1V0uid have to co-operate and are unwilling to do [ .. J 
so. 
g. Other, please specify ................................. . 
[ .. J 
16. How has the use and importance of financial performance criteria in the selection and 
continuation of product innovation projects changed in the last 5 years? 
Diminished 
substantially 
I 
Diminished 
2 
No change 
3 
Gone up 
4 
Gone up 
substantially 
5 
17. Which of the following do you count on to protect your product innovations 
from competitors? Please indicate their importance now and five years ago. 
Not Very 
used/negligible important 
1. Patents on products 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
2. Patents on processes 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
3. Copyright 
Now 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
4. Your firm's specific knowledge and expertise 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
I 
5. COlllplelllentary assets (eg: capital investment, distribution lIetwork, brand image) 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
6, Secrecy 
Now 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
7. Long-term contracts 
Now I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years ago 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8, Other, please specify 
Noll' I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 years I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ago 
18. What pel'centage of your tUl'llover is fl'OlII (lJ'Oducts innovated in the last thl'ce 
19. 
years? ........ .... D/t) 
On a scale from t to 7, to what extcnt do you consider product iunovation in your industry 
to be more or less radical compared to nve years ago'? 
Substantially less 
radical 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
Substanthllly 
1II0re radical 
7 
I 20. On a scale from 1 to 7, to what extent do you cOllsider product innovation in your jirlll to 
be more or less radical relative to (a) that of other national linllS; (b) linlls abroad in your 
industry? 
Much Much 
less mOl'c 
radical radical 
National finns 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Firms abroad 2 3 <1 5 6 7 
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21. If your finn is working with radically new technologies what is their main source? (lick 
more Ihall Olle ijappropriale) 
These technologies are developed in- house 
These technologies are developed jointly with academic institutions 
These technologies are developed in collaboration with other firms: 
Suppliers 
Rivals 
Customers 
Others ................................. . 
These technologies are brought in through mergers and acquisitions 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
22. Is your finn working on leading-edge technologies that are unlikely to affect market share 
in the next 5 years? 
Is working on these technologies 
Is working on them but makes sure that they are a very 
smal1 proportion of the overall assets (activities) of the 
firm 
We are making a substantial commitment in 
collaboration with other firms 
We are making a substantial commitment on our own 
Other, please specify ................................................ . 
23. Have you ever received public funding for innovation? 
I) No, we have never asked for it. 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
2) No, we would have like to apply but the burocratic procedures are too long. 
3) No, we apply for it but we never received any. 
4) Yes, but rarely. 
5) Yes, very often. 
6) Other, please 
L-------------------------------------------------------~'257 
Section 3 
DEFINITIONS 
Product innovation: The introduction of a good or service which (for the finn) is new or substantially 
improved. 
Process innovation: The introduction of a new means of production which (for the firm) is new or 
substantially improved. 
** Please (lIIslI'er 011/1' the qllestiolls that appll' to FOllr firm *'k 
1. Name of 
2. Sector of activity 
3. Position of person filling in the questionnaire ............................................... . 
4. How long have you been in this position? ........................................................ . 
5. How long have you been in the company'!. ...................................................... . 
6, What is the number of employees in your compauy (give full time and part time if 
possible) 
... (full time) 
(part time) 
7, Does your company currently have systems for relating pay to the financial 
performance of the compan)' for following sections of the workforce and did it have sitch 
measures 5 years ago? 
Yes No 
Top management 
NolV [ .. ] [ .. ] 
5 years ago [ .. ] [ .. ] 
Middlc managemcnt 
Now [ .. ] [ .. ] 
5 years ago [ .. ] [ .. ] 
Key Innovation workers(eg: scientists, senior programmers in IT) 
NolV [ .. ] [ .. ] 
5 years ago [ .. ] [ .. ] 
All the workforce 
Now 
5 years ago 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
8. 'Vhat is the average percentage of the total wage that is variable for the following 
categories of employees now and five ),ears ago? 
Top management 
Now 
5 years ago 
Middle management 
Now 
.... % 
..... %1 
.... % 
5 years ago ..... % 
Key Innovation workers (eg: scicntists, senior programmers in IT) 
Now ..... % 
5 years ago 
All the workforce 
Oggi 
5 anni fa 
9. Docs yonI' compan)' have a system of share options? 
[ .. ] Yes [ .. ] No 
If the answer is NO, please go to question 10. 
% 
.. % 
.. 0/0 
2SSL1 ----------------------------------------------------~ 
9.a. Has your company introduced share options to remuncrate the following sections 
of the workforce and did it have such measures 5 years ago? 
Yes No 
Top management 
Now [ .. ] [ .. ] 
5 years ago [ .. ] [ .. ] 
Middle management 
Now [ .. ] [ .. ] 
5 years ago [ .. ] [ .. ] 
Key Innovation workers(eg: scientists, senior programmers in IT) 
Now . [ .. ] [ .. ] 
5 years ago [ .. ] [ .. ] 
All the workforce 
Now 
5 years ago 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
10. Are there any incentives for the following employees to come up with innovative 
suggestions? 
Production 
Sales and marketing 
Yes 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ] 
No 
[ .. ] 
[ .. ) 
11. How many years docs the average employee in the following categorics stay with the 
finn? 
0-2 2-5 5-10 More than 10 
a. Senior [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] 
management 
b. Research, develoPlllent and design/IT development 
Graduate scientists and [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] 
technologists 
Technicians/non- [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] graduate programmers 
c. Production 
Graduate engineers [.] [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. J 
and technologists 
Technicians/ manual [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] [.] 
workers 
Direct production [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] 
operatives 
d. Sales, marketing and after-sales service 
Sales and marketing [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] [.] 
managers 
Sales representatives f .. ] [··1 [ .. ] [ .. 1 
Service engineers [ .. ] [ .. ] [ .. ] [.] 
L-____________________________________________________ ~1259~1 ------------------------------------------------------~ 
12. For the following categories of employees to what extent are their skills specific to the 
firm or relevant throughout the industry? 
Totally Relevant 
specific throughout 
to the the 
firm industry 
a. Senior 2 3 4 5 6 7 
management 
h. Research, development and design/IT development 
Graduate scientists 2 3 
and technologists 
4 5 6 7 
Teclmicians/non-
graduate 2 3 4 5 6 7 
programmers 
c. l'roduction 
Graduate engineers 2 3 
and technologists 
4 5 6 7 
Technicians/ 2 3 
manual workers 
4 5 6 7 
Direct production 2 3 
operatives 
4 5 6 7 
d. Sales, marketing and after-sales service 
Sales and 
marketing 2 3 4 5 6 7 
managers 
Sales 2 3 
representatives 
4 5 6 7 
Service engineers 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. How much do you spend on all kinds of training as a percentage of 
turnover? ...................... o/u 
14. What percentage of the workforce belongs to a union? ........... . 
I 
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15. Do you have any form of employee representation beyond what the law provides? 
[ .. ] Yes [ .. ] No 
If Yes, please specify 
16. Do the unions or other forms of representation have any role in the decision-making 
process'? 
[ .. ] Yes [ .. ] No 
If Yes, please soecllV .. 
17. With respect to (1) Product Innovation (2) Change in processes, how would you 
describe the attitude of manual production employees on the following scale 
Deliberately Thoroughly 
obstruct change co-operative 
attitude 
Product 2 3 4 5 6 7 innovation 
Process 2 3 4 5 6 7 
innovation 
18. 'Vhat arc the trends of employment in the finn fur the following categories of 
employees'? 
Employment is There is no Employment is 
falling by more change rising by more 
than I O'Yo per than 10% per 
year year 
Middle I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
management 
Key 2 3 4 5 6 7 
innovation 
workers 
All the 2 3 4 5 6 7 
workforce 
19. In a scale from 1 to 7, what is the role of the education system iu preparing the 
students to work in this sector? 
NOlie. The prcpation 
of the studcnts is too 
general and training 
takes place mainly 
within the firm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very good. 
The 
students are 
very 
qllalified 
7 
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Section 4 
DEFINITIONS 
Product innovation: The introduction of a good or service which (for the firm) is new or substantially 
improved. 
Process innovation: The introduction of a new means of production which (for the firm) is new or 
substantially improved. 
** Please aI/sIVer ol/Iv the qllestiolls that applv to )lollr firm ** 
1. Name of Company ..................................................... . 
2. Nationality of Company ...................................... . 
3. Name of parent company .................................. .. 
4. Nationality of parent company ...................... .. 
5. Sector of activity .................................................... . 
6. Position of person filling in the questionnaire ................................ . 
7. 
8. 
9. 
How long have you been in this position? ................................................ . 
How long have you been in the group'? .................. .. 
And in the subsidiary'! ...................................................................... .. 
10. Number of employees of this subsidiary ............ .. 
11. Gross Turnover of this subsidial'y 
1997 .......................... 1998 ............................ 1999 .......................... . 
12. What proportion of this tUl'llover is sold within the group to which you belong? 
13. Is your parent company's shareholding in your company 100";'" or less? 
100% [ .. ] Less than 100% ....... % 
14. As a profit centre docs your company report directly to headquarters, or is there an 
intermediate level to which you report - i.e. arc you a subsidiary of a subsidiary? 
We report directly to HQ [ .. ] We report to an intermediate level [ .. ] 
Relationship with the HQ 
15. How many times per year are there face-to-face meetings between the headquarters 
and the management of your company'? .. 
16. How many times per year arc there face-to-face meetings between the intermediate 
level and the management of your company? .... 
17. On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent would you describe the activity of your profit centre 
as part of the core activities of the group'? 
Totally 
peripheral 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
Right at 
the core 
7 
18. What is the degree of autonomy of the subsidiary fl'om the Headquarters in the 
following functions, and what was it live years ago'? 
Entirely The company 
provided by raises its funds 
the parent independently 
7 
Finance* 2 3 4 5 6 
Entirely Independent 
calTied out function of the 
by company 
headquarters 
Marketing 
& Sales 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Entirely Independent 
can'ied out function of the 
by company 
headquarters 
R&S 2 3 4 5 6 7 
*Degree of freedom to finance activities or to find funding for projects. 
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19. If the subsidiary has its own R&D department or unit, what is the percentage of R&D 
directly financed by Headqnarters, and what was it five years ago? 
Financed NOW ....... ,' Financed five years ago",,"" 
20, If some R&D for the subsidiary is (or can be) carried out by the central R&D department, 
to what extent does the subsidiary have to pay for this and does it have discretion to decide 
how much is done for it; and what was the situation five years ago'? 
Docs not 
have to pay 
2 3 
Has no 
discretion 
2 3 
4 5 6 
4 5 6 
Has 
to pay 
all 
7 
It is 
free 
to 
decide 
7 
21. 
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The following list contains performance measures, Please indicate for each measure how 
important it is in Headquarters' tinal evaluation of the ove/'all perfonnance of your 
subsidiary. The following list contains performance measures. Please indicate for each 
measure how important it is in Headquarters' final evaluntion of the overall performance of 
your subsidiary. 
Totally Of decisive 
unimportant importance 
1. Production efficiency 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Changes in net profit 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Employee satisfaction 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Market share 2 3 4 5 6 7 
S. Adherence to cost 
estimates 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Time to market of new 
products 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Economic value added (eg. 
EVA, CFROl) 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Ability to rapidly renew 
products and processes 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Net profit (corporate 
overhead included) 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Active support for 
corporate strategy 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. QUality of final products 
and services 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Adherence to the budget 
line items 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Return on Investment 
(ROJ) or on (Net) Assets 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(ROA) 
14. Customer satisfaction 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. On a scale of I to 7, how tight do you perceive the financial control from 
Headquarters, in tcrms of how they respond to a failure to meet financial targets; 
how tight do you think financial control from Headquarters shollid be'? 
1. How tight 
do you 
perceive 
financial 
conlt'ol 
today? 
2. How tight 
do you think 
financial 
control 
should be? 
Vcry loose 
(any 
excuse 
will do) 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
5 6 
5 6 
Very 
strict (no 
excuscs) 
7 
7 
23. On a scale of I to 7, how tight do you pcrceive the non-financial control from 
Headquarters, in terms of how they respond to a failure to mcet financial targets; 
how tight do you think non- financial control from Headquarters shollid be'? 
1. How tight 
do you 
Very loose 
(anyexcnse 
will do) 
perceive non-
financial 
control 
today? 
2. How tight 
do you think 
non-financial 
control 
shollid be? 
2 3 
2 3 
4 5 
4 5 
6 
6 
Vcry 
strict (no 
excuses) 
7 
7 
24. To what cxtent do thc following tcnd to reduce your subsidiary's expenditure of 
lIloncy and labour on product innovation; to what extent did they reduce it nyC years 
ago? 
No Reduce 
clIect/not very 
relcvant sevcrely 
I. Tightness of 
financial 2 3 4 5 6 7 
targets 
2. Remuneration 
by profit 2 3 4 5 6 7 
centre results 
3. Lack of 
centrc's 
attention 
to/understand 
ing of the 2 3 4 5 6 7 
underlying 
non-t1l1ancial 
performance 
ofthc 
company 
4. Difficulty of 
getting 
funding for 2 3 4 5 6 7 
product 
innovation 
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Appendix 3. Regional map of Italy 
Trentino Alto Adige 
Lombardia 
Piemont 
Liguria 
Tosc.ana 
Umbria 
lazio. 
Emilia Romagna 
Marche 
Basi Hcata 
S.icJlia 
265 
Appendix 4. The Swedish system of corporate governance 
A3.1 Ownership, control, and the most recent developments 
The Swedish and the Italian systems of corporate governance differ in several 
respects but present also a few similarities. They are both insider systems even 
though the Swedish is much closer to the outsider end of the continuum than the 
Italian one. Both systems are characterised by a high concentration of ownership and 
control of listed firms in the hands of a few families, even though the percentage of 
ownership in the hands of individuals has in Sweden progressively decreased since 
the 1970s (See Table A3.1). This, however, has not reduced the concentration of 
control as the widespread use of dual class shares! allows keeping control with a 
small percentage of shares. 
Table A3.1 Ownership of quoted shares 1983-1994. Per cent 
Insurance Mutual NP-
companies funds funds 
1983 11 5 2 
1986 14 6 5 
1989 15 10 5 
1991 15 9 6 
1992 15 9 6 
1993 13 10 4 
1994 13 10 4 
1995 13 9 4 
1. PublIc sector, banks, foundatIons. 
Source: OEeD (1997b). 
Investment Non-financial 
companies 
enterprises 
16 16 
13 17 
8 20 
11 22 
10 20 
7 17 
6 12 
7 9 
Other Foreign Individuals domestic 
owners! owners 
30 12 8 
25 13 8 
20 15 7 
18 13 8 
16 12 12 
17 12 21 
17 12 28 
15 12 30 
As a consequence of the concentration of ownership (or at least of the shares 
with voting power), as much as in Italy, the market for corporate control in Sweden 
is to a large extent located outside the ordinary stock market. The stock exchange in 
Sweden is however much more liquid and developed than the Italian one and the 
percentage of shares in the hands of financial institutions is much higher than in 
Italy. Since the 1970s there has been an emergence of investment companies which, 
apart from operating as venture capitalists, tend to establish strategic long-term 
minority positions in a few publicly-traded operating companies and to play an active 
1 Swedish corporations can issue shares with different voting rights with a maximum ratio of 10: 1 
between A-class and B-class shares. 
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role in the corporate governance of these firms. Their importance has however 
decreased during the 1990s, with the penetration of foreign investors. 
Public ownership of business sector companies has never been extensive in 
Sweden and during the 1990s the process of privatisation has further reduced this 
presence. 
As for the role played by banks, we need to go back to the fall of the 
Kreuger's empire in 1932, when several banks were heavily damaged. In that 
occasion, the Company Act and bank legislation were reformed. Since then banks 
have no longer been allowed to own shares except to protect bad debts and for a 
limited period. Nevertheless some of them set up investment companies, transferred 
their industrial shares to those holding companies and offered to their own 
shareholders the shares of the investment companies. In addition, the industrial firms, 
whose shares were in large part in the hands of the investment companies, were also 
customers of the banks. During this period the so-called "bank spheres" were also 
established. They are characterised by managerial cooperation, mutual membership 
in Boards of Directors and support in internationalisation effort, resembling in this 
way the German model. Within the spheres, "banks provided financial problem 
solving and to a considerable extent, industrial leadership, with a long-term 
perspective" (Adolfsson et aI., 1999). 
Like Italy, Sweden is dualistic in terms of firms' SIze, with very few large 
firms, and a large number of small firms (See Figure A3.1). 
Figure A3.1 Share of enterprises, by enterprise size (number of employees) 
80,00% 
70,00% 
60,00% 
50,00% 
40,00% 
30,00% 
20,00% 
1 0,00% ~!!!I.~.:J!l~!!!!!l=~~!!!!~~~!!!'!l!Z!s~r 0,00%,-1=""'---'''''- "'" 
0-4 5-19 20-199 200-1999 >2000 
Number of employees 
Source: OEeD (1997b). 
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Small firms present in Sweden the same financial problems as they do in 
Italy. This is for several reasons. Firstly, the close link between the trade union 
movement (see below) and the Social Democratic party, the governing party for most 
of the post-war period, ensured that the results of the collective bargaining of the 
confederations of employers and employees often translated into national acts or 
regulations, leaving small companies little discretion as to contractual and work-time 
regulations. Secondly, industrial policy in Sweden has always supported large 
enterprises. For example, competition policy focused on promoting economies of 
scale and the tax system, capital market regulations and the foreign direct investment 
regime have combined to favour large capital-intensive enterprises (OECD, 1997b). 
Thirdly, before the financial market deregulations (completed in 1989), credit was 
allocated to areas of high political priority, such as housing finance. Consumer credit 
and lending for business finance was restricted in order to maintain overall credit 
growth within ceilings considered consistent with macroeconomic objectives. The 
allocation of loans under credit rationing favoured established entities, generally 
larger companies, as these had a long-standing relationship with financial institutions 
("spheres") and were able to furnish collateral for loans granted. In addition, the cost 
of funds for medium- small firms has always been much higher than that of large 
firms due to the higher risk they embody (the bankrupt rates are much higher among 
small-medium firms than among larger onesi (See Figure A3.2). 
Figure A3.2 Cost of funds, per cent 
8~--------------------------------------
7+---------------------~~~~--~-----
6+-----------------~.r~~----~~~~~--
4+------=~-~~----------------------~ 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Source: OEeD (1997b). 
-II- Enterprises with less than 19 
employees 
Enterprises with 20 to 49 
employees 
--+- Enterprises with 50 to 199 
employees 
--Enterprises with more than 200 
employees 
2 Since the mid-1980s, several public programmes have been directed towards small and medium-
sized enterprises, due to the failure of the capital market to make adequate financial provisions for this 
segment of the economy. Now Sweden offers a wide range of support with respect to investment, 
exports, technology, R&D, management and education, consultancies and environment issues. Overall 
there exist 140 types of subsidies with an additional 110 available from the EU. 
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The low availability of funds for SMEs is reflected in the difficulty that small 
firms display in reaching a larger dimension3 and a high level of R&D spending. In 
1994, 85% of the total private R&D spending was undertaken by companies with 
more than 500 employees, thanks to the ability of large firms to appropriate the 
benefits of R&D expenditures through economies of scale. 
The strong development undergone by the venture capital market in the last 
few years might change this situation. In fact, the Swedish venture capital market 
now ranks third in the world when it comes to investments, after the US and UK. The 
amount invested by VC- firms in 1999 was over 11 billion SEK, representing 0,57% 
of the GDP, which is about double the European average. Sweden is also the leader 
in investing in start up companies, with 58% of all investments going to the early 
stages of activity. As for the sectors that have attracted most of the investments, the 
leading industry is telecom (followed by computer and electronics) if the number of 
investments is considered, and industry products and services, if the amount invested 
is considered (SWCA, 2000). 
Figure A3.3 R&D expenditure by financial sources. Per cent ofGDP.1994 
3,5 ~------------------------------------------, 
3 +---------------------------------------
2,5 +-------------==----==--i::J--
2+---------;--r-
1,5 +------cJ--
1 
0,5 
o ~~-.~~~~.-~~~~~~.-~~~~~~~ 
Source: OEeD (l997b). 
o Other 
iI Government expenditure 
o Private Expenditure 
In comparison with the other countries, Sweden presents a very high intensity 
of R&D relative to GDP. As it can be seen in Figure A3.3, in 1994 Sweden spent in 
R&D, 3.3% ofGDP. In the same year, the average of the OEeD countries was 2.3% 
and the percentage spent by the US was 2.5%. The private business sector accounts 
3 The survival rate of new firms after three years is only 66%, after 5 years 60% and after 10 years 
40%. However, the average employment of 10-years old firms is only 3 people. 
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for the largest part (71.7%), whereas the level of R&D expenditures by the 
government is much lower, accounting for less than 30% of total expenditures. 
Notwithstanding the high intensity of R&D expenditure, a very low share of 
the activities of Swedish firms are high-tech with some notable exceptions such as 
motor vehicle and instruments production. Sweden and Italy are at the opposite ends 
of the scale with regard to R&D expenditure relative to GDP. However, the share of 
manufacturing value added by industry is rather similar in the two countries with 
more than 50% of the value added being produced by low-tech activities and less 
than 20% produced by high-tech activities (See Table A3. 2). 
Table A3. 2 Share of manufacturing value added by industry (1993) 
Sweden USA Japan Gennany France Italy UK Canada OECD 
High tech 16.8 24 21.4 20.1 18.6 13.7 2; 12.3 20.6 
Medium- 29.7 30.3 34.3 33.9 27.8 23.7 30.4 34.7 
tech 30.9 
Low-tech 53.5 45.7 44.3 46 53.6 62.6 47.6 53 48.5 
Source: OECD (1997b). 
A3. 2 The Swedish model 
"Broadly conceived, the Swedish model comprised not only a structure of 
union-management relations but also a pattern of economic and social policy" 
(Locke et aI., 1995, p.263). In the beginning of the 1900s in fact, state, capital and 
labour formed a coalition that in less than a century was to bring Sweden among the 
most advanced economies in the world. 
The Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Swedish 
Employers' Confederation (SAF) were formed respectively in 1898 and 1902. That 
period was characterised by a very high frequency of strikes and lockouts. However, 
the threat that disputes within the labour market could end up m the mutual 
extinction was very real and both parties recognised each other as negotiating 
partners for the sake of self-preservation. The first agreements granted the employers 
the management of labour organisation, pay and control system within companies 
and the unions the administration of all the issues concerning working hours, pay and 
insurance, and problems of an overall character. Since the establishment of such 
coalition, the unions have always been very supportive of technical advances and 
efficiency measures as these are considered as instruments creating opportunities to 
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improve profits in trade and industry, which also benefited workers in the form of 
increased wages and higher living standards. In 1938, the Saltsjobaden Agreement 
was signed. This gave the State the duty of taking responsibility for unemployment, 
and SAF and LO the opportunity to spend their energies in maintaining efficient and 
friction free production. This agreement increased the degree of collaboration 
between capital and labour and the respect of what was called the collective wage 
agreement. The latter ensured that even in industries exposed to heavy competition or 
where profits were poor, the employees were to have the same wage increase as 
successful industries. This had immense effects on the Swedish economy as the least 
efficient enterprises were rapidly eliminated from the market, and only the best, more 
innovative and efficient ones were left. 
During the 1960s, the negative side of the Swedish model, namely the 
extensive use of Taylorism (the fragmentation of work into simple, narrowly defined, 
closely controlled tasks, readily performed by highly interchangeable workers) 
caused a progressive reduction in the degree of collaboration between capital and 
labour. Several strikes broke out. During the 1970s, the unions obtained from the 
Social Democratic Party the approval of a series of measures that would have 
improved the working conditions on the shop floor, the most famous ones being the 
Co-determination Act of 19764 and the one that instituted the Employee Investment 
Funds. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden underwent a major economic crisis 
and the state made profound cuts in the social welfare system. According to several 
authors this has destroyed the so-called Swedish model. Persson (1997, p.131), 
however, argues that the Swedish model is just entering a new phase. It is worth 
reporting his words. "1 believe that making such a claim is a great exaggeration: in 
Swedish working life there exists a consensus which remains deeply rooted at all 
levels of Swedish society, whatever the reductions in the social safety-net. [ .. J Today, 
there is greater interest from the management of companies in introducing various 
types of Management By Objectives (MBO), combined with a greater element of 
individual wage setting. Often ideas from other countries are adopted. There has 
been interest in the steel industry in investigating the high degree of effectiveness to 
be found in mini-mills, at which, many writers claim, trust and commitment between 
4 The law granted the Unions the right to negotiate agreements extending joint determination to any 
workplace issues, including hiring and firing, work assignment and disciplinary matters. 
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management and labour also prevail. The basic feeling still exists in Sweden that 
decisions should largely be taken in agreement, even if management achieves its 
objectives in the end. This feeling creates an interest in organisational models 
involving trust and commitment". 
There is now a certain amount of room for individual responsibility and that 
gives the worker a feeling of confidence. Employees know that the Swedish model 
has made it impossible for employees to be fired without a reason and that even if 
they were to be made redundant, the system of social security would ensure that they 
would not fare too badly. Therefore they dare to take responsibility, make mistakes, 
discuss and cooperate with the company management with no fear (Persson, 1997). 
A3.3. The relationship with other stakeholders 
The major Swedish firms have always developed their strength from an early 
customer orientation, which often took the form of cooperation. For example 
companies like ASEA in electricity and Ericsson in telephones cooperated closely 
with the state authorities in charge of these areas in order to solve problems, increase 
the technological level and find new solutions. There is also a strong tendency to co-
operate with industrial customers in general and a limited focus on consumer goods, 
with the exception of IKEA, the do-it-yourself furniture company (Adolfsson et aI, 
1999). 
Conclusions 
The Swedish system of corporate governance is rather similar to the Italian 
one even if the Swedish system is shifting at a much faster speed towards the 
outsider model. Both systems appear to have a good degree of firm specific 
perceptiveness of those who finance innovation. However, the higher liquidity and 
development of the Swedish stock exchange makes it more likely that at least among 
the listed firms the number of outsider shareholders is much higher in Sweden than 
in Italy. This is very important if one remembers that large firms account for the 
largest part of R&D carried out in the country. At the same time, large firms also 
belong to the bank spheres, which appear to have a very high degree of firm- specific 
perceptiveness. 
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The role played by small firms in innovation is basically non-existent but the 
strong support that these firms have been obtaining in the last few years and the 
recent development of the venture capital market might change the situation in the 
near future. 
The degree of industry specific expertise appears higher than the Italian one 
due to the much stronger development of the venture and private capital markets and 
their investments in this type of expertise. 
The degree of inclusion of customers, suppliers and employees appears very 
high. Employees, in particular, seem to have many more incentives than in Italy to 
invest in firm-specific skills and to actively contribute to the innovation process. In 
fact, in Italy, job protection is not accompanied by a degree of delegation of 
responsibilities as high as in Sweden and the employees do not have many incentives 
in investing in their own skills and in actively participating in the innovation process. 
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